host/taint: pure graph model + taint engine (phase 2)

Implements design v3.4 §6.1–§6.1.3 behind a fixture test surface. No
PipeWire types in any signature; nothing here links against libpipewire.
Not wired into anything yet — phase 3's registry observer is what will
feed it, so the module is `#![allow(dead_code)]` for now.

    evaluate(&GraphSnapshot, &ExclusionCtx, &StickyState)
        -> (Decisions, StickyState)

- snapshot.rs: owned Node/Port/Link/Client model keyed on `Serial`
  (object.serial, 64-bit, identity) with `GlobalId` retained strictly as
  a snapshot-local lookup key. Two live objects claiming one id resolve
  as `Ambiguous`, which fails closed.
- owner.rs: the owner bridge — the key union (link-group, pulse.module.id,
  client.id, application.process.id) with equality-not-first-present
  semantics, transitive union-find components, and both suppression rules.
- mod.rs: monotone fixpoint over link edges, the conditional owner bridge
  (gated on the tainted member being one that *receives* audio) and the
  unbounded-owner backstop, then sticky merge. Stable `Reason` codes with
  an explicit priority so the reported reason never depends on traversal
  order.

Three judgement calls that go beyond what v3.4 spells out, all flagged
in the source:

1. Coarse keys (client.id, application.process.id) may not bridge
   device-role nodes. Every ALSA device is created by one WirePlumber
   process, so they share a client and a PID; peerspeak's playback taints
   the default sink on every recompute, and without this rule that taint
   reaches the microphone source and then every app holding a mic loses
   its playback — the §6.1.1 catastrophe by another route.
2. "Owner is bounded" is not "has a usable key": client.id alone does not
   bound an owner (the measured GStreamer split-client refutation), so
   the fail-closed backstop keys on strong keys or a usable PID.
3. Sticky entries record a reason per node rather than one per owner, so
   a forwarder's output leg keeps `tainted-owner-bridge` instead of
   inheriting its input leg's `tainted-upstream`.

32 fixture tests, each asserting an exact partition of the full candidate
universe rather than spot-checking named nodes: v3.4 §12's matrix, the
impl plan's degenerate-snapshot boundary, and the eligible half of every
scenario so an exclude-everything build fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-21 16:24:15 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent d54e2b99fc
commit 6ead1fe9f8
6 changed files with 2492 additions and 0 deletions
+1
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ mod capture;
mod pipeline;
mod quality;
mod serve;
pub mod taint;
mod wayland;
mod x11;
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@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
//! Synthetic graph builders for the taint-engine tests.
//!
//! Serials are handed out monotonically and never reused, exactly as
//! PipeWire does; global ids are handed out separately and **may be reused
//! on purpose**, which is what the recycling tests need.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use super::snapshot::{
ClientSnapshot, GlobalId, GraphSnapshot, LinkSnapshot, MediaRole, NodeProps, NodeSnapshot,
PortDirection, PortSnapshot, Serial,
};
/// pipewire-pulse's PID, as measured on the target machine.
pub const PULSE_PID: u32 = 2541;
/// WirePlumber's PID — one process owning every device node on the box.
pub const SESSION_PID: u32 = 900;
/// A node's identity in a fixture: what tests pass around.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct NodeRef {
pub serial: Serial,
pub id: GlobalId,
}
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct Graph {
next_serial: u64,
next_id: u32,
nodes: Vec<NodeSnapshot>,
ports: Vec<PortSnapshot>,
links: Vec<LinkSnapshot>,
clients: Vec<ClientSnapshot>,
/// One client connection per process / per module, which is what the
/// live graph looks like. Tests that need the *split*-client shape
/// (GStreamer opens one per stream) pass clients explicitly instead.
client_by_app: BTreeMap<u32, GlobalId>,
client_by_module: BTreeMap<u64, GlobalId>,
session_client: Option<GlobalId>,
}
impl Graph {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
// Start past u32::MAX so every fixture also exercises the phase
// 0a widening: a serial that a u32 model would have truncated.
next_serial: u64::from(u32::MAX) + 1,
next_id: 1,
..Self::default()
}
}
fn serial(&mut self) -> Serial {
self.next_serial += 1;
Serial(self.next_serial)
}
fn id(&mut self) -> GlobalId {
self.next_id += 1;
GlobalId(self.next_id)
}
/// A client object. `sec_pid` is `pipewire.sec.pid` — pipewire-pulse's
/// PID for Pulse-emulated clients.
pub fn client(&mut self, sec_pid: Option<u32>) -> GlobalId {
let serial = self.serial();
let id = self.id();
self.clients.push(ClientSnapshot {
serial,
id,
sec_pid,
});
id
}
/// The client connection an ordinary process holds — one per PID,
/// created on demand.
pub fn client_of_app(&mut self, pid: u32) -> GlobalId {
if let Some(id) = self.client_by_app.get(&pid) {
return *id;
}
let id = self.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
self.client_by_app.insert(pid, id);
id
}
/// An ordinary application stream: its own client, its own PID.
pub fn app_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, pid: u32) -> NodeRef {
let client = self.client_of_app(pid);
self.node(name, role, app(client, pid))
}
/// A leg of a pactl-loaded module: one client per module, and the
/// node's `application.process.id` is **pipewire-pulse's own**, because
/// pipewire-pulse genuinely is the client.
pub fn module_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, module: u64) -> NodeRef {
let client = match self.client_by_module.get(&module) {
Some(id) => *id,
None => {
let id = self.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
self.client_by_module.insert(module, id);
id
}
};
self.node(name, role, pulse_module(client, module, PULSE_PID))
}
/// A leg joined to its siblings by `node.link-group` — loopback,
/// filter-chain, echo-cancel.
pub fn group_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, group: &str, pid: u32) -> NodeRef {
let client = self.client_of_app(pid);
self.node(name, role, link_group(group, client, pid))
}
/// A device node as the session manager creates it: no strong key, and
/// WirePlumber's client and PID — shared with every other device.
pub fn device_node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole) -> NodeRef {
let session = match self.session_client {
Some(id) => id,
None => {
let id = self.client(None);
self.session_client = Some(id);
id
}
};
self.node(name, role, device(session, SESSION_PID))
}
pub fn peerspeak_node(&mut self, name: &str, pid: u32) -> NodeRef {
let client = self.client_of_app(pid);
self.node(name, MediaRole::StreamOutput, peerspeak_owned(client, pid))
}
pub fn node(&mut self, name: &str, role: MediaRole, props: NodeProps) -> NodeRef {
let id = self.id();
self.node_with_id(name, role, id, props)
}
/// Force a global id — for reproducing id recycling after teardown.
