Merge phase 2: pure graph model + taint engine
Impl-plan §4/Phase 2, design v3.4 §6.1-§6.1.3. Pure engine (evaluate(&GraphSnapshot,&ExclusionCtx,&StickyState)->(Decisions,StickyState)), never linked against libpipewire; fed by the phase-3 observer to come. Six adversarial review rounds with Codex (gpt-5.6-sol xhigh). Real echo leaks found and closed in rounds 1-3 (owner-bridge, sticky-client contamination, asymmetric forwarders, device mis-classification); my F1 narrowing refuted and conceded in round 4; contract strengthenings in 5-6. Every fix mutation-verified (reverting it is killed by its intended test). 57 tests, each asserting an exact eligible/excluded partition. KNOWN v1 LIMITATION (user-accepted 2026-07-22, owed to design doc round 8): an app that buffers the call, fully tears down its PipeWire objects, and replays after reconnecting can leak. In-threat-model but contrived; the fix (process-generation sticky lifetime, revising v3.4 §6.1.3) is deferred to phase 3's process-liveness work. Documented in src/host/taint/mod.rs. Phase-3 obligations recorded in the taint module docs and Codex's round-6 report. Unblocks phase 3 (registry observer). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Claude Opus 4.8
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ mod capture;
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mod pipeline;
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mod quality;
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mod serve;
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pub mod taint;
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mod wayland;
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mod x11;
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@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
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//! Synthetic graph builders for the taint-engine tests.
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//!
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//! Serials are handed out monotonically and never reused, exactly as
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//! PipeWire does; global ids are handed out separately and **may be reused
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//! on purpose**, which is what the recycling tests need.
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use std::collections::BTreeMap;
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use super::snapshot::{
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ClientSnapshot, GlobalId, GraphSnapshot, LinkSnapshot, MediaRole, NodeProps, NodeSnapshot,
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PortDirection, PortSnapshot, Serial,
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};
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/// pipewire-pulse's PID, as measured on the target machine.
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pub const PULSE_PID: u32 = 2541;
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/// WirePlumber's PID — one process owning every device node on the box.
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pub const SESSION_PID: u32 = 900;
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/// A node's identity in a fixture: what tests pass around.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
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pub struct NodeRef {
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pub serial: Serial,
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pub id: GlobalId,
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}
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#[derive(Default)]
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pub struct Graph {
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next_serial: u64,
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next_id: u32,
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nodes: Vec<NodeSnapshot>,
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ports: Vec<PortSnapshot>,
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links: Vec<LinkSnapshot>,
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clients: Vec<ClientSnapshot>,
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/// One client connection per process / per module, which is what the
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/// live graph looks like. Tests that need the *split*-client shape
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/// (GStreamer opens one per stream) pass clients explicitly instead.
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client_by_app: BTreeMap<u32, GlobalId>,
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client_by_module: BTreeMap<u64, GlobalId>,
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session_client: Option<GlobalId>,
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}
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impl Graph {
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pub fn new() -> Self {
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Self {
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// Start past u32::MAX so every fixture also exercises the phase
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// 0a widening: a serial that a u32 model would have truncated.
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next_serial: u64::from(u32::MAX) + 1,
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next_id: 1,
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..Self::default()
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}
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}
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fn serial(&mut self) -> Serial {
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self.next_serial += 1;
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Serial(self.next_serial)
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}
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fn id(&mut self) -> GlobalId {
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self.next_id += 1;
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GlobalId(self.next_id)
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}
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/// A client object. `sec_pid` is `pipewire.sec.pid` — pipewire-pulse's
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/// PID for Pulse-emulated clients.
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pub fn client(&mut self, sec_pid: Option<u32>) -> GlobalId {
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let serial = self.serial();
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let id = self.id();
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self.clients.push(ClientSnapshot {
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serial,
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id,
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sec_pid,
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});
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id
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}
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/// The client connection an ordinary process holds — one per PID,
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/// created on demand.
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pub fn client_of_app(&mut self, pid: u32) -> GlobalId {
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if let Some(id) = self.client_by_app.get(&pid) {
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return *id;
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}
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let id = self.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
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self.client_by_app.insert(pid, id);
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id
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}
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/// An ordinary application stream: its own client, its own PID.
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pub fn app_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, pid: u32) -> NodeRef {
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let client = self.client_of_app(pid);
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self.node(name, role, app(client, pid))
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}
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/// The client a pactl module holds. Measured: each module gets its own
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/// (`sink-sunshine-*` were clients 83/86/92), which is why one tainted
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/// module does not fuse with the next.
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pub fn client_of_module(&mut self, module: u64) -> GlobalId {
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match self.client_by_module.get(&module) {
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Some(id) => *id,
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None => {
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let id = self.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
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self.client_by_module.insert(module, id);
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id
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}
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}
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}
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/// A leg of a pactl-loaded module: one client per module, and the
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/// node's `application.process.id` is **pipewire-pulse's own**, because
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/// pipewire-pulse genuinely is the client.
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pub fn module_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, module: u64) -> NodeRef {
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let client = self.client_of_module(module);
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self.node(name, role, pulse_module(client, module, PULSE_PID))
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}
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/// A leg joined to its siblings by `node.link-group` — loopback,
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/// filter-chain, echo-cancel.
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pub fn group_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, group: &str, pid: u32) -> NodeRef {
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let client = self.client_of_app(pid);
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self.node(name, role, link_group(group, client, pid))
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}
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/// A device node as the session manager creates it: no strong key,
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/// WirePlumber's client and PID — shared with every other device — and
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/// a `device.id`, which is what marks it as session-manager-exported.
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pub fn device_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole) -> NodeRef {
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let session = match self.session_client {
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Some(id) => id,
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None => {
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let id = self.client(None);
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self.session_client = Some(id);
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id
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}
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};
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self.node(name, role, device(session, SESSION_PID))
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}
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/// A node that *belongs to* a Device but is not a passive device node —
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/// a filter associated with a card. Phase 3 must not classify this as a
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/// session device, or it loses both its coarse owner keys and its
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/// ability to trip the fail-closed backstop.
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pub fn device_associated_filter(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, pid: u32) -> NodeRef {
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let client = self.client_of_app(pid);
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self.node(name, role, app(client, pid))
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}
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/// A **virtual** sink an application created natively: an `Audio/Sink`
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/// with no `device.id` and no strong key, sharing one client with the
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/// stream that re-emits what it receives. Coarse keys must still bridge
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/// these two, or the whole call leaks through the re-emitting leg.
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pub fn native_virtual_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, pid: u32) -> NodeRef {
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let client = self.client_of_app(pid);
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self.node(name, role, app(client, pid))
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}
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pub fn peerspeak_node(&mut self, name: &str, pid: u32) -> NodeRef {
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let client = self.client_of_app(pid);
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self.node(name, MediaRole::StreamOutput, peerspeak_owned(client, pid))
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}
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pub fn node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, props: NodeProps) -> NodeRef {
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let id = self.id();
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self.node_with_id(name, role, id, props)
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}
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/// Force a global id — for reproducing id recycling after teardown.
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pub fn node_with_id(
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&mut self,
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name: &str,
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role: MediaRole,
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id: GlobalId,
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props: NodeProps,
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) -> NodeRef {
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let serial = self.serial();
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self.nodes.push(NodeSnapshot {
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serial,
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id,
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name: Some(name.to_string()),
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role,
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props,
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});
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NodeRef { serial, id }
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}
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pub fn port(&mut self, node: NodeRef, direction: PortDirection, exclusive: bool) {
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let serial = self.serial();
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let id = self.id();
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self.ports.push(PortSnapshot {
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serial,
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id,
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node: node.id,
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direction,
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exclusive,
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monitor: false,
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});
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}
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/// A signal edge: audio flows `from → to`.
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pub fn link(&mut self, from: NodeRef, to: NodeRef) {
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self.link_ids(from.id, to.id);
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}
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/// A link naming raw ids, so a test can dangle an endpoint.
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pub fn link_ids(&mut self, from: GlobalId, to: GlobalId) {
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let serial = self.serial();
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let id = self.id();
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self.links.push(LinkSnapshot {
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serial,
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id,
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output_node: from,
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input_node: to,
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output_port: None,
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input_port: None,
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});
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}
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/// An id that belongs to nothing — for unresolved-endpoint tests.
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pub fn dangling_id(&mut self) -> GlobalId {
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self.id()
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}
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pub fn build(&self) -> GraphSnapshot {
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self.build_without(&[])
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}
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/// A later snapshot in which some nodes have gone away, along with
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/// their ports and every link touching them. Surviving objects keep
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/// their serials, which is what makes sticky-taint sequences testable.
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pub fn build_without(&self, dropped: &[NodeRef]) -> GraphSnapshot {
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let gone_serials: Vec<Serial> = dropped.iter().map(|n| n.serial).collect();
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let nodes: Vec<NodeSnapshot> = self
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.nodes
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.iter()
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.filter(|n| !gone_serials.contains(&n.serial))
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.cloned()
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.collect();
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// Filter by what was *dropped*, not by what is live: a link to an id
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// that never had a node is a dangling endpoint, and dropping those
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// here would quietly disarm every unresolved-ancestry test.
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let gone_ids: Vec<GlobalId> = dropped.iter().map(|n| n.id).collect();
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GraphSnapshot::new(
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nodes,
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self.ports
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.iter()
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.filter(|p| !gone_ids.contains(&p.node))
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.cloned()
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.collect(),
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self.links
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.iter()
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.filter(|l| !gone_ids.contains(&l.output_node) && !gone_ids.contains(&l.input_node))
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.cloned()
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.collect(),
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self.clients.clone(),
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)
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}
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/// Drop clients too — full owner teardown.
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///
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/// Invalidates the per-app/per-module caches as well: leaving them
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/// stale made a later `client_of_app` hand back the *removed* client's
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/// id, so a test that meant "a brand-new client after teardown" was
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/// really building a node pointing at a client object that no longer
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/// existed (Codex round 1, finding 8).
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pub fn drop_clients(&mut self, ids: &[GlobalId]) {
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self.clients.retain(|c| !ids.contains(&c.id));
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self.client_by_app.retain(|_, id| !ids.contains(id));
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self.client_by_module.retain(|_, id| !ids.contains(id));
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if self.session_client.is_some_and(|id| ids.contains(&id)) {
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self.session_client = None;
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}
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}
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/// A client that reuses a global id a dead client had — the recycling
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/// case, with a fresh serial.