pub fn node_with_id(
&mut self,
name: &str,
role: MediaRole,
id: GlobalId,
props: NodeProps,
) -> NodeRef {
let serial = self.serial();
self.nodes.push(NodeSnapshot {
serial,
id,
name: Some(name.to_string()),
role,
props,
});
NodeRef { serial, id }
}
pub fn port(&mut self, node: NodeRef, direction: PortDirection, exclusive: bool) {
let serial = self.serial();
let id = self.id();
self.ports.push(PortSnapshot {
serial,
id,
node: node.id,
direction,
exclusive,
monitor: false,
});
}
/// A signal edge: audio flows `from → to`.
pub fn link(&mut self, from: NodeRef, to: NodeRef) {
self.link_ids(from.id, to.id);
}
/// A link naming raw ids, so a test can dangle an endpoint.
pub fn link_ids(&mut self, from: GlobalId, to: GlobalId) {
let serial = self.serial();
let id = self.id();
self.links.push(LinkSnapshot {
serial,
id,
output_node: from,
input_node: to,
output_port: None,
input_port: None,
});
}
/// An id that belongs to nothing — for unresolved-endpoint tests.
pub fn dangling_id(&mut self) -> GlobalId {
self.id()
}
pub fn build(&self) -> GraphSnapshot {
self.build_without(&[])
}
/// A later snapshot in which some nodes have gone away, along with
/// their ports and every link touching them. Surviving objects keep
/// their serials, which is what makes sticky-taint sequences testable.
pub fn build_without(&self, dropped: &[NodeRef]) -> GraphSnapshot {
let gone_serials: Vec<Serial> = dropped.iter().map(|n| n.serial).collect();
let nodes: Vec<NodeSnapshot> = self
.nodes
.iter()
.filter(|n| !gone_serials.contains(&n.serial))
.cloned()
.collect();
// Filter by what was *dropped*, not by what is live: a link to an id
// that never had a node is a dangling endpoint, and dropping those
// here would quietly disarm every unresolved-ancestry test.
let gone_ids: Vec<GlobalId> = dropped.iter().map(|n| n.id).collect();
GraphSnapshot::new(
nodes,
self.ports
.iter()
.filter(|p| !gone_ids.contains(&p.node))
.cloned()
.collect(),
self.links
.iter()
.filter(|l| !gone_ids.contains(&l.output_node) && !gone_ids.contains(&l.input_node))
.cloned()
.collect(),
self.clients.clone(),
)
}
/// Drop clients too — full owner teardown.
pub fn drop_clients(&mut self, ids: &[GlobalId]) {
self.clients.retain(|c| !ids.contains(&c.id));
}
}
/// An ordinary application stream: real PID, one client connection.
pub fn app(client: GlobalId, pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
NodeProps {
client_id: Some(client),
process_id: Some(pid),
..NodeProps::default()
}
}
/// A pactl-module-created stream: the daemon is the client, so the node's
/// `application.process.id` is pipewire-pulse's own.
pub fn pulse_module(client: GlobalId, module: u64, pulse_pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
NodeProps {
pulse_module_id: Some(module),
client_id: Some(client),
process_id: Some(pulse_pid),
..NodeProps::default()
}
}
/// A PipeWire-module leg joined to its siblings by `node.link-group`
/// (loopback, filter-chain, echo-cancel).
pub fn link_group(group: &str, client: GlobalId, pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
NodeProps {
link_group: Some(group.to_string()),
client_id: Some(client),
process_id: Some(pid),
..NodeProps::default()
}
}
/// A device node as the session manager creates it: no strong key, and the
/// session manager's own client and PID — shared with every other device.
pub fn device(session_client: GlobalId, session_pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
NodeProps {
client_id: Some(session_client),
process_id: Some(session_pid),
..NodeProps::default()
}
}
pub fn peerspeak_owned(client: GlobalId, pid: u32) -> NodeProps {
NodeProps {
peerspeak_owned: true,
..app(client, pid)
}
}
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//! The taint engine — decides which `Stream/Output/Audio` nodes may be
//! fanned out into the screen-share capture without echoing peerspeak's own
//! audio back at the viewer.
//!
//! Implements design v3.4 §6.1–§6.1.3 (`peerspeak/docs/
//! screenshare-audio-exclusion-plan.md`), phase 2 of the implementation
//! plan. **Pure**: no PipeWire types appear in any signature, nothing here
//! touches the daemon, and every test builds its own graph.
//!
//! ## The one-sentence predicate
//!
//! > A node is eligible only if **no** signal path reaches it from a
//! > peerspeak-owned node, the live AEC identity, or any pixelpass-owned
//! > object. **Unresolvable ancestry is not eligible.**
//!
//! That last sentence is the invariant the whole design rests on: every
//! other failure mode in here degrades into over-exclusion (one app's audio
//! silently missing from the share) rather than into echo.
//!
//! ## Why a graph walk and not a property check
//!
//! Exclusion does not propagate downstream by itself. Any node that
//! re-emits audio it received is a fresh, *untagged* `Stream/Output/Audio`
//! carrying the mix — including the one peerspeak playback stream that was
//! correctly excluded one hop earlier. EasyEffects, `module-loopback`,
//! combine-sinks, tunnel/RTP sinks and virtual-sink forwarders all have this
//! shape, and at least one such topology has been observed live on the
//! target machine.
//!
//! Taint therefore flows over **three** edge types:
//!
//! 1. **Link edges** — `link.output.node → link.input.node`.
//! 2. **Sink → monitor** — free at node granularity: the monitor connection
//! *is* a real Link whose output node is the sink node itself (measured).
//! A port-granular walk would need a synthetic edge; a node-granular one
//! does not.
//! 3. **Owner bridges** — the intra-process hop the graph cannot see. See
//! [`owner`]; this is the hard one.
//!
//! ## Stickiness
//!
//! Taint is **sticky per owner** for the duration of the share, because a
//! topological recompute forgets *buffered* audio: an app can read a tainted
//! monitor into a 5-second ring buffer, then have its input leg vanish, and
//! a purely topological engine would relink its output while it is still
//! emitting peerspeak's audio out of that buffer. No graph event marks the
//! moment a buffer drains.
//!
//! Stickiness is keyed on [`Serial`] — never on a node id, `client.id`,
//! module index or `link-group` string, **all of which recycle on this
//! stack**. An entry is cleared only once every member object has
//! disappeared; a key that reappears after full teardown is a new owner and
//! starts clean.
// Phase 2 lands the engine behind its own test surface and nothing else:
// the registry observer that will feed it is phase 3, so in a non-test
// build every item here is legitimately unreachable for now.
#![allow(dead_code)]
pub mod owner;
pub mod snapshot;
#[cfg(test)]
mod fixture;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet, VecDeque};
use owner::{OwnerComponents, OwnerKey};
use snapshot::{GraphSnapshot, IdLookup, MediaRole, NodeSnapshot, Serial};
/// The `node.name` prefix of a pixelpass capture sink. Any host's sink
/// counts, not just ours — fanning out a stream that is downstream of
/// *another* pixelpass host's capture sink builds a cycle (v3.4 §6.2).
pub const CAPTURE_SINK_PREFIX: &str = "pixelpass_capture_";
/// `node.link-group` prefix that marks *some* echo canceller. Hazard
/// detection only — it does **not** identify peerspeak's instance, which is
/// what `pulse.module.id` is for (v3.4 §5.2 correction 4).
pub const ECHO_CANCEL_GROUP_PREFIX: &str = "echo-cancel-";
/// Why a node is tainted or excluded. Stable machine-readable codes: this
/// value is the phase 5 audit output, the phase 6 status event, and the
/// eventual answer to "why isn't this app being shared?".
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Hash)]
pub enum Reason {
/// Carries the `peerspeak.owned` tag (v3.4 §5.1).
PeerspeakOwned,
/// `pulse.module.id` equals the live AEC module index — exact equality
/// only. "Has any `pulse.module.id`" is explicitly rejected as a rule:
/// tunnel/RTP/loopback modules may be the only carrier of audio the
/// user legitimately wants shared (v3.4 §5.2 correction 2).
AecIdentity,
/// A pixelpass-owned object, ours or another host's capture sink.
PixelpassOwned,
/// An `echo-cancel-*` group that is **not** our validated identity.
/// Decision D3: warn and exclude rather than fan out.
ForeignEchoCancel,
/// Reached by a signal path from a tainted node (link or monitor edge).
TaintedUpstream,
/// Reached across an owner bridge; the key that did it, when the
/// tainted member shares one directly rather than transitively.
TaintedOwnerBridge { key: Option<OwnerKey> },
/// A link endpoint, or a node's own id, could not be resolved in this
/// snapshot. Fail closed (v3.4 §6.1.4).
UnresolvedAncestry,
/// A tainted capture stream whose owner cannot be bounded by any usable
/// key, so its sibling output legs cannot be identified. Fail closed
/// (v3.4 §6.1.1, final paragraph).
UnresolvedOwner,
/// The observer has not reached a complete, coherent view of the graph
/// yet. No decision made from a partial graph is a decision.
GraphNotReady,
/// A `port.exclusive` port — fan-out will be refused (v3.4 §6.2). Local
/// to the node; does not propagate.
PortExclusive,
/// An encoded/passthrough stream — a second link would corrupt it.
/// Local to the node; does not propagate.
Passthrough,
}
impl Reason {
pub fn code(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::PeerspeakOwned => "peerspeak-owned",
Self::AecIdentity => "aec-identity",
Self::PixelpassOwned => "pixelpass-owned",
Self::ForeignEchoCancel => "foreign-echo-cancel",
Self::TaintedUpstream => "tainted-upstream",
Self::TaintedOwnerBridge { .. } => "tainted-owner-bridge",
Self::UnresolvedAncestry => "unresolved-ancestry",
Self::UnresolvedOwner => "unresolved-owner",
Self::GraphNotReady => "graph-not-ready",
Self::PortExclusive => "port-exclusive",
Self::Passthrough => "passthrough",
}
}
/// Lower wins. A node can acquire taint several ways in one recompute
/// and the reported reason must not depend on traversal order, or the
/// audit output is unstable and the fixture tests are flaky. Explicit
/// priority, not BFS arrival order.
fn priority(self) -> u8 {
match self {
Self::PeerspeakOwned => 0,
Self::AecIdentity => 1,
Self::PixelpassOwned => 2,
Self::ForeignEchoCancel => 3,
Self::TaintedUpstream => 4,
Self::TaintedOwnerBridge { .. } => 5,
Self::UnresolvedAncestry => 6,
Self::UnresolvedOwner => 7,
// Non-propagating; never competes with the taint reasons above
// because it is only consulted for untainted candidates.
Self::GraphNotReady => 8,
Self::PortExclusive => 9,
Self::Passthrough => 10,
}
}
/// Does this reason spread to downstream nodes and owner siblings?
fn propagates(self) -> bool {
self.priority() <= Self::UnresolvedOwner.priority()
}
}
/// Everything the engine needs that is not in the graph itself.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ExclusionCtx {
/// The **validated** live AEC module index, or `None` for `--aec=off`.
/// The validation state machine (phase 4) owns the transitions; if it
/// is still `Validating` or has `Failed`, its caller must not fan out at
/// all rather than passing `None` here, which would merely mean "there
/// is no AEC".
pub aec_module_id: Option<u64>,
/// pipewire-pulse's own PID, derived by the observer (phase 3) from a
/// consistent `pipewire.sec.pid` across Pulse clients validated against
/// `/proc/<pid>/comm`. `None` is safe but coarse — see [`owner`].
pub pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>,
/// Serials of objects pixelpass itself created this run.
pub pixelpass_owned: BTreeSet<Serial>,
/// False until the readiness epoch has been reached (phase 3). Every
/// candidate is then ineligible: a decision from a partial graph is not
/// a decision.
pub graph_ready: bool,
}
/// Object identity for sticky bookkeeping. Always a [`Serial`] — never a
/// recyclable id (v3.4 §6.1.3).
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
pub enum ObjectRef {
Node(Serial),
Client(Serial),
}
/// One owner that has been tainted, and every object observed to constitute
/// it. Cleared only when **all** of them are gone.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct StickyOwner {
/// Every object seen to be part of this owner, ever. Membership
/// accumulates: that is what makes "clear only once all member objects
/// have disappeared" true across churn.
pub members: BTreeSet<ObjectRef>,
/// The reason recorded for each node that was tainted in its own right.