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pub fn client_with_id(&mut self, id: GlobalId, sec_pid: Option<u32>) -> GlobalId {
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let serial = self.serial();
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self.clients.push(ClientSnapshot {
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serial,
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id,
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sec_pid,
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});
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id
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}
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}
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/// An ordinary application stream: real PID, one client connection.
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pub fn app(client: GlobalId, pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
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NodeProps {
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client_id: Some(client),
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process_id: Some(pid),
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..NodeProps::default()
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}
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}
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/// A pactl-module-created stream: the daemon is the client, so the node's
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/// `application.process.id` is pipewire-pulse's own.
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pub fn pulse_module(client: GlobalId, module: u64, pulse_pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
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NodeProps {
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pulse_module_id: Some(module),
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client_id: Some(client),
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process_id: Some(pulse_pid),
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..NodeProps::default()
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}
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}
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/// A PipeWire-module leg joined to its siblings by `node.link-group`
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/// (loopback, filter-chain, echo-cancel).
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pub fn link_group(group: &str, client: GlobalId, pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
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NodeProps {
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link_group: Some(group.to_string()),
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client_id: Some(client),
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process_id: Some(pid),
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..NodeProps::default()
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}
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}
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/// A device node as the session manager creates it: no strong key, and the
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/// session manager's own client and PID — shared with every other device.
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///
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/// Measured 2026-07-21: real ALSA device nodes carry the shared
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/// `client.id` but **no** `application.process.id` at all. Giving them one
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/// here is deliberately *more* pessimistic than reality — it hands the
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/// engine a second coarse key it could fuse devices on, so a test that
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/// passes here also passes against the real props.
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pub fn device(session_client: GlobalId, session_pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
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NodeProps {
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client_id: Some(session_client),
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process_id: Some(session_pid),
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session_device: true,
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..NodeProps::default()
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}
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}
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pub fn peerspeak_owned(client: GlobalId, pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
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NodeProps {
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peerspeak_owned: true,
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..app(client, pid)
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,956 @@
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//! The taint engine — decides which `Stream/Output/Audio` nodes may be
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//! fanned out into the screen-share capture without echoing peerspeak's own
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//! audio back at the viewer.
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//!
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//! Implements design v3.4 §6.1–§6.1.3 (`peerspeak/docs/
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//! screenshare-audio-exclusion-plan.md`), phase 2 of the implementation
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//! plan. **Pure**: no PipeWire types appear in any signature, nothing here
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//! touches the daemon, and every test builds its own graph.
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//!
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//! ## The one-sentence predicate
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//!
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//! > A node is eligible only if **no** signal path reaches it from a
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//! > peerspeak-owned node, the live AEC identity, or any pixelpass-owned
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//! > object. **Unresolvable ancestry is not eligible.**
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//!
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//! That last sentence is the invariant the whole design rests on: every
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//! other failure mode in here degrades into over-exclusion (one app's audio
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//! silently missing from the share) rather than into echo.
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//!
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//! ## Why a graph walk and not a property check
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//!
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//! Exclusion does not propagate downstream by itself. Any node that
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//! re-emits audio it received is a fresh, *untagged* `Stream/Output/Audio`
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//! carrying the mix — including the one peerspeak playback stream that was
|
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//! correctly excluded one hop earlier. EasyEffects, `module-loopback`,
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//! combine-sinks, tunnel/RTP sinks and virtual-sink forwarders all have this
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//! shape, and at least one such topology has been observed live on the
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//! target machine.
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//!
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//! Taint therefore flows over **three** edge types:
|
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//!
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//! 1. **Link edges** — `link.output.node → link.input.node`.
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//! 2. **Sink → monitor** — free at node granularity: the monitor connection
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//! *is* a real Link whose output node is the sink node itself (measured).
|
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//! A port-granular walk would need a synthetic edge; a node-granular one
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//! does not.
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//! 3. **Owner bridges** — the intra-process hop the graph cannot see. See
|
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//! [`owner`]; this is the hard one.
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//!
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//! ## Stickiness
|
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//!
|
||||
//! Taint is **sticky per owner** for the duration of the share, because a
|
||||
//! topological recompute forgets *buffered* audio: an app can read a tainted
|
||||
//! monitor into a 5-second ring buffer, then have its input leg vanish, and
|
||||
//! a purely topological engine would relink its output while it is still
|
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//! emitting peerspeak's audio out of that buffer. No graph event marks the
|
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//! moment a buffer drains.
|
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//!
|
||||
//! Stickiness is keyed on [`Serial`] — never on a node id, `client.id`,
|
||||
//! module index or `link-group` string, **all of which recycle on this
|
||||
//! stack**. An entry is cleared only once every member object has
|
||||
//! disappeared; a key that reappears after full teardown is a new owner and
|
||||
//! starts clean.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ## ⚠️ KNOWN OPEN GAP — buffered audio across a full PipeWire teardown of
|
||||
//! ## a still-live process (Codex phase-2 rounds 5–6) — DESIGN DECISION OWED
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! **This is an in-threat-model echo gap, not an outside-the-model one — an
|
||||
//! earlier version of this note wrongly scoped it to keyless streams.**
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The scenario, entirely with a real PID-bearing app (a recorder, a DAW,
|
||||
//! a GStreamer pipeline): it reads the call into an application buffer,
|
||||
//! **fully** tears down its PipeWire Node *and* Client while keeping that
|
||||
//! buffer, then — still the same live process — opens a fresh Client and a
|
||||
//! `Stream/Output/Audio` and replays. Every old serial is gone, so
|
||||
//! [`seed_sticky`] refuses to apply the remembered PID fingerprint (the
|
||||
//! fingerprint is lifetime-scoped to a live serial member, because bare keys
|
||||
//! recycle); no reader is live in the new epoch, so the backstop does not
|
||||
//! fire; the replayed leg is eligible.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! It is real and reachable by non-adversarial software. It also sits
|
||||
//! exactly on the design's stated boundary (v3.4 §6.1.3: "a key that
|
||||
//! reappears after full teardown is a new owner and starts clean"), so
|
||||
//! closing it is a **design change**, not a local bug fix:
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! - **Option A — accept as a documented v1 limitation.** Contrived in
|
||||
//! practice (most apps hold their PipeWire connection open for their
|
||||
//! lifetime; the round-2 fix already covers the common
|
||||
//! idle-a-client-and-open-another case), never a *silent* correctness
|
||||
//! regression since it is written down, and phase 5's dry run would show
|
||||
//! it. But it is a known echo path, which sits badly against the feature's
|
||||
//! fail-closed ethos.
|
||||
//! - **Option B — process-generation lifetime.** Key the fingerprint's
|
||||
//! lifetime on the owning **process** being alive — PID + `/proc` start
|
||||
//! time (or a pidfd) to defeat PID reuse — instead of on a live PipeWire
|
||||
//! object. Phase 3 supplies process liveness; §6.1.3's node/client-only
|
||||
//! lifetime definition is revised. Closes the PID-bearing case; the truly
|
||||
//! keyless sub-case (no PID at all) genuinely *is* outside the threat
|
||||
//! model and stays a documented limit.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The choice is the designer's (it revises the security surface). Until it
|
||||
//! is made, `a_fingerprint_does_not_outlive_its_owner` encodes Option A's
|
||||
//! behaviour — flip it if B is chosen. Owed to the design doc as round 8.
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2 lands the engine behind its own test surface and nothing else:
|
||||
// the registry observer that will feed it is phase 3, so in a non-test
|
||||
// build every item here is legitimately unreachable for now.
|
||||
#![allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod owner;
|
||||
pub mod snapshot;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod fixture;
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet, VecDeque};
|
||||
|
||||
use owner::{OwnerComponents, OwnerKey};
|
||||
use snapshot::{GraphSnapshot, IdLookup, MediaRole, NodeSnapshot, Serial};
|
||||
|
||||
/// The `node.name` prefix of a pixelpass capture sink. Any host's sink
|
||||
/// counts, not just ours — fanning out a stream that is downstream of
|
||||
/// *another* pixelpass host's capture sink builds a cycle (v3.4 §6.2).
|
||||
pub const CAPTURE_SINK_PREFIX: &str = "pixelpass_capture_";
|
||||
|
||||
/// `node.link-group` prefix that marks *some* echo canceller. Hazard
|
||||
/// detection only — it does **not** identify peerspeak's instance, which is
|
||||
/// what `pulse.module.id` is for (v3.4 §5.2 correction 4).
|
||||
pub const ECHO_CANCEL_GROUP_PREFIX: &str = "echo-cancel-";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Why a node is tainted or excluded. Stable machine-readable codes: this
|
||||
/// value is the phase 5 audit output, the phase 6 status event, and the
|
||||
/// eventual answer to "why isn't this app being shared?".
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Hash)]
|
||||
pub enum Reason {
|
||||
/// Carries the `peerspeak.owned` tag (v3.4 §5.1).
|
||||
PeerspeakOwned,
|
||||
/// `pulse.module.id` equals the live AEC module index — exact equality
|
||||
/// only. "Has any `pulse.module.id`" is explicitly rejected as a rule:
|
||||
/// tunnel/RTP/loopback modules may be the only carrier of audio the
|
||||
/// user legitimately wants shared (v3.4 §5.2 correction 2).
|
||||
AecIdentity,
|
||||
/// A pixelpass-owned object, ours or another host's capture sink.
|
||||
PixelpassOwned,
|
||||
/// An `echo-cancel-*` group that is **not** our validated identity.
|
||||
/// Decision D3: warn and exclude rather than fan out.
|
||||
ForeignEchoCancel,
|
||||
/// Reached by a signal path from a tainted node (link or monitor edge).
|
||||
TaintedUpstream,
|
||||
/// Reached across an owner bridge; the key that did it, when the
|
||||
/// tainted member shares one directly rather than transitively.
|
||||
TaintedOwnerBridge { key: Option<OwnerKey> },
|
||||
/// A link endpoint, or a node's own id, could not be resolved in this
|
||||
/// snapshot. Fail closed (v3.4 §6.1.4).
|
||||
UnresolvedAncestry,
|
||||
/// A tainted capture stream whose owner cannot be bounded by any usable
|
||||
/// key, so its sibling output legs cannot be identified. Fail closed
|
||||
/// (v3.4 §6.1.1, final paragraph).
|
||||
UnresolvedOwner,
|
||||
/// The observer has not reached a complete, coherent view of the graph
|
||||
/// yet. No decision made from a partial graph is a decision.