/// Kept per node rather than collapsed to one owner-wide reason, or a
/// forwarder's output leg inherits its *input* leg's `tainted-upstream`
/// and the audit output stops naming the mechanism that actually
/// excluded it.
pub node_reasons: BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
}
impl StickyOwner {
/// The reason to apply to a member: its own recorded one, or — for a
/// leg that appeared later — the fact that it belongs to a tainted
/// owner, which is a bridge by definition.
fn reason_for(&self, serial: Serial) -> Reason {
self.node_reasons
.get(&serial)
.copied()
.unwrap_or(Reason::TaintedOwnerBridge { key: None })
}
}
/// Threaded explicitly through [`evaluate`] so stickiness is testable as a
/// sequence of snapshots rather than as hidden mutable state.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct StickyState {
pub owners: Vec<StickyOwner>,
}
impl StickyState {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.owners.is_empty()
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub enum Eligibility {
Eligible,
NotEligible {
reason: Reason,
/// The taint was carried over from a previous snapshot rather than
/// derived from the current topology.
sticky: bool,
},
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NodeDecision {
pub serial: Serial,
pub name: Option<String>,
pub eligibility: Eligibility,
}
impl NodeDecision {
pub fn is_eligible(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self.eligibility, Eligibility::Eligible)
}
pub fn reason(&self) -> Option<Reason> {
match self.eligibility {
Eligibility::Eligible => None,
Eligibility::NotEligible { reason, .. } => Some(reason),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct TaintEntry {
pub reason: Reason,
pub sticky: bool,
}
/// The result of one recompute.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Decisions {
/// Every `Stream/Output/Audio` node in the snapshot — the complete
/// candidate universe, so callers can assert an exact partition rather
/// than spot-checking named nodes.
pub candidates: BTreeMap<Serial, NodeDecision>,
/// Taint over *all* node roles, for diagnostics and for the phase 5
/// audit output.
pub taint: BTreeMap<Serial, TaintEntry>,
}
impl Decisions {
/// Serials of eligible candidates, ascending.
pub fn eligible(&self) -> Vec<Serial> {
self.candidates
.values()
.filter(|d| d.is_eligible())
.map(|d| d.serial)
.collect()
}
/// `(serial, reason code)` for excluded candidates, ascending.
pub fn excluded(&self) -> Vec<(Serial, &'static str)> {
self.candidates
.values()
.filter_map(|d| d.reason().map(|r| (d.serial, r.code())))
.collect()
}
}
/// Recompute eligibility for the whole graph.
///
/// Full recompute per graph event is the v1 design (O(V+E) over a ~40-node
/// desktop graph); there is deliberately no incremental dirty-set.
pub fn evaluate(
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
ctx: &ExclusionCtx,
prior: &StickyState,
) -> (Decisions, StickyState) {
let components = OwnerComponents::build(snapshot, ctx.pipewire_pulse_pid);
let mut taint: BTreeMap<Serial, Reason> = BTreeMap::new();
let mut sticky_serials: BTreeSet<Serial> = BTreeSet::new();
seed_local_roots(snapshot, ctx, &mut taint);
seed_sticky(
snapshot,
prior,
&components,
&mut taint,
&mut sticky_serials,
);
// Monotone fixpoint: every step only adds taint, or lowers a node's
// reason priority, both of which are bounded. Link propagation and the
// owner bridge feed each other — a bridged output leg has downstream
// links, and a downstream monitor reader bridges to its own siblings —
// so neither can be run once.
let downstream = downstream_edges(snapshot, &mut taint);
loop {
let mut changed = false;
changed |= propagate_links(&downstream, &mut taint);
changed |= propagate_owner_bridge(snapshot, ctx, &components, &mut taint);
changed |= propagate_unresolved_owner(snapshot, ctx, &mut taint);
if !changed {
break;
}
}
let decisions = build_decisions(snapshot, ctx, &taint, &sticky_serials);
let next_sticky = build_sticky(snapshot, &components, &taint, prior);
(decisions, next_sticky)
}
/// Roots that are visible on the node itself.
fn seed_local_roots(
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
ctx: &ExclusionCtx,
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
) {
for node in snapshot.nodes() {
if let Some(reason) = local_root_reason(node, ctx) {
raise(taint, node.serial, reason);
}
// A node whose own global id is ambiguous cannot be the reliable
// endpoint of any link, so its ancestry is unresolvable.
if snapshot.node_by_id(node.id) == Some(IdLookup::Ambiguous) {
raise(taint, node.serial, Reason::UnresolvedAncestry);
}
}
}
fn local_root_reason(node: &NodeSnapshot, ctx: &ExclusionCtx) -> Option<Reason> {
if node.props.peerspeak_owned {
return Some(Reason::PeerspeakOwned);
}
if let (Some(module), Some(aec)) = (node.props.pulse_module_id, ctx.aec_module_id)
&& module == aec
{
return Some(Reason::AecIdentity);
}
if ctx.pixelpass_owned.contains(&node.serial)
|| node
.name
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(|name| name.starts_with(CAPTURE_SINK_PREFIX))
{
return Some(Reason::PixelpassOwned);
}
if node
.props
.link_group
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(|group| group.starts_with(ECHO_CANCEL_GROUP_PREFIX))
{
return Some(Reason::ForeignEchoCancel);
}
None
}
/// Carry taint forward from previous snapshots (v3.4 §6.1.3).
fn seed_sticky(
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
prior: &StickyState,
components: &OwnerComponents,
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
sticky_serials: &mut BTreeSet<Serial>,
) {
for entry in &prior.owners {
let live_nodes: Vec<Serial> = entry
.members
.iter()
.filter_map(|member| match member {
ObjectRef::Node(serial) => snapshot.node(*serial).map(|_| *serial),
ObjectRef::Client(_) => None,
})
.collect();
// The owner is sticky, not the individual node: a leg that appears
// later in the same still-live owner inherits the taint.
for serial in live_nodes {
for member in components.members_with(serial) {
let reason = entry.reason_for(*member);
if raise(taint, *member, reason) || taint.get(member) == Some(&reason) {
sticky_serials.insert(*member);
}
}
}
}
}
/// `output node → input nodes`, resolving snapshot-local ids. An endpoint
/// that does not resolve taints the *other* end as unresolved ancestry when
/// that other end is the input side — we cannot know what is feeding it.
fn downstream_edges(
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
) -> BTreeMap<Serial, Vec<Serial>> {
let mut edges: BTreeMap<Serial, Vec<Serial>> = BTreeMap::new();
for link in snapshot.links() {
let from = snapshot.node_by_id(link.output_node);
let to = snapshot.node_by_id(link.input_node);
match (from, to) {
(Some(IdLookup::Unique(from)), Some(IdLookup::Unique(to))) => {
edges.entry(from).or_default().push(to);
}
(_, Some(IdLookup::Unique(to))) => {
// Something feeds this node and we cannot say what.
raise(taint, to, Reason::UnresolvedAncestry);
}
_ => {}
}
}
for targets in edges.values_mut() {
targets.sort_unstable();
targets.dedup();
}
edges
}
fn propagate_links(
downstream: &BTreeMap<Serial, Vec<Serial>>,
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
) -> bool {
let mut changed = false;
let mut queue: VecDeque<Serial> = taint
.iter()
.filter(|(_, reason)| reason.propagates())
.map(|(serial, _)| *serial)
.collect();
while let Some(serial) = queue.pop_front() {
let Some(targets) = downstream.get(&serial) else {
continue;
};
for target in targets {
if raise(taint, *target, Reason::TaintedUpstream) {
changed = true;
queue.push_back(*target);
}
}
}
changed
}
/// The conditional owner bridge (v3.4 §6.1.1): taint crosses to an owner's
/// other legs **only** when the tainted member is one that actually
/// receives audio. The naive "this owner has both an input and an output
/// leg ⇒ exclude the output" rule would exclude every app using a
/// microphone, Firefox in a video call included.
fn propagate_owner_bridge(
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
ctx: &ExclusionCtx,
components: &OwnerComponents,
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
) -> bool {
let mut changed = false;
for members in components.components() {
let sources: Vec<Serial> = members
.iter()
.copied()
.filter(|serial| {
taint.get(serial).is_some_and(|r| r.propagates())
&& snapshot
.node(*serial)
.is_some_and(|n| n.role.receives_audio())
})
.collect();
if sources.is_empty() {
continue;
}
for target in members {
if sources.contains(target) {
continue;
}
let Some(target_node) = snapshot.node(*target) else {
continue;
};
// Name the strongest key shared directly with any tainted
// member; `None` means the two are only transitively related.
let key = sources
.iter()
.filter_map(|source| snapshot.node(*source))
.filter_map(|source| {
owner::strongest_shared_key(source, target_node, ctx.pipewire_pulse_pid)
})
.min();
changed |= raise(taint, *target, Reason::TaintedOwnerBridge { key });
}
}
changed
}
/// Fail-closed backstop for an owner we cannot bound (v3.4 §6.1.1, final
/// paragraph): a capture stream is reading tainted audio and nothing about
/// it lets us enumerate its sibling output legs, so we cannot know which
/// output leg is re-emitting what it read. Exclude the output legs that are
/// equally unbounded.
///
/// Two deliberate restrictions keep the blast radius at "small", as the
/// design promises:
///
/// - **Source must be a `Stream/Input/Audio`.** A tainted *device* sink is
/// the normal case, not an anomaly — peerspeak's own playback taints the
/// default sink on literally every recompute — and letting that trip this
/// rule would exclude the entire desktop.
/// - **Targets must themselves be unbounded.** Ordinary application streams
/// carry a real `application.process.id` and are bounded, so they are
/// never swept up; in practice only other daemon-owned keyless module
/// streams are.
fn propagate_unresolved_owner(
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
ctx: &ExclusionCtx,
taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
) -> bool {
let unbounded_reader = snapshot.nodes().any(|node| {
node.role == MediaRole::StreamInput
&& taint.get(&node.serial).is_some_and(|r| r.propagates())
&& !owner::owner_is_bounded(node, ctx.pipewire_pulse_pid)
});
if !unbounded_reader {
return false;
}
let mut changed = false;
for node in snapshot.nodes() {
if node.role == MediaRole::StreamOutput
&& !owner::owner_is_bounded(node, ctx.pipewire_pulse_pid)
{
changed |= raise(taint, node.serial, Reason::UnresolvedOwner);
}
}
changed
}
fn build_decisions(
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
ctx: &ExclusionCtx,
taint: &BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
sticky_serials: &BTreeSet<Serial>,
) -> Decisions {
let mut candidates = BTreeMap::new();
for node in snapshot.nodes().filter(|n| n.role.is_candidate()) {
let sticky = sticky_serials.contains(&node.serial);
let eligibility = if !ctx.graph_ready {
Eligibility::NotEligible {
reason: Reason::GraphNotReady,
sticky: false,
}
} else if let Some(reason) = taint.get(&node.serial) {
Eligibility::NotEligible {
reason: *reason,
sticky,
}
} else if let Some(reason) = local_exclusion(snapshot, node) {
Eligibility::NotEligible {
reason,
sticky: false,
}
} else {
Eligibility::Eligible
};
candidates.insert(
node.serial,
NodeDecision {
serial: node.serial,
name: node.name.clone(),
eligibility,
},
);
}
Decisions {
candidates,
taint: taint
.iter()
.map(|(serial, reason)| {
(
*serial,
TaintEntry {
reason: *reason,
sticky: sticky_serials.contains(serial),
},
)
})
.collect(),
}
}
/// Node-local reasons a link cannot be created even though the node is
/// clean. These do not propagate — an exclusive-port stream is unlinkable,
/// not hazardous.
fn local_exclusion(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, node: &NodeSnapshot) -> Option<Reason> {
if node.props.passthrough {
return Some(Reason::Passthrough);
}
if snapshot.ports_of(node.id).any(|port| port.exclusive) {
return Some(Reason::PortExclusive);
}
None
}
/// Sticky bookkeeping for the next recompute: every tainted owner, with
/// every object observed to constitute it, merged with any prior entry that
/// still overlaps. Members accumulate — that is what makes "clear only once
/// all member objects have disappeared" true across churn.
fn build_sticky(
snapshot: &GraphSnapshot,
components: &OwnerComponents,
taint: &BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>,
prior: &StickyState,
) -> StickyState {
let mut entries: Vec<StickyOwner> = Vec::new();
// Carry forward prior entries that still have at least one live member.