|
||||
GraphNotReady,
|
||||
/// A `port.exclusive` port — fan-out will be refused (v3.4 §6.2). Local
|
||||
/// to the node; does not propagate.
|
||||
PortExclusive,
|
||||
/// An encoded/passthrough stream — a second link would corrupt it.
|
||||
/// Local to the node; does not propagate.
|
||||
Passthrough,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Reason {
|
||||
pub fn code(self) -> &'static str {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
Self::PeerspeakOwned => "peerspeak-owned",
|
||||
Self::AecIdentity => "aec-identity",
|
||||
Self::PixelpassOwned => "pixelpass-owned",
|
||||
Self::ForeignEchoCancel => "foreign-echo-cancel",
|
||||
Self::TaintedUpstream => "tainted-upstream",
|
||||
Self::TaintedOwnerBridge { .. } => "tainted-owner-bridge",
|
||||
Self::UnresolvedAncestry => "unresolved-ancestry",
|
||||
Self::UnresolvedOwner => "unresolved-owner",
|
||||
Self::GraphNotReady => "graph-not-ready",
|
||||
Self::PortExclusive => "port-exclusive",
|
||||
Self::Passthrough => "passthrough",
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Lower wins. A node can acquire taint several ways in one recompute
|
||||
/// and the reported reason must not depend on traversal order, or the
|
||||
/// audit output is unstable and the fixture tests are flaky. Explicit
|
||||
/// priority, not BFS arrival order.
|
||||
fn priority(self) -> u8 {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
Self::PeerspeakOwned => 0,
|
||||
Self::AecIdentity => 1,
|
||||
Self::PixelpassOwned => 2,
|
||||
Self::ForeignEchoCancel => 3,
|
||||
Self::TaintedUpstream => 4,
|
||||
Self::TaintedOwnerBridge { .. } => 5,
|
||||
Self::UnresolvedAncestry => 6,
|
||||
Self::UnresolvedOwner => 7,
|
||||
// Non-propagating; never competes with the taint reasons above
|
||||
// because it is only consulted for untainted candidates.
|
||||
Self::GraphNotReady => 8,
|
||||
Self::PortExclusive => 9,
|
||||
Self::Passthrough => 10,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Does this reason spread to downstream nodes and owner siblings?
|
||||
fn propagates(self) -> bool {
|
||||
self.priority() <= Self::UnresolvedOwner.priority()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Everything the engine needs that is not in the graph itself.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct ExclusionCtx {
|
||||
/// The **validated** live AEC module index, or `None` for `--aec=off`.
|
||||
/// The validation state machine (phase 4) owns the transitions; if it
|
||||
/// is still `Validating` or has `Failed`, its caller must not fan out at
|
||||
/// all rather than passing `None` here, which would merely mean "there
|
||||
/// is no AEC".
|
||||
pub aec_module_id: Option<u64>,
|
||||
/// pipewire-pulse's own PID, derived by the observer (phase 3) from a
|
||||
/// consistent `pipewire.sec.pid` across Pulse clients validated against
|
||||
/// `/proc/<pid>/comm`. `None` is safe but coarse — see [`owner`].
|
||||
pub pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>,
|
||||
/// Serials of objects pixelpass itself created this run.
|
||||
pub pixelpass_owned: BTreeSet<Serial>,
|
||||
/// False until the readiness epoch has been reached (phase 3). Every
|
||||
/// candidate is then ineligible: a decision from a partial graph is not
|
||||
/// a decision.
|
||||
pub graph_ready: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Object identity for sticky bookkeeping. Always a [`Serial`] — never a
|
||||
/// recyclable id (v3.4 §6.1.3).
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
|
||||
pub enum ObjectRef {
|
||||
Node(Serial),
|
||||
Client(Serial),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// One owner that has been tainted, and every object observed to constitute
|
||||
/// it. Cleared only when **all** of them are gone.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct StickyOwner {
|
||||
/// Every object seen to be part of this owner, ever. Membership
|
||||
/// accumulates: that is what makes "clear only once all member objects
|
||||
/// have disappeared" true across churn.
|
||||
pub members: BTreeSet<ObjectRef>,
|
||||
/// Owner keys remembered across connections — strong keys and a usable
|
||||
/// process id, never `client.id`. Applied only while some serial member
|
||||
/// above is still live, which is what keeps a recyclable key from
|
||||
/// resurrecting a dead owner.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Needed because a live Client is not the same thing as a live owner:
|
||||
/// a process can leave one connection idle and open a second, and
|
||||
/// GStreamer opens one connection per stream as a matter of course, so
|
||||
/// following connections alone lets the next leg escape (Codex round 2,
|
||||
/// finding 2).
|
||||
pub fingerprints: BTreeSet<owner::Fingerprint>,
|
||||
/// The reason recorded for each node that was tainted in its own right.
|
||||
/// Kept per node rather than collapsed to one owner-wide reason, or a
|
||||
/// forwarder's output leg inherits its *input* leg's `tainted-upstream`
|
||||
/// and the audit output stops naming the mechanism that actually
|
||||
/// excluded it.
|
||||
pub node_reasons: BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl StickyOwner {
|
||||
/// The reason to apply to a member: its own recorded one, or — for a
|
||||
/// leg that appeared later — the fact that it belongs to a tainted
|
||||
/// owner, which is a bridge by definition.
|
||||
fn reason_for(&self, serial: Serial) -> Reason {
|
||||
self.node_reasons
|
||||
.get(&serial)
|
||||
.copied()
|
||||
.unwrap_or(Reason::TaintedOwnerBridge { key: None })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Threaded explicitly through [`evaluate`] so stickiness is testable as a
|
||||
/// sequence of snapshots rather than as hidden mutable state.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct StickyState {
|
||||
pub owners: Vec<StickyOwner>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl StickyState {
|
||||
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
self.owners.is_empty()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
|
||||
pub enum Eligibility {
|
||||
Eligible,
|
||||
NotEligible {
|
||||
reason: Reason,
|
||||
/// The taint was carried over from a previous snapshot rather than
|
||||
/// derived from the current topology.
|
||||
sticky: bool,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct NodeDecision {
|
||||
pub serial: Serial,
|
||||
pub name: Option<String>,
|
||||
pub eligibility: Eligibility,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl NodeDecision {
|
||||
pub fn is_eligible(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self.eligibility, Eligibility::Eligible)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn reason(&self) -> Option<Reason> {
|
||||
match self.eligibility {
|
||||
Eligibility::Eligible => None,
|
||||
Eligibility::NotEligible { reason, .. } => Some(reason),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct TaintEntry {
|
||||
pub reason: Reason,
|
||||
pub sticky: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The result of one recompute.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct Decisions {
|
||||
/// Every `Stream/Output/Audio` node in the snapshot — the complete
|
||||
/// candidate universe, so callers can assert an exact partition rather
|
||||
/// than spot-checking named nodes.
|
||||
pub candidates: BTreeMap<Serial, NodeDecision>,
|
||||
/// Taint over *all* node roles, for diagnostics and for the phase 5
|
||||
/// audit output.
|
||||
pub taint: BTreeMap<Serial, TaintEntry>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Decisions {
|
||||
/// Serials of eligible candidates, ascending.
|
||||
pub fn eligible(&self) -> Vec<Serial> {
|
||||
self.candidates
|
||||
.values()
|
||||
.filter(|d| d.is_eligible())
|
||||
.map(|d| d.serial)
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `(serial, reason code)` for excluded candidates, ascending.
|
||||
pub fn excluded(&self) -> Vec<(Serial, &'static str)> {
|
||||
self.candidates
|
||||
.values()
|
||||
.filter_map(|d| d.reason().map(|r| (d.serial, r.code())))
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Recompute eligibility for the whole graph.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Full recompute per graph event is the v1 design; there is deliberately
|
||||
/// no incremental dirty-set.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ⚠️ **Cost is not O(V+E), despite what v3.4 §6.4 says.** Each fixpoint
|
||||
/// pass re-runs a full link BFS *and* a full owner scan, and the bridge
|
||||
/// scans every tainted source in a component for each target, so the bound
|
||||
/// is `O(D · (V + E + Σ_C |sources_C|·|targets_C|))` — worst case
|
||||
/// `O(D · (V² + E))` — for an owner-bridge depth D. D is 1 for every
|
||||
/// topology observed so far and 2 for a forwarder feeding a forwarder, and
|
||||
/// components on a real desktop are two or three nodes; the quadratic term
|
||||
/// needs one owner with many legs. A 60-layer chain test guards the depth
|
||||
/// dimension only. Phase 5 records the real recompute-duration
|
||||
/// distribution and maximum, which is what "full recompute is fine for v1"
|
||||
/// should rest on — measured headroom, not a node count.
|
||||
pub fn evaluate(
|
||||
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
|
||||
ctx: &ExclusionCtx,
|
||||
prior: &StickyState,
|
||||
) -> (Decisions, StickyState) {
|
||||
let components = OwnerComponents::build(snapshot, ctx.pipewire_pulse_pid);
|
||||
let keys = owner::OwnerKeyIndex::build(snapshot, ctx.pipewire_pulse_pid);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut taint: BTreeMap<Serial, Reason> = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
let mut sticky_serials: BTreeSet<Serial> = BTreeSet::new();
|
||||
|
||||
seed_local_roots(snapshot, ctx, &mut taint);
|
||||
seed_sticky(
|
||||
snapshot,
|
||||
&keys,
|
||||
prior,
|
||||
&components,
|
||||
&mut taint,
|
||||
&mut sticky_serials,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Monotone fixpoint: every step only adds taint, or lowers a node's
|
||||
// reason priority, both of which are bounded. Link propagation and the
|
||||
// owner bridge feed each other — a bridged output leg has downstream
|
||||
// links, and a downstream monitor reader bridges to its own siblings —
|
||||
// so neither can be run once.
|
||||
let edges = downstream_edges(snapshot, &mut taint);
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let mut changed = false;
|
||||
changed |= propagate_links(&edges.edges, &mut taint);
|
||||
changed |= propagate_owner_bridge(&keys, &components, &edges, &mut taint);
|
||||
changed |= propagate_unresolved_owner(snapshot, &keys, &edges, &mut taint);
|
||||
if !changed {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let decisions = build_decisions(snapshot, ctx, &taint, &sticky_serials);
|
||||
// ⚠️ Readiness gates **retirement only**, never addition (Codex rounds
|
||||
// 1 and 2, which caught the two halves of this in turn). An object
|
||||
// missing from an untrustworthy snapshot has not been observed to
|
||||
// disappear, so retiring on that basis erases history and the next
|
||||
// ready recompute hands back a clean bill of health. But taint
|
||||
// *observed* during a not-ready epoch is real — a reader can consume
|
||||
// and buffer the call and then vanish before readiness — so discarding
|
||||
// additions was the same defect pointing the other way.