// An entry with none is gone for good: serials never recycle, so a
// vanished member can never come back.
for entry in &prior.owners {
if entry
.members
.iter()
.any(|member| is_live(snapshot, *member))
{
entries.push(entry.clone());
}
}
for members in components.components() {
let node_reasons: BTreeMap<Serial, Reason> = members
.iter()
.filter_map(|serial| {
taint
.get(serial)
.filter(|reason| reason.propagates())
.map(|reason| (*serial, *reason))
})
.collect();
if node_reasons.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let mut refs: BTreeSet<ObjectRef> = members.iter().map(|s| ObjectRef::Node(*s)).collect();
refs.extend(
owner::client_serials_of(snapshot, members)
.into_iter()
.map(ObjectRef::Client),
);
entries.push(StickyOwner {
members: refs,
node_reasons,
});
}
StickyState {
owners: merge_overlapping(entries),
}
}
fn is_live(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, member: ObjectRef) -> bool {
match member {
ObjectRef::Node(serial) => snapshot.node(serial).is_some(),
ObjectRef::Client(serial) => snapshot.clients().any(|c| c.serial == serial),
}
}
/// Merge entries that share any member, keeping the strongest reason.
/// Owners fuse over time (a component that gains a leg belonging to a
/// previously separate sticky owner is one owner now); splitting them back
/// apart would drop taint, which is the unsafe direction.
fn merge_overlapping(mut entries: Vec<StickyOwner>) -> Vec<StickyOwner> {
let mut merged: Vec<StickyOwner> = Vec::new();
while let Some(mut entry) = entries.pop() {
let mut absorbed = true;
while absorbed {
absorbed = false;
let mut rest = Vec::with_capacity(entries.len());
for other in entries.drain(..) {
if entry.members.is_disjoint(&other.members) {
rest.push(other);
} else {
for (serial, reason) in other.node_reasons {
entry
.node_reasons
.entry(serial)
.and_modify(|existing| {
if reason.priority() < existing.priority() {
*existing = reason;
}
})
.or_insert(reason);
}
entry.members.extend(other.members);
absorbed = true;
}
}
entries = rest;
}
merged.push(entry);
}
merged.sort_by(|a, b| a.members.iter().next().cmp(&b.members.iter().next()));
merged
}
/// Record `reason` for `serial` if it is new or strictly stronger than what
/// is already recorded. Returns whether anything changed — the fixpoint's
/// termination argument rests on this being monotone.
fn raise(taint: &mut BTreeMap<Serial, Reason>, serial: Serial, reason: Reason) -> bool {
match taint.get(&serial) {
Some(existing) if existing.priority() <= reason.priority() => false,
_ => {
taint.insert(serial, reason);
true
}
}
}
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//! The owner bridge — grouping nodes that belong to the same *owner* even
//! though the graph shows no Link between them.
//!
//! This is the subtlest part of the design (v3.4 §6.1.2). Measured fact it
//! exists to handle: a `module-loopback` forwarder's input leg and output
//! leg have **no Link between them**, so walking Links alone from the
//! leaking output leg finds no inbound links at all — a dead end that reads
//! as "clean". The legs are related only by shared properties.
//!
//! ## The rule
//!
//! A union of keys, strongest first:
//!
//! | # | key | scope |
//! | --- | --- | --- |
//! | 1 | `node.link-group` | per module/filter instance |
//! | 2 | `pulse.module.id` | per pactl module |
//! | 3 | `client.id` | per **connection** |
//! | 4 | `application.process.id` | per process |
//!
//! ⚠️ **"Resolves" means the two legs carry the key AND the values are
//! EQUAL — not "the first key present".** A first-present implementation
//! reproduces the exact measured leak: for `gst-launch pulsesrc ! pulsesink`
//! both legs carry `client.id` (209 and 210) but the values *differ*, so
//! first-present stops at key 3, sees a mismatch, and concludes "different
//! owners". The legs are in fact one process (`application.process.id`
//! 20172 on both). So: try each key in order, and a key resolves only if
//! both legs carry it and the values are equal; otherwise fall through.
//!
//! ## Two exceptions, both guarding against mass over-exclusion
//!
//! 1. **Never bridge on key 4 when the value is pipewire-pulse's own PID**
//! (v3.4 §6.1.2). Module-created streams all carry the daemon's PID, so
//! bridging on it fuses every Pulse module into one owner and a single
//! tainted module input would exclude every module-created stream on the
//! box. Keys 1 and 2 already cover those cases precisely.
//!
//! 2. **Coarse keys (3 and 4) may not bridge device-role nodes.** ⚠️ This
//! rule is *not* in design v3.4 — it was found while implementing, and
//! it is the exact analogue of exception 1 for the session manager:
//! every ALSA `Audio/Sink` and `Audio/Source` on the box is created by
//! WirePlumber and therefore shares one `client.id` and one
//! `application.process.id`. Without this rule, the hardware sink
//! carrying peerspeak's playback (tainted by design, every single time)
//! would bridge to *every other device node including the microphone
//! source*, whose readers would then taint their owners' playback legs —
//! reproducing precisely the §6.1.1 catastrophe ("excludes any app using
//! a microphone") through a different door. Device nodes that genuinely
//! belong to a module still bridge, via keys 1 and 2.
//!
//! Grouping is **transitive** (union-find). That is the fail-closed
//! direction: bigger owner components mean more taint, never less.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use super::snapshot::{GlobalId, GraphSnapshot, NodeSnapshot, Serial};
/// Which key bridged two legs. Ordered strongest first; the `Ord` derive is
/// load-bearing for "report the strongest shared key".
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
pub enum OwnerKey {
LinkGroup,
PulseModuleId,
ClientId,
ProcessId,
}
impl OwnerKey {
/// Stable, machine-readable — this ends up in the phase 5 audit output
/// and the phase 6 status event.
pub fn code(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::LinkGroup => "node.link-group",
Self::PulseModuleId => "pulse.module.id",
Self::ClientId => "client.id",
Self::ProcessId => "application.process.id",
}
}
}
/// The value a node presents for a given key, if it presents one at all.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
enum KeyValue {
Text(String),
Num(u64),
}
/// Owner keys usable on this node, strongest first.
///
/// A key that is present but unusable (the pipewire-pulse PID; a coarse key
/// on a device node) is **absent** here — that is the whole mechanism of the
/// two exceptions.
fn keys_of(node: &NodeSnapshot, pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>) -> Vec<(OwnerKey, KeyValue)> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
if let Some(group) = &node.props.link_group {
out.push((OwnerKey::LinkGroup, KeyValue::Text(group.clone())));
}
if let Some(module) = node.props.pulse_module_id {
out.push((OwnerKey::PulseModuleId, KeyValue::Num(module)));
}
// Exception 2: coarse keys never bridge device-role nodes.
if node.role.is_device_role() {
return out;
}
if let Some(client) = node.props.client_id {
out.push((OwnerKey::ClientId, KeyValue::Num(u64::from(client.0))));
}
if let Some(pid) = node.props.process_id {
// Exception 1. Note the fail-closed asymmetry when the daemon PID is
// unknown (`None`): the exception does *not* fire, key 4 applies to
// everything, and Pulse modules fuse into one owner. That is broad
// over-exclusion — annoying and safe — which is the direction v3.4
// §6.1.2's failure-mode paragraph asks for.
if Some(pid) != pipewire_pulse_pid {
out.push((OwnerKey::ProcessId, KeyValue::Num(u64::from(pid))));
}
}
out
}
/// Can this node's owner be positively bounded — i.e. can we enumerate its
/// sibling legs and be right?
///
/// ⚠️ Not the same as "has any usable key", and the difference is a leak.
/// `client.id` alone does **not** bound an owner: that is the measured
/// GStreamer refutation, where one process presented two different
/// `client.id`s for its two legs. So an owner is bounded only by a strong
/// key (link-group / pulse.module.id) or by a *usable* process id — usable
/// meaning key 4 was not suppressed as pipewire-pulse's own PID.
///
/// The case this exists for is v3.4 §12's "module forwarder with neither
/// `link-group` nor `pulse.module.id`": its process id is the daemon's and
/// therefore suppressed, its two legs may carry different `client.id`s, and
/// nothing else relates them. Its sibling output leg cannot be found, so
/// the engine must fail closed rather than declare it clean
/// (v3.4 §6.1.1, final paragraph).
pub fn owner_is_bounded(node: &NodeSnapshot, pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>) -> bool {
keys_of(node, pipewire_pulse_pid)
.iter()
.any(|(key, _)| *key != OwnerKey::ClientId)
}
/// The strongest key two nodes share, or `None` if they share none. Used to
/// *name* the key in a bridge decision; membership itself is transitive and
/// comes from [`OwnerComponents`].
pub fn strongest_shared_key(
a: &NodeSnapshot,
b: &NodeSnapshot,
pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>,
) -> Option<OwnerKey> {
let a_keys = keys_of(a, pipewire_pulse_pid);
let b_keys = keys_of(b, pipewire_pulse_pid);
// `keys_of` yields strongest-first, so the first match is the strongest.
a_keys.iter().find_map(|(key, value)| {
b_keys
.iter()
.any(|(other_key, other_value)| other_key == key && other_value == value)
.then_some(*key)
})
}
/// Nodes partitioned into owner components.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
pub struct OwnerComponents {
/// node serial → component index.
of_node: BTreeMap<Serial, usize>,
/// component index → member node serials, ascending.
members: Vec<Vec<Serial>>,
}
impl OwnerComponents {
pub fn build(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, pipewire_pulse_pid: Option<u32>) -> Self {
let serials: Vec<Serial> = snapshot.nodes().map(|n| n.serial).collect();
let index: BTreeMap<Serial, usize> =
serials.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, s)| (*s, i)).collect();
let mut uf = UnionFind::new(serials.len());
// Group by (key, value) and union within each group. Equivalent to
// the pairwise "some key resolves" rule, and O(n log n).
let mut buckets: BTreeMap<(OwnerKey, KeyValue), Vec<usize>> = BTreeMap::new();
for node in snapshot.nodes() {
let slot = index[&node.serial];
for (key, value) in keys_of(node, pipewire_pulse_pid) {
buckets.entry((key, value)).or_default().push(slot);
}
}
for group in buckets.values() {
for pair in group.windows(2) {
uf.union(pair[0], pair[1]);
}
}
// Compact roots into dense component indices, deterministically.
let mut root_to_component: BTreeMap<usize, usize> = BTreeMap::new();
let mut members: Vec<Vec<Serial>> = Vec::new();
let mut of_node = BTreeMap::new();
for (slot, serial) in serials.iter().enumerate() {
let root = uf.find(slot);
let component = *root_to_component.entry(root).or_insert_with(|| {
members.push(Vec::new());
members.len() - 1
});
members[component].push(*serial);
of_node.insert(*serial, component);
}
Self { of_node, members }
}
pub fn component_of(&self, serial: Serial) -> Option<usize> {
self.of_node.get(&serial).copied()
}
/// Member serials of the component containing `serial`, including it.
/// Empty if the node is not in this snapshot.
pub fn members_with(&self, serial: Serial) -> &[Serial] {
match self.component_of(serial) {
Some(component) => &self.members[component],
None => &[],
}
}
pub fn components(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &[Serial]> {
self.members.iter().map(Vec::as_slice)
}
}
struct UnionFind {
parent: Vec<usize>,
}
impl UnionFind {
fn new(len: usize) -> Self {
Self {
parent: (0..len).collect(),
}
}
fn find(&mut self, mut node: usize) -> usize {
while self.parent[node] != node {
self.parent[node] = self.parent[self.parent[node]];
node = self.parent[node];
}
node
}
fn union(&mut self, a: usize, b: usize) {
let (a, b) = (self.find(a), self.find(b));
if a != b {
// Lowest root wins, so components are deterministic.
let (low, high) = if a < b { (a, b) } else { (b, a) };
self.parent[high] = low;
}
}
}
/// Client objects belonging to an owner component, so sticky taint can be
/// keyed on every object that constitutes the owner (v3.4 §6.1.3: clear the
/// entry only once **all** member objects are gone).
pub fn client_serials_of(snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, nodes: &[Serial]) -> Vec<Serial> {
let mut out: Vec<Serial> = nodes
.iter()
.filter_map(|serial| snapshot.node(*serial))
.filter_map(|node| node.props.client_id)
.filter_map(|id: GlobalId| match snapshot.client_by_id(id) {
Some(super::snapshot::IdLookup::Unique(serial)) => Some(serial),
_ => None,
})
.collect();
out.sort_unstable();
out.dedup();
out
}
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//! The plain, owned graph model the taint engine reasons over.
//!
//! **No PipeWire types appear in this file, by design** (impl plan §4,
//! phase 2). The registry observer (phase 3) translates live globals into
//! these structs; every test builds them by hand. Nothing here ever links
//! against libpipewire.