|
||||
let next_sticky = build_sticky(snapshot, &keys, &components, &taint, prior, ctx.graph_ready);
|
||||
(decisions, next_sticky)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Roots that are visible on the node itself.
|
||||
fn seed_local_roots(
|
||||
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
|
||||
ctx: &ExclusionCtx,
|
||||
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
for node in snapshot.nodes() {
|
||||
if let Some(reason) = local_root_reason(node, ctx) {
|
||||
raise(taint, node.serial, reason);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A node whose own global id is ambiguous cannot be the reliable
|
||||
// endpoint of any link, so its ancestry is unresolvable.
|
||||
if snapshot.node_by_id(node.id) == Some(IdLookup::Ambiguous) {
|
||||
raise(taint, node.serial, Reason::UnresolvedAncestry);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn local_root_reason(node: &NodeSnapshot, ctx: &ExclusionCtx) -> Option<Reason> {
|
||||
if node.props.peerspeak_owned {
|
||||
return Some(Reason::PeerspeakOwned);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let (Some(module), Some(aec)) = (node.props.pulse_module_id, ctx.aec_module_id)
|
||||
&& module == aec
|
||||
{
|
||||
return Some(Reason::AecIdentity);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ctx.pixelpass_owned.contains(&node.serial)
|
||||
|| node
|
||||
.name
|
||||
.as_deref()
|
||||
.is_some_and(|name| name.starts_with(CAPTURE_SINK_PREFIX))
|
||||
{
|
||||
return Some(Reason::PixelpassOwned);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if node
|
||||
.props
|
||||
.link_group
|
||||
.as_deref()
|
||||
.is_some_and(|group| group.starts_with(ECHO_CANCEL_GROUP_PREFIX))
|
||||
{
|
||||
return Some(Reason::ForeignEchoCancel);
|
||||
}
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Carry taint forward from previous snapshots (v3.4 §6.1.3).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// An owner is re-seeded from three kinds of evidence, all lifetime-scoped
|
||||
/// to a still-live member: its own surviving nodes, nodes on a surviving
|
||||
/// **Client**, and nodes presenting a remembered owner **fingerprint**.
|
||||
fn seed_sticky(
|
||||
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
|
||||
keys: &owner::OwnerKeyIndex,
|
||||
prior: &StickyState,
|
||||
components: &OwnerComponents,
|
||||
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
|
||||
sticky_serials: &mut BTreeSet<Serial>,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
for entry in &prior.owners {
|
||||
let mut live_nodes: Vec<Serial> = Vec::new();
|
||||
for member in &entry.members {
|
||||
match member {
|
||||
ObjectRef::Node(serial) => {
|
||||
if snapshot.node(*serial).is_some() {
|
||||
live_nodes.push(*serial);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A surviving **Client** re-seeds too. An app can close
|
||||
// every stream it had while keeping its PipeWire connection
|
||||
// open, then open a fresh one — Firefox does exactly this.
|
||||
ObjectRef::Client(serial) => {
|
||||
live_nodes.extend(nodes_of_client(snapshot, keys, *serial));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if live_nodes.is_empty() && !entry.members.iter().any(|m| is_live(snapshot, *m)) {
|
||||
// Nothing of this owner remains; its fingerprints are just
|
||||
// recyclable strings now and must not be applied to anyone.
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Fingerprints reach a *new connection* of the same still-live
|
||||
// process, which neither of the two paths above can see.
|
||||
for fingerprint in &entry.fingerprints {
|
||||
live_nodes.extend(
|
||||
snapshot
|
||||
.nodes()
|
||||
.filter(|node| keys.has_fingerprint(node.serial, fingerprint))
|
||||
.map(|node| node.serial),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The owner is sticky, not the individual node: a leg that appears
|
||||
// later in the same still-live owner inherits the taint.
|
||||
for serial in live_nodes {
|
||||
for member in components.members_with(serial) {
|
||||
let reason = entry.reason_for(*member);
|
||||
if raise(taint, *member, reason) || taint.get(member) == Some(&reason) {
|
||||
sticky_serials.insert(*member);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Nodes currently attached to a client, by the client's **serial**. The
|
||||
/// client's snapshot-local id is resolved fresh each time, so a recycled id
|
||||
/// can never resurrect a dead owner.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Nodes for which `client.id` is not a usable owner key — session-manager
|
||||
/// device nodes — are excluded, or the shared `WirePlumber [export]` Client
|
||||
/// would drag every sound card on the box into one sticky owner.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The same gate is applied when *recording* clients into a sticky entry
|
||||
/// (`owner::client_serials_of`). Either one alone closes the leak; both are
|
||||
/// kept because they answer different questions ("may this client be
|
||||
/// remembered?" and "may this client speak for that node?"), and the
|
||||
/// regression test kills the removal of the pair.
|
||||
fn nodes_of_client(
|
||||
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
|
||||
keys: &owner::OwnerKeyIndex,
|
||||
client: Serial,
|
||||
) -> Vec<Serial> {
|
||||
let Some(id) = snapshot
|
||||
.clients()
|
||||
.find(|c| c.serial == client)
|
||||
.map(|c| c.id)
|
||||
else {
|
||||
return Vec::new();
|
||||
};
|
||||
snapshot
|
||||
.nodes()
|
||||
.filter(|node| node.props.client_id == Some(id))
|
||||
.filter(|node| keys.uses_client_key(node.serial))
|
||||
.map(|node| node.serial)
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `output node → input nodes`, resolving snapshot-local ids. An endpoint
|
||||
/// that does not resolve taints the *other* end as unresolved ancestry when
|
||||
/// that other end is the input side — we cannot know what is feeding it.
|
||||
fn downstream_edges(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>) -> Edges {
|
||||
let mut edges: BTreeMap<Serial, Vec<Serial>> = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
let mut receivers: BTreeSet<Serial> = BTreeSet::new();
|
||||
for link in snapshot.links() {
|
||||
let from = snapshot.node_by_id(link.output_node);
|
||||
let to = snapshot.node_by_id(link.input_node);
|
||||
match (from, to) {
|
||||
(Some(IdLookup::Unique(from)), Some(IdLookup::Unique(to))) => {
|
||||
edges.entry(from).or_default().push(to);
|
||||
receivers.insert(to);
|
||||
}
|
||||
(_, Some(IdLookup::Unique(to))) => {
|
||||
// Something feeds this node and we cannot say what.
|
||||
raise(taint, to, Reason::UnresolvedAncestry);
|
||||
receivers.insert(to);
|
||||
}
|
||||
(_, Some(IdLookup::Ambiguous)) => {
|
||||
// Several nodes claim the input id and we cannot say which
|
||||
// one this link feeds, so every claimant is a receiver.
|
||||
// They are already tainted as unresolved by their own
|
||||
// ambiguous id — but taint without receiver status cannot
|
||||
// start an owner bridge, so their sibling output legs stayed
|
||||
// Eligible (Codex round 2, finding 3).
|
||||
receivers.extend(
|
||||
snapshot
|
||||
.nodes_with_id(link.input_node)
|
||||
.map(|node| node.serial),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for targets in edges.values_mut() {
|
||||
targets.sort_unstable();
|
||||
targets.dedup();
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A node that receives audio by *role* counts even with no inbound link
|
||||
// yet: a pixelpass capture sink is a taint root the moment it exists,
|
||||
// and its owner's re-emitting leg must be bridged from it immediately.
|
||||
receivers.extend(
|
||||
snapshot
|
||||
.nodes()
|
||||
.filter(|node| node.role.receives_audio())
|
||||
.map(|node| node.serial),
|
||||
);
|
||||
Edges { edges, receivers }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Resolved signal edges plus the set of nodes that can receive audio.
|
||||
struct Edges {
|
||||
edges: BTreeMap<Serial, Vec<Serial>>,
|
||||
/// ⚠️ Membership is "appears as a resolved `link.input.node`" **or**
|
||||
/// "has a receiving role" — deliberately not role alone. Codex round 1:
|
||||
/// a node whose `media.class` is absent or unexpected (`Other`), or an
|
||||
/// `Audio/Source` that is really a filter output, can sit on an inbound
|
||||
/// link carrying tainted audio; inferring "receives audio" from the role
|
||||
/// alone left such a node unable to start an owner bridge, and its
|
||||
/// sibling output leg stayed Eligible while re-emitting the call.
|
||||
receivers: BTreeSet<Serial>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn propagate_links(
|
||||
downstream: &BTreeMap<Serial, Vec<Serial>>,
|
||||
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
|
||||
) -> bool {
|
||||
let mut changed = false;
|
||||
let mut queue: VecDeque<Serial> = taint
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|(_, reason)| reason.propagates())
|
||||
.map(|(serial, _)| *serial)
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
while let Some(serial) = queue.pop_front() {
|
||||
let Some(targets) = downstream.get(&serial) else {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
for target in targets {
|
||||
if raise(taint, *target, Reason::TaintedUpstream) {
|
||||
changed = true;
|
||||
queue.push_back(*target);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
changed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The conditional owner bridge (v3.4 §6.1.1): taint crosses to an owner's
|
||||
/// other legs **only** when the tainted member is one that actually
|
||||
/// receives audio. The naive "this owner has both an input and an output
|
||||
/// leg ⇒ exclude the output" rule would exclude every app using a
|
||||
/// microphone, Firefox in a video call included.
|
||||
fn propagate_owner_bridge(
|
||||
keys: &owner::OwnerKeyIndex,
|
||||
components: &OwnerComponents,
|
||||
edges: &Edges,
|
||||
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
|
||||
) -> bool {
|
||||
let mut changed = false;
|
||||
for members in components.components() {
|
||||
let sources: BTreeSet<Serial> = members
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.copied()
|
||||
.filter(|serial| {
|
||||
taint.get(serial).is_some_and(|r| r.propagates())
|
||||
&& edges.receivers.contains(serial)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
if sources.is_empty() {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for target in members {
|
||||
if sources.contains(target) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Name the strongest key shared directly with any tainted
|
||||
// member; `None` means the two are only transitively related.
|
||||
let key = sources
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter_map(|source| keys.strongest_shared(*source, *target))
|
||||
.min();
|
||||
changed |= raise(taint, *target, Reason::TaintedOwnerBridge { key });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
changed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fail-closed backstop for an owner we cannot bound (v3.4 §6.1.1, final
|
||||
/// paragraph): something read tainted audio and nothing about the output
|
||||
/// legs on this box lets us enumerate which of them are its siblings, so we
|
||||
/// cannot know which one is re-emitting what it read. Exclude the output
|
||||
/// legs that are equally unbounded.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The trigger and the sweep, precisely (both edges hard-won across four
|
||||
/// Codex rounds):
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - **Trigger — any tainted receiver that is not a real device node.** A
|
||||
/// tainted hardware sink is the normal case, not an anomaly (peerspeak's
|
||||
/// playback taints the default sink every recompute), so device nodes do
|
||||
/// not trip it. The source does **not** have to be unbounded: a reader
|
||||
/// with a `node.link-group` whose re-emitting leg carries none is bounded
|
||||
/// while its sibling is unfindable (round 1).
|
||||
/// - **Sweep — depends on whether any tainted reader is itself unbounded.**
|
||||
/// A *bounded* reader's siblings are exactly the outputs sharing its key,
|
||||
/// so only the unbounded outputs (which could share its unknowable-only-
|
||||
/// in-part identity) are swept; a differently-keyed output is provably a
|
||||
/// different owner. An *unbounded* reader could be **any** owner — a real
|
||||
/// process may present no PID on its reading leg (round 4) — so every
|
||||
/// output candidate is swept, real apps included.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// **Two tiers, because a tainted reader we cannot bound is a bigger
|
||||
/// unknown than one we can** (Codex round 3 — the mirror image of the
|
||||
/// round-1 case):
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - A *bounded* tainted reader has a strong key or a usable PID, so its
|
||||
/// siblings are exactly the output legs sharing that key. Any output leg
|
||||
/// that is *itself* bounded by a **different** key is provably a different
|
||||
/// owner and stays eligible; only unbounded output legs are its possible
|
||||
/// siblings. → exclude unbounded outputs.
|
||||
/// - An *unbounded* tainted reader has nothing that identifies its owner, so
|
||||
/// its re-emitting leg could be **any** output on the box, and no property
|
||||
/// on an output leg can prove it is unrelated. → exclude every output
|
||||
/// candidate.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ⚠️ I tried to narrow this to "daemon-owned outputs only", on the
|
||||
/// theory that an unbounded reader must be daemon-owned (a real app has a
|
||||
/// PID, which would bound it) so a real-PID output is provably a different
|
||||
/// owner. **Codex refuted it (round 4):** `application.process.id` is
|
||||
/// optional and client-controlled, so a real process can present *no* PID
|
||||
/// on its reading leg (unbounded) and a real PID on its output leg — one
|
||||
/// owner, spared by the narrowing, leaking the call. Only `pipewire.*`
|
||||
/// properties have protected identity; app properties cannot carry a
|
||||
/// soundness argument. So: exclude everything. The trigger is genuinely
|
||||
/// anomalous — a keyless reader actively consuming the call; EasyEffects
|
||||
/// and loopbacks carry a `node.link-group` and are *bounded*, so they do
|
||||
/// not trip this tier — and phase 5's dry run surfaces it before it can
|
||||
/// gate anything real.
|
||||
fn propagate_unresolved_owner(
|
||||
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
|
||||
keys: &owner::OwnerKeyIndex,
|
||||
edges: &Edges,
|
||||
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
|
||||
) -> bool {
|
||||
let mut has_tainted_reader = false;
|
||||
let mut has_unbounded_tainted_reader = false;
|
||||
for node in snapshot.nodes() {
|
||||
let is_tainted_reader = !node.props.session_device
|
||||
&& edges.receivers.contains(&node.serial)
|
||||
&& taint.get(&node.serial).is_some_and(|r| r.propagates());
|
||||
if is_tainted_reader {
|
||||
has_tainted_reader = true;
|
||||
has_unbounded_tainted_reader |= !keys.is_bounded(node.serial);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !has_tainted_reader {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut changed = false;
|
||||
for node in snapshot.nodes() {
|
||||
if node.role == MediaRole::StreamOutput
|
||||
&& (has_unbounded_tainted_reader || !keys.is_bounded(node.serial))
|
||||
{
|
||||
changed |= raise(taint, node.serial, Reason::UnresolvedOwner);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
changed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_decisions(
|
||||
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
|
||||
ctx: &ExclusionCtx,
|
||||
taint: &BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
|
||||
sticky_serials: &BTreeSet<Serial>,
|
||||
) -> Decisions {
|
||||
let mut candidates = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
for node in snapshot.nodes().filter(|n| n.role.is_candidate()) {
|
||||
let sticky = sticky_serials.contains(&node.serial);
|
||||
let eligibility = if !ctx.graph_ready {
|
||||
Eligibility::NotEligible {
|
||||
reason: Reason::GraphNotReady,
|
||||
sticky: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if let Some(reason) = taint.get(&node.serial) {
|
||||
Eligibility::NotEligible {
|
||||
reason: *reason,
|
||||
sticky,
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if let Some(reason) = local_exclusion(snapshot, node) {
|
||||
Eligibility::NotEligible {
|
||||
reason,
|
||||
sticky: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Eligibility::Eligible
|
||||
};
|
||||
candidates.insert(
|
||||
node.serial,
|
||||
NodeDecision {
|
||||
serial: node.serial,
|
||||
name: node.name.clone(),
|
||||
eligibility,
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Decisions {
|
||||
candidates,
|
||||
taint: taint
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|(serial, reason)| {
|
||||
(
|
||||
*serial,
|
||||
TaintEntry {
|
||||
reason: *reason,
|
||||
sticky: sticky_serials.contains(serial),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Node-local reasons a link cannot be created even though the node is
|
||||
/// clean. These do not propagate — an exclusive-port stream is unlinkable,
|
||||
/// not hazardous.
|
||||
fn local_exclusion(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, node: &NodeSnapshot) -> Option<Reason> {
|
||||
if node.props.passthrough {
|
||||
return Some(Reason::Passthrough);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if snapshot.ports_of(node.id).any(|port| port.exclusive) {
|
||||
return Some(Reason::PortExclusive);
|
||||
}
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Sticky bookkeeping for the next recompute: every tainted owner, with
|
||||
/// every object observed to constitute it, merged with any prior entry that
|
||||
/// still overlaps. Members accumulate — that is what makes "clear only once
|
||||
/// all member objects have disappeared" true across churn.
|
||||
fn build_sticky(
|
||||
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
|
||||
keys: &owner::OwnerKeyIndex,
|
||||
components: &OwnerComponents,
|
||||
taint: &BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
|
||||
prior: &StickyState,
|
||||
retire_absent: bool,
|
||||
) -> StickyState {
|
||||
let mut entries: Vec<StickyOwner> = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Carry forward prior entries that still have at least one live member.
|
||||
// An entry with none is gone for good: serials never recycle, so a
|
||||
// vanished member can never come back — but only a *trustworthy*
|
||||
// snapshot is allowed to conclude that a member is absent.
|
||||
for entry in &prior.owners {
|
||||
if !retire_absent
|
||||
|| entry
|
||||
.members
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.any(|member| is_live(snapshot, *member))
|
||||
{
|
||||
entries.push(entry.clone());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for members in components.components() {
|
||||
let node_reasons: BTreeMap<Serial, Reason> = members
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter_map(|serial| {
|
||||
taint
|
||||
.get(serial)
|
||||
.filter(|reason| reason.propagates())
|
||||
.map(|reason| (*serial, *reason))
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
if node_reasons.is_empty() {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut refs: BTreeSet<ObjectRef> = members.iter().map(|s| ObjectRef::Node(*s)).collect();
|
||||
refs.extend(
|
||||
owner::client_serials_of(snapshot, keys, members)
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.map(ObjectRef::Client),
|
||||
);
|
||||
let fingerprints = members
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.flat_map(|serial| keys.fingerprints(*serial))
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
entries.push(StickyOwner {
|
||||
members: refs,
|
||||
fingerprints,
|
||||
node_reasons,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
StickyState {
|
||||
owners: merge_overlapping(entries),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn is_live(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, member: ObjectRef) -> bool {
|
||||
match member {
|
||||
ObjectRef::Node(serial) => snapshot.node(serial).is_some(),
|
||||
ObjectRef::Client(serial) => snapshot.clients().any(|c| c.serial == serial),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Merge entries that share any member, keeping the strongest reason.
|
||||
/// Owners fuse over time (a component that gains a leg belonging to a
|
||||
/// previously separate sticky owner is one owner now); splitting them back
|
||||
/// apart would drop taint, which is the unsafe direction.
|
||||
fn merge_overlapping(mut entries: Vec<StickyOwner>) -> Vec<StickyOwner> {
|
||||
let mut merged: Vec<StickyOwner> = Vec::new();
|
||||
while let Some(mut entry) = entries.pop() {
|
||||
let mut absorbed = true;
|
||||
while absorbed {
|
||||
absorbed = false;
|
||||
let mut rest = Vec::with_capacity(entries.len());
|
||||
for other in entries.drain(..) {
|
||||
if entry.members.is_disjoint(&other.members) {
|
||||
rest.push(other);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
for (serial, reason) in other.node_reasons {
|
||||
entry
|
||||
.node_reasons
|
||||
.entry(serial)
|
||||
.and_modify(|existing| {
|
||||
if reason.priority() < existing.priority() {
|
||||
*existing = reason;
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
.or_insert(reason);
|
||||
}
|
||||
entry.members.extend(other.members);
|
||||
entry.fingerprints.extend(other.fingerprints);
|
||||
absorbed = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
entries = rest;
|
||||
}
|
||||
merged.push(entry);
|
||||
}
|
||||
merged.sort_by(|a, b| a.members.iter().next().cmp(&b.members.iter().next()));
|
||||
merged
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Record `reason` for `serial` if it is new or strictly stronger than what
|
||||
/// is already recorded. Returns whether anything changed — the fixpoint's
|
||||
/// termination argument rests on this being monotone.