//!
//! Two id-ish things live in this model and confusing them is the bug the
//! whole file is shaped to prevent:
//!
//! - [`Serial`] — `object.serial`, 64-bit, monotonic, **never reused**.
//! This is *identity*. Sticky taint is keyed on it.
//! - [`GlobalId`] — the PipeWire global id, 32-bit and **recycled**. It is
//! a *lookup key within one snapshot* and nothing else: links name their
//! endpoints with it, nodes name their client with it. It must never
//! outlive the snapshot it was read from (design v3.4 §6.1.3).
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
/// `object.serial` — 64-bit, monotonic, never recycled. Identity.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
pub struct Serial(pub u64);
/// A PipeWire global id — 32-bit and **recycled**. Snapshot-local lookup
/// key only; see the module docs.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
pub struct GlobalId(pub u32);
/// What a node does with audio, parsed from `media.class`.
///
/// Taint is computed at **node** granularity (v3.4 §6.1 edge type 2: the
/// monitor connection is already a real Link whose output node is the sink
/// itself, so a node-level walk crosses `app → sink → monitor-reader` for
/// free). Ports exist in the model for link creation in phase 6 and for the
/// `port.exclusive` predicate, not for taint.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
pub enum MediaRole {
/// `Stream/Output/Audio` — an application playing audio. The only
/// fan-out candidate.
StreamOutput,
/// `Stream/Input/Audio` — an application capturing audio.
StreamInput,
/// `Audio/Sink` — a real or virtual sink.
Sink,
/// `Audio/Source` — a real or virtual source.
Source,
/// `Audio/Duplex`. ⚠️ Node granularity smears taint across both roles
/// of these; accepted for v1 as fail-closed over-exclusion
/// (v3.4 §6.1, edge type 2 caveat).
Duplex,
/// Anything else, including video and unparseable/absent `media.class`.
Other,
}
impl MediaRole {
pub fn parse(media_class: Option<&str>) -> Self {
match media_class {
Some("Stream/Output/Audio") => Self::StreamOutput,
Some("Stream/Input/Audio") => Self::StreamInput,
Some("Audio/Sink") => Self::Sink,
Some("Audio/Source") => Self::Source,
Some("Audio/Duplex") => Self::Duplex,
_ => Self::Other,
}
}
/// Can this node *receive* audio? This is the gate on the owner bridge:
/// taint crosses the intra-process hop only when the owner is actually
/// reading tainted audio (v3.4 §6.1.1 — "this client has both an input
/// and an output leg ⇒ exclude the output" is the catastrophic rule
/// that excludes every app with a microphone).
///
/// `Sink` counts: EasyEffects' `ee_sink` is an `Audio/Sink` that
/// receives the tainted mix, and its re-emitting leg is joined to it by
/// `node.link-group` with no Link between them.
pub fn receives_audio(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::StreamInput | Self::Sink | Self::Duplex)
}
/// Device-ish nodes — everything that is not a `Stream/*`. Coarse owner
/// keys are not allowed to bridge these; see [`super::owner`].
pub fn is_device_role(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::Sink | Self::Source | Self::Duplex)
}
/// Only `Stream/Output/Audio` nodes are fan-out candidates (v3.4 §6.2).
pub fn is_candidate(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::StreamOutput)
}
}
/// The subset of node properties the engine actually reasons about.
///
/// Deliberately a struct of parsed fields rather than a property bag: the
/// parsing (and its failure modes) belongs at the observer boundary, and a
/// bag invites `props.get("...")` typos that silently read `None` — which
/// on this feature means "not tainted".
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NodeProps {
/// `peerspeak.owned` is present and truthy (v3.4 §5.1). A correctness
/// mechanism, explicitly *not* a security boundary.
pub peerspeak_owned: bool,
/// `pulse.module.id`, parsed as `u64` — never `u32`, per v3.4 §5.2's
/// parse-defensively note and the phase 0a truncation bug.
pub pulse_module_id: Option<u64>,
/// `node.link-group` — owner key 1, and the `echo-cancel-` hazard
/// prefix (v3.4 §5.4 / D3).
pub link_group: Option<String>,
/// `client.id` — owner key 3. A **connection**, not an owner: GStreamer
/// opens one per stream (v3.4 §6.1.2, measured refutation).
pub client_id: Option<GlobalId>,
/// `application.process.id` **on the node** — owner key 4. For
/// module-created streams this is pipewire-pulse's own PID, which is
/// why [`super::ExclusionCtx::pipewire_pulse_pid`] exists.
pub process_id: Option<u32>,
/// The stream negotiated an encoded/passthrough format; a second link
/// would refuse or corrupt it (v3.4 §6.2).
pub passthrough: bool,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NodeSnapshot {
pub serial: Serial,
pub id: GlobalId,
/// `node.name`, for diagnostics and for `pixelpass_capture_*` ancestry
/// detection (v3.4 §6.2, cycle prevention).
pub name: Option<String>,
pub role: MediaRole,
pub props: NodeProps,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub enum PortDirection {
In,
Out,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PortSnapshot {
pub serial: Serial,
pub id: GlobalId,
/// Owning node, by snapshot-local id.
pub node: GlobalId,
pub direction: PortDirection,
/// `port.exclusive` — fan-out will be refused (v3.4 §6.2).
pub exclusive: bool,
/// `port.monitor`. Recorded for phase 6 link creation; taint does not
/// need it at node granularity.
pub monitor: bool,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct LinkSnapshot {
pub serial: Serial,
pub id: GlobalId,
/// `link.output.node` — the node audio flows **from**.
pub output_node: GlobalId,
/// `link.input.node` — the node audio flows **to**.
pub input_node: GlobalId,
pub output_port: Option<GlobalId>,
pub input_port: Option<GlobalId>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClientSnapshot {
pub serial: Serial,
pub id: GlobalId,
/// `pipewire.sec.pid` — for Pulse-emulated clients this is
/// **pipewire-pulse's** PID, identical across every unrelated app
/// (v3.4 §5.2 correction 5). Phase 3 derives the daemon PID from the
/// consistency of this value; the engine only consumes the result.
pub sec_pid: Option<u32>,
}
/// How a snapshot-local id resolves.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub enum IdLookup {
Unique(Serial),
/// Two live objects in one snapshot claim the same global id — the
/// observer missed a removal, so