|
||||
fn raise(taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>, serial: Serial, reason: Reason) -> bool {
|
||||
match taint.get(&serial) {
|
||||
Some(existing) if existing.priority() <= reason.priority() => false,
|
||||
_ => {
|
||||
taint.insert(serial, reason);
|
||||
true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
|
||||
//! The owner bridge — grouping nodes that belong to the same *owner* even
|
||||
//! though the graph shows no Link between them.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This is the subtlest part of the design (v3.4 §6.1.2). Measured fact it
|
||||
//! exists to handle: a `module-loopback` forwarder's input leg and output
|
||||
//! leg have **no Link between them**, so walking Links alone from the
|
||||
//! leaking output leg finds no inbound links at all — a dead end that reads
|
||||
//! as "clean". The legs are related only by shared properties.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ## The rule
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! A union of keys, strongest first:
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | # | key | scope |
|
||||
//! | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
//! | 1 | `node.link-group` | per module/filter instance |
|
||||
//! | 2 | `pulse.module.id` | per pactl module |
|
||||
//! | 3 | `client.id` | per **connection** |
|
||||
//! | 4 | `application.process.id` | per process |
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ⚠️ **"Resolves" means the two legs carry the key AND the values are
|
||||
//! EQUAL — not "the first key present".** A first-present implementation
|
||||
//! reproduces the exact measured leak: for `gst-launch pulsesrc ! pulsesink`
|
||||
//! both legs carry `client.id` (209 and 210) but the values *differ*, so
|
||||
//! first-present stops at key 3, sees a mismatch, and concludes "different
|
||||
//! owners". The legs are in fact one process (`application.process.id`
|
||||
//! 20172 on both). So: try each key in order, and a key resolves only if
|
||||
//! both legs carry it and the values are equal; otherwise fall through.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ## Two exceptions, both guarding against mass over-exclusion
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! 1. **Never bridge on key 4 when the value is pipewire-pulse's own PID**
|
||||
//! (v3.4 §6.1.2). Module-created streams all carry the daemon's PID, so
|
||||
//! bridging on it fuses every Pulse module into one owner and a single
|
||||
//! tainted module input would exclude every module-created stream on the
|
||||
//! box. Keys 1 and 2 already cover those cases precisely.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! 2. **Coarse keys (3 and 4) may not bridge nodes exported from a real
|
||||
//! `Device`** — i.e. nodes carrying `device.id`. ⚠️ This rule is *not*
|
||||
//! in design v3.4; it was found while implementing, and it is the exact
|
||||
//! analogue of exception 1 for the session manager.
|
||||
//! ✅ **MEASURED on the live graph 2026-07-21:**
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | node | `client.id` | `device.id` | `factory.name` |
|
||||
//! | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
//! | 5 × `alsa_{output,input}.*` | **42** (`WirePlumber [export]`) | 43/45/46 | `api.alsa.pcm.{sink,source}` |
|
||||
//! | 3 × `sink-sunshine-*` | 83 / 86 / 92 (each its own) | **absent** | `support.null-audio-sink` |
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! So one shared coarse key genuinely does relate every hardware device
|
||||
//! on the box, and `device.id` cleanly separates that set from virtual
|
||||
//! sinks. Without the rule, the hardware sink carrying peerspeak's
|
||||
//! playback (tainted by design, every single recompute) would bridge to
|
||||
//! *every other device node including the microphone source*, whose
|
||||
//! readers would then taint their owners' playback legs — reproducing
|
||||
//! precisely the §6.1.1 catastrophe ("excludes any app using a
|
||||
//! microphone") through a different door.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ⚠️ **Keyed on `device.id`, NOT on `media.class` being `Audio/Sink`.**
|
||||
//! The first cut suppressed coarse keys for every device-*role* node,
|
||||
//! and Codex refuted it: a **native virtual sink** — an app that creates
|
||||
//! an `Audio/Sink` plus a re-emitting stream on one client, with no
|
||||
//! `link-group` and no `pulse.module.id` — would then have had its only
|
||||
//! correlation stripped, and it would have leaked the whole call. Such a
|
||||
//! sink has no `device.id`, so it now bridges on `client.id` as it
|
||||
//! should.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Grouping is **transitive** (union-find). That is the fail-closed
|
||||
//! direction: bigger owner components mean more taint, never less.
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::snapshot::{GlobalId, GraphSnapshot, NodeSnapshot, Serial};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Which key bridged two legs. Ordered strongest first; the `Ord` derive is
|
||||
/// load-bearing for "report the strongest shared key".
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
|
||||
pub enum OwnerKey {
|
||||
LinkGroup,
|
||||
PulseModuleId,
|
||||
ClientId,
|
||||
ProcessId,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl OwnerKey {
|
||||
/// Stable, machine-readable — this ends up in the phase 5 audit output
|
||||
/// and the phase 6 status event.
|
||||
pub fn code(self) -> &'static str {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
Self::LinkGroup => "node.link-group",
|
||||
Self::PulseModuleId => "pulse.module.id",
|
||||
Self::ClientId => "client.id",
|
||||
Self::ProcessId => "application.process.id",
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The value a node presents for a given key, if it presents one at all.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
|
||||
enum KeyValue {
|
||||
Text(String),
|
||||
Num(u64),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Owner keys usable on this node, strongest first.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A key that is present but unusable (the pipewire-pulse PID; a coarse key
|
||||
/// on a device node) is **absent** here — that is the whole mechanism of the
|
||||
/// two exceptions.
|
||||
fn keys_of(node: &NodeSnapshot, pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>) -> Vec<(OwnerKey, KeyValue)> {
|
||||
let mut out = Vec::new();
|
||||
if let Some(group) = &node.props.link_group {
|
||||
out.push((OwnerKey::LinkGroup, KeyValue::Text(group.clone())));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(module) = node.props.pulse_module_id {
|
||||
out.push((OwnerKey::PulseModuleId, KeyValue::Num(module)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Exception 2: coarse keys never bridge passive session-manager device
|
||||
// nodes — they all share the session manager's client.
|
||||
if node.props.session_device {
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(client) = node.props.client_id {
|
||||
out.push((OwnerKey::ClientId, KeyValue::Num(u64::from(client.0))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(pid) = node.props.process_id {
|
||||
// Exception 1. Note the fail-closed asymmetry when the daemon PID is
|
||||
// unknown (`None`): the exception does *not* fire, key 4 applies to
|
||||
// everything, and Pulse modules fuse into one owner. That is broad
|
||||
// over-exclusion — annoying and safe — which is the direction v3.4
|
||||
// §6.1.2's failure-mode paragraph asks for.
|
||||
if Some(pid) != pipewire_pulse_pid {
|
||||
out.push((OwnerKey::ProcessId, KeyValue::Num(u64::from(pid))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Can this node's owner be positively bounded — i.e. can we enumerate its
|
||||
/// sibling legs and be right?
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ⚠️ Not the same as "has any usable key", and the difference is a leak.
|
||||
/// `client.id` alone does **not** bound an owner: that is the measured
|
||||
/// GStreamer refutation, where one process presented two different
|
||||
/// `client.id`s for its two legs. So an owner is bounded only by a strong
|
||||
/// key (link-group / pulse.module.id) or by a *usable* process id — usable
|
||||
/// meaning key 4 was not suppressed as pipewire-pulse's own PID.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The case this exists for is v3.4 §12's "module forwarder with neither
|
||||
/// `link-group` nor `pulse.module.id`": its process id is the daemon's and
|
||||
/// therefore suppressed, its two legs may carry different `client.id`s, and
|
||||
/// nothing else relates them. Its sibling output leg cannot be found, so
|
||||
/// the engine must fail closed rather than declare it clean
|
||||
/// (v3.4 §6.1.1, final paragraph).
|
||||
pub fn owner_is_bounded(node: &NodeSnapshot, pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>) -> bool {
|
||||
keys_of(node, pipewire_pulse_pid)
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.any(|(key, _)| *key != OwnerKey::ClientId)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Owner keys computed once per snapshot.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `keys_of` allocates a `Vec` and clones the `link-group` string, and the
|
||||
/// bridge asks for keys once per (tainted member × component member) pair —
|
||||
/// so recomputing was the hot spot in an otherwise linear pass.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
|
||||
pub struct OwnerKeyIndex {
|
||||
keys: BTreeMap<Serial, Vec<(OwnerKey, KeyValue)>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl OwnerKeyIndex {
|
||||
pub fn build(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
keys: snapshot
|
||||
.nodes()
|
||||
.map(|node| (node.serial, keys_of(node, pipewire_pulse_pid)))
|
||||
.collect(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The strongest key these two nodes share directly, if any.
|
||||
pub fn strongest_shared(&self, a: Serial, b: Serial) -> Option<OwnerKey> {
|
||||
let (Some(a_keys), Some(b_keys)) = (self.keys.get(&a), self.keys.get(&b)) else {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Stored strongest-first, so the first match is the strongest.
|
||||
a_keys.iter().find_map(|(key, value)| {
|
||||
b_keys
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.any(|(other_key, other_value)| other_key == key && other_value == value)
|
||||
.then_some(*key)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Is `client.id` a usable owner key for this node?
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ⚠️ Load-bearing for sticky state. A device node's `client.id` is
|
||||
/// suppressed by exception 2, so recording the session manager's Client
|
||||
/// as a *member* of a tainted device's sticky owner would smuggle the
|
||||
/// suppressed key back in: the next recompute would expand that Client
|
||||
/// to every hardware node on the box — the microphone included — and
|
||||
/// the §6.1.1 catastrophe would arrive one epoch late instead of never.
|
||||
/// (Codex round 2, finding 1.)
|
||||
pub fn uses_client_key(&self, serial: Serial) -> bool {
|
||||
self.keys
|
||||
.get(&serial)
|
||||
.is_some_and(|keys| keys.iter().any(|(key, _)| *key == OwnerKey::ClientId))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The owner keys that are safe to remember *across* connections, for
|
||||
/// sticky taint: the strong keys plus a usable process id.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `client.id` is deliberately excluded — it identifies a *connection*,
|
||||
/// and the whole point of a fingerprint is to survive one process
|
||||
/// closing a connection and opening another. A live Client member is
|
||||
/// what covers the same-connection case, precisely.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// These are recyclable strings and numbers, so they are only ever
|
||||
/// applied while some **serial** member of the owner is still live
|
||||
/// (v3.4 §6.1.3): while the process is alive, its PID cannot have been
|
||||
/// handed to anyone else.
|
||||
pub fn fingerprints(&self, serial: Serial) -> Vec<Fingerprint> {
|
||||
self.keys
|
||||
.get(&serial)
|
||||
.map(|keys| {
|
||||
keys.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|(key, _)| *key != OwnerKey::ClientId)
|
||||
.map(|(key, value)| Fingerprint(*key, value.clone()))
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
})
|
||||
.unwrap_or_default()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Does this node currently present `fingerprint`?
|
||||
pub fn has_fingerprint(&self, serial: Serial, fingerprint: &Fingerprint) -> bool {
|
||||
self.keys.get(&serial).is_some_and(|keys| {
|
||||
keys.iter()
|
||||
.any(|(key, value)| *key == fingerprint.0 && *value == fingerprint.1)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// See [`owner_is_bounded`].
|
||||
pub fn is_bounded(&self, serial: Serial) -> bool {
|
||||
self.keys
|
||||
.get(&serial)
|
||||
.is_some_and(|keys| keys.iter().any(|(key, _)| *key != OwnerKey::ClientId))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The strongest key two nodes share, or `None` if they share none. Used to
|
||||
/// *name* the key in a bridge decision; membership itself is transitive and
|
||||
/// comes from [`OwnerComponents`].
|
||||
pub fn strongest_shared_key(
|
||||
a: &NodeSnapshot,
|
||||
b: &NodeSnapshot,
|
||||
pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>,
|
||||
) -> Option<OwnerKey> {
|
||||
let a_keys = keys_of(a, pipewire_pulse_pid);
|
||||
let b_keys = keys_of(b, pipewire_pulse_pid);
|
||||
// `keys_of` yields strongest-first, so the first match is the strongest.
|
||||
a_keys.iter().find_map(|(key, value)| {
|
||||
b_keys
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.any(|(other_key, other_value)| other_key == key && other_value == value)
|
||||
.then_some(*key)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A remembered owner key — see [`OwnerKeyIndex::fingerprints`].
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct Fingerprint(OwnerKey, KeyValue);
|
||||
|
||||
/// Nodes partitioned into owner components.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
|
||||
pub struct OwnerComponents {
|
||||
/// node serial → component index.
|
||||
of_node: BTreeMap<Serial, usize>,
|
||||
/// component index → member node serials, ascending.
|
||||
members: Vec<Vec<Serial>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl OwnerComponents {
|
||||
pub fn build(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>) -> Self {
|
||||
let serials: Vec<Serial> = snapshot.nodes().map(|n| n.serial).collect();
|
||||
let index: BTreeMap<Serial, usize> =
|
||||
serials.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, s)| (*s, i)).collect();
|
||||
let mut uf = UnionFind::new(serials.len());
|
||||
|
||||
// Group by (key, value) and union within each group. Equivalent to
|
||||
// the pairwise "some key resolves" rule, and O(n log n).
|
||||
let mut buckets: BTreeMap<(OwnerKey, KeyValue), Vec<usize>> = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
for node in snapshot.nodes() {
|
||||
let slot = index[&node.serial];
|
||||
for (key, value) in keys_of(node, pipewire_pulse_pid) {
|
||||
buckets.entry((key, value)).or_default().push(slot);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for group in buckets.values() {
|
||||
for pair in group.windows(2) {
|
||||
uf.union(pair[0], pair[1]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Compact roots into dense component indices, deterministically.
|
||||
let mut root_to_component: BTreeMap<usize, usize> = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
let mut members: Vec<Vec<Serial>> = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut of_node = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
for (slot, serial) in serials.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
let root = uf.find(slot);
|
||||
let component = *root_to_component.entry(root).or_insert_with(|| {
|
||||
members.push(Vec::new());
|
||||
members.len() - 1
|
||||
});
|
||||
members[component].push(*serial);
|
||||
of_node.insert(*serial, component);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Self { of_node, members }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn component_of(&self, serial: Serial) -> Option<usize> {
|
||||
self.of_node.get(&serial).copied()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Member serials of the component containing `serial`, including it.
|
||||
/// Empty if the node is not in this snapshot.
|
||||
pub fn members_with(&self, serial: Serial) -> &[Serial] {
|
||||
match self.component_of(serial) {
|
||||
Some(component) => &self.members[component],
|
||||
None => &[],
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn components(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &[Serial]> {
|
||||
self.members.iter().map(Vec::as_slice)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct UnionFind {
|
||||
parent: Vec<usize>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl UnionFind {
|
||||
fn new(len: usize) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
parent: (0..len).collect(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn find(&mut self, mut node: usize) -> usize {
|
||||
while self.parent[node] != node {
|
||||
self.parent[node] = self.parent[self.parent[node]];
|
||||
node = self.parent[node];
|
||||
}
|
||||
node
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn union(&mut self, a: usize, b: usize) {
|
||||
let (a, b) = (self.find(a), self.find(b));
|
||||
if a != b {
|
||||
// Lowest root wins, so components are deterministic.
|
||||
let (low, high) = if a < b { (a, b) } else { (b, a) };
|
||||
self.parent[high] = low;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Client objects belonging to an owner component, so sticky taint can be
|
||||
/// keyed on every object that constitutes the owner (v3.4 §6.1.3: clear the
|
||||
/// entry only once **all** member objects are gone).
|
||||
pub fn client_serials_of(
|
||||
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
|
||||
keys: &OwnerKeyIndex,
|
||||
nodes: &[Serial],
|
||||
) -> Vec<Serial> {
|
||||
let mut out: Vec<Serial> = nodes
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
// Only nodes for which `client.id` is a *usable* owner key. See
|
||||
// `uses_client_key`: recording a device node's shared session-manager
|
||||
// Client here would defeat exception 2 on the next recompute.
|
||||
.filter(|serial| keys.uses_client_key(**serial))
|
||||
.filter_map(|serial| snapshot.node(*serial))
|
||||
.filter_map(|node| node.props.client_id)
|
||||
// An ambiguous client id means two Clients claim it and we cannot
|
||||
// say which one is ours, so remember both: an entry that recorded
|
||||
// neither could be retired while its owner was still live.
|
||||
.flat_map(|id: GlobalId| snapshot.clients_with_id(id).map(|client| client.serial))
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
out.sort_unstable();
|
||||
out.dedup();
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
|
||||
//! The plain, owned graph model the taint engine reasons over.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! **No PipeWire types appear in this file, by design** (impl plan §4,
|
||||
//! phase 2). The registry observer (phase 3) translates live globals into
|
||||
//! these structs; every test builds them by hand. Nothing here ever links
|
||||
//! against libpipewire.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Two id-ish things live in this model and confusing them is the bug the
|
||||
//! whole file is shaped to prevent:
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! - [`Serial`] — `object.serial`, 64-bit, monotonic, **never reused**.
|
||||
//! This is *identity*. Sticky taint is keyed on it.
|
||||
//! - [`GlobalId`] — the PipeWire global id, 32-bit and **recycled**. It is
|
||||
//! a *lookup key within one snapshot* and nothing else: links name their
|
||||
//! endpoints with it, nodes name their client with it. It must never
|
||||
//! outlive the snapshot it was read from (design v3.4 §6.1.3).
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
|
||||
|
||||
/// `object.serial` — 64-bit, monotonic, never recycled. Identity.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
|
||||
pub struct Serial(pub u64);
|
||||
|
||||
/// A PipeWire global id — 32-bit and **recycled**. Snapshot-local lookup
|
||||
/// key only; see the module docs.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
|
||||
pub struct GlobalId(pub u32);
|
||||
|
||||
/// What a node does with audio, parsed from `media.class`.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Taint is computed at **node** granularity (v3.4 §6.1 edge type 2: the
|
||||
/// monitor connection is already a real Link whose output node is the sink
|
||||
/// itself, so a node-level walk crosses `app → sink → monitor-reader` for
|
||||
/// free). Ports exist in the model for link creation in phase 6 and for the
|
||||
/// `port.exclusive` predicate, not for taint.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
|
||||
pub enum MediaRole {
|
||||
/// `Stream/Output/Audio` — an application playing audio. The only
|
||||
/// fan-out candidate.
|
||||
StreamOutput,
|
||||
/// `Stream/Input/Audio` — an application capturing audio.
|
||||
StreamInput,
|
||||
/// `Audio/Sink` — a real or virtual sink.
|
||||
Sink,
|
||||
/// `Audio/Source` — a real or virtual source.
|
||||
Source,
|
||||
/// `Audio/Duplex`. ⚠️ Node granularity smears taint across both roles
|
||||
/// of these; accepted for v1 as fail-closed over-exclusion
|
||||
/// (v3.4 §6.1, edge type 2 caveat).
|
||||
Duplex,
|
||||
/// Anything else, including video and unparseable/absent `media.class`.
|
||||
Other,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl MediaRole {
|
||||
pub fn parse(media_class: Option<&str>) -> Self {
|
||||
match media_class {
|
||||
Some("Stream/Output/Audio") => Self::StreamOutput,
|
||||
Some("Stream/Input/Audio") => Self::StreamInput,
|
||||
Some("Audio/Sink") => Self::Sink,
|
||||
Some("Audio/Source") => Self::Source,
|
||||
Some("Audio/Duplex") => Self::Duplex,
|
||||
_ => Self::Other,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Can this node *receive* audio? This is the gate on the owner bridge:
|
||||
/// taint crosses the intra-process hop only when the owner is actually
|
||||
/// reading tainted audio (v3.4 §6.1.1 — "this client has both an input
|
||||
/// and an output leg ⇒ exclude the output" is the catastrophic rule
|
||||
/// that excludes every app with a microphone).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `Sink` counts: EasyEffects' `ee_sink` is an `Audio/Sink` that
|
||||
/// receives the tainted mix, and its re-emitting leg is joined to it by
|
||||
/// `node.link-group` with no Link between them.
|
||||
pub fn receives_audio(self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self, Self::StreamInput | Self::Sink | Self::Duplex)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Device-ish nodes — everything that is not a `Stream/*`. Coarse owner
|
||||
/// keys are not allowed to bridge these; see [`super::owner`].
|
||||
pub fn is_device_role(self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self, Self::Sink | Self::Source | Self::Duplex)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Only `Stream/Output/Audio` nodes are fan-out candidates (v3.4 §6.2).
|
||||
pub fn is_candidate(self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self, Self::StreamOutput)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The subset of node properties the engine actually reasons about.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Deliberately a struct of parsed fields rather than a property bag: the
|
||||
/// parsing (and its failure modes) belongs at the observer boundary, and a
|
||||
/// bag invites `props.get("...")` typos that silently read `None` — which
|
||||
/// on this feature means "not tainted".
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct NodeProps {
|
||||
/// `peerspeak.owned` is present and truthy (v3.4 §5.1). A correctness
|
||||
/// mechanism, explicitly *not* a security boundary.
|
||||
pub peerspeak_owned: bool,
|
||||
/// `pulse.module.id`, parsed as `u64` — never `u32`, per v3.4 §5.2's
|
||||
/// parse-defensively note and the phase 0a truncation bug.
|
||||
pub pulse_module_id: Option<u64>,
|
||||
/// `node.link-group` — owner key 1, and the `echo-cancel-` hazard
|
||||
/// prefix (v3.4 §5.4 / D3).
|
||||
pub link_group: Option<String>,
|
||||
/// `client.id` — owner key 3. A **connection**, not an owner: GStreamer
|
||||
/// opens one per stream (v3.4 §6.1.2, measured refutation).
|
||||
pub client_id: Option<GlobalId>,
|
||||
/// `application.process.id` **on the node** — owner key 4. For
|
||||
/// module-created streams this is pipewire-pulse's own PID, which is
|
||||
/// why [`super::ExclusionCtx::pipewire_pulse_pid`] exists.
|
||||
pub process_id: Option<u32>,
|
||||
/// The stream negotiated an encoded/passthrough format; a second link
|
||||
/// would refuse or corrupt it (v3.4 §6.2).
|
||||
pub passthrough: bool,
|
||||
/// This node is a **passive device node exported by the session
|
||||
/// manager** — a real sound card's sink or source, not something that
|
||||
/// forwards audio.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ⚠️ **A positive high-confidence classification the observer owes, not
|
||||
/// a raw property** (Codex rounds 2–3). PipeWire defines `device.id`
|
||||
/// only as "the Device this node belongs to" and `device.api` as that
|
||||
/// Device's access API; **neither promises the node passively terminates
|
||||
/// audio**, so a card-associated filter can satisfy both. Setting this
|
||||
/// flag *removes* two protections at once — the node's coarse owner keys
|
||||
/// (`owner` exception 2) and its ability to trip the fail-closed
|
||||
/// backstop — so a false positive is a leak, not over-exclusion.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// **Phase-3 contract:**
|
||||
/// - Set `true` only on positively-identified passive hardware
|
||||
/// terminals: a resolved `device.id` on a real backend
|
||||
/// (`device.api` present) whose `factory.name` is on an **explicit
|
||||
/// hardware-PCM allowlist** — `api.alsa.pcm.sink`, `api.alsa.pcm.source`,
|
||||
/// and the equivalent for other real backends (bluez5, v4l2 for the
|
||||
/// media case) as phase 3 enumerates them — never a filter, loopback,
|
||||
/// or `support.null-audio-sink` factory. An allowlist, not a
|
||||
/// substring or a denylist: an unknown factory is not a device.
|
||||
/// Measured discriminator on the
|
||||
/// target box: the five ALSA nodes carry `device.api=alsa` +
|
||||
/// `factory.name=api.alsa.pcm.*` and share `client.id=42`
|
||||
/// (`WirePlumber [export]`); the three `support.null-audio-sink` nodes
|
||||
/// carry neither. (`node.physical` was measured **null** on the ALSA
|
||||
/// nodes here, so it is *not* a usable discriminator — do not rely on
|
||||
/// it.)
|
||||
/// - **Fail closed: unknown ⇒ `false`.** A node that cannot be
|
||||
/// positively classified keeps its owner keys and can trip the
|
||||
/// backstop; both are the safe direction.
|
||||
/// - A node MUST NOT enter a snapshot with this field provisional. If
|
||||
/// the Device backing a node has not yet been bound, withhold the node
|
||||
/// and keep the epoch not-ready — otherwise a provisional `false`
|
||||
/// during not-ready fuses sink and mic on the shared session client
|
||||
/// and that fusion can persist as sticky over-exclusion (round-3
|
||||
/// finding 3).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ⚠️ **A false positive is leak-capable — do not treat it as braced.**
|
||||
/// I claimed a mis-classified filter could not leak because its legs
|
||||
/// share a `node.link-group` (strong-key bridge) or trip the unbounded
|
||||
/// backstop. Codex refuted it (round 4): a filter *without* a shared
|
||||
/// strong key, marked `session_device=true`, cannot activate the
|
||||
/// backstop from its reading leg, so a differently-keyed re-emitting leg
|
||||
/// leaks. Those braces catch *some* shapes, not all. The only real
|
||||
/// defence is a correct classifier — hence "positive high-confidence"
|
||||
/// and "fail closed to false" above, without exception.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// What it is for: every real device node shares the session manager's
|
||||
/// `client.id`, so coarse owner keys must not bridge them — else
|
||||
/// peerspeak's playback (which taints the default sink every recompute)
|
||||
/// would reach the microphone. See [`super::owner`] exception 2.
|
||||
pub session_device: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct NodeSnapshot {
|
||||
pub serial: Serial,
|
||||
pub id: GlobalId,
|
||||
/// `node.name`, for diagnostics and for `pixelpass_capture_*` ancestry
|
||||
/// detection (v3.4 §6.2, cycle prevention).
|
||||
pub name: Option<String>,
|
||||
pub role: MediaRole,
|
||||
pub props: NodeProps,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
|
||||
pub enum PortDirection {
|
||||
In,
|
||||
Out,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct PortSnapshot {
|
||||
pub serial: Serial,
|
||||
pub id: GlobalId,
|
||||
/// Owning node, by snapshot-local id.
|
||||
pub node: GlobalId,
|
||||
pub direction: PortDirection,
|
||||
/// `port.exclusive` — fan-out will be refused (v3.4 §6.2).
|
||||
pub exclusive: bool,
|
||||
/// `port.monitor`. Recorded for phase 6 link creation; taint does not
|
||||
/// need it at node granularity.
|
||||
pub monitor: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct LinkSnapshot {
|
||||
pub serial: Serial,
|
||||
pub id: GlobalId,
|
||||
/// `link.output.node` — the node audio flows **from**.
|
||||
pub output_node: GlobalId,
|
||||
/// `link.input.node` — the node audio flows **to**.
|
||||
pub input_node: GlobalId,
|
||||
pub output_port: Option<GlobalId>,
|
||||
pub input_port: Option<GlobalId>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct ClientSnapshot {
|
||||
pub serial: Serial,
|
||||
pub id: GlobalId,
|
||||
/// `pipewire.sec.pid` — for Pulse-emulated clients this is
|
||||
/// **pipewire-pulse's** PID, identical across every unrelated app
|
||||
/// (v3.4 §5.2 correction 5). Phase 3 derives the daemon PID from the
|
||||
/// consistency of this value; the engine only consumes the result.
|
||||
pub sec_pid: Option<u32>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// How a snapshot-local id resolves.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
|
||||
pub enum IdLookup {
|
||||
Unique(Serial),
|
||||
/// Two live objects in one snapshot claim the same global id — the
|
||||
/// observer missed a removal, so the recycled id is ambiguous. Every
|
||||
/// edge touching it is treated as unresolved, i.e. fail closed.
|
||||
Ambiguous,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// One coherent observation of the graph.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Built through [`GraphSnapshot::new`] so the id indexes and the ambiguity
|
||||
/// detection cannot be skipped.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct GraphSnapshot {
|
||||
nodes: BTreeMap<Serial, NodeSnapshot>,
|
||||
ports: BTreeMap<Serial, PortSnapshot>,
|
||||
links: BTreeMap<Serial, LinkSnapshot>,
|
||||
clients: BTreeMap<Serial, ClientSnapshot>,
|
||||
node_ids: BTreeMap<GlobalId, IdLookup>,
|
||||
client_ids: BTreeMap<GlobalId, IdLookup>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl GraphSnapshot {
|
||||
pub fn new(
|
||||
nodes: Vec<NodeSnapshot>,
|
||||
ports: Vec<PortSnapshot>,
|
||||
links: Vec<LinkSnapshot>,
|
||||
clients: Vec<ClientSnapshot>,
|
||||
) -> Self {
|
||||
let node_ids = index_ids(nodes.iter().map(|n| (n.id, n.serial)));
|
||||
let client_ids = index_ids(clients.iter().map(|c| (c.id, c.serial)));
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
nodes: nodes.into_iter().map(|n| (n.serial, n)).collect(),
|
||||
ports: ports.into_iter().map(|p| (p.serial, p)).collect(),
|
||||
links: links.into_iter().map(|l| (l.serial, l)).collect(),
|
||||
clients: clients.into_iter().map(|c| (c.serial, c)).collect(),
|
||||
node_ids,
|
||||
client_ids,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn nodes(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &NodeSnapshot> {
|
||||
self.nodes.values()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn node(&self, serial: Serial) -> Option<&NodeSnapshot> {
|
||||
self.nodes.get(&serial)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn links(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &LinkSnapshot> {
|
||||
self.links.values()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn ports(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &PortSnapshot> {
|
||||
self.ports.values()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn clients(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &ClientSnapshot> {
|
||||
self.clients.values()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Resolve a snapshot-local node id. `None` means "no such node in this
|
||||
/// snapshot", which for a link endpoint means unresolved ancestry.
|
||||
pub fn node_by_id(&self, id: GlobalId) -> Option<IdLookup> {
|
||||
self.node_ids.get(&id).copied()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn client_by_id(&self, id: GlobalId) -> Option<IdLookup> {
|
||||
self.client_ids.get(&id).copied()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Every node claiming a global id. More than one means the id is
|
||||
/// [`IdLookup::Ambiguous`] and each claimant must be treated as a
|
||||
/// possible endpoint of any link naming it.
|
||||
pub fn nodes_with_id(&self, id: GlobalId) -> impl Iterator<Item = &NodeSnapshot> {
|
||||
self.nodes.values().filter(move |node| node.id == id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Every client claiming a global id — same fail-closed reasoning.
|
||||
pub fn clients_with_id(&self, id: GlobalId) -> impl Iterator<Item = &ClientSnapshot> {
|
||||
self.clients.values().filter(move |client| client.id == id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Ports belonging to a node, by the node's snapshot-local id.
|
||||
pub fn ports_of(&self, node: GlobalId) -> impl Iterator<Item = &PortSnapshot> {
|
||||
self.ports.values().filter(move |p| p.node == node)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn index_ids(entries: impl Iterator<Item = (GlobalId, Serial)>) -> BTreeMap<GlobalId, IdLookup> {
|
||||
let mut out: BTreeMap<GlobalId, IdLookup> = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
for (id, serial) in entries {
|
||||
out.entry(id)
|
||||
.and_modify(|slot| {
|
||||
if *slot != IdLookup::Unique(serial) {
|
||||
*slot = IdLookup::Ambiguous;
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
.or_insert(IdLookup::Unique(serial));
|
||||
}
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
Reference in New Issue
Block a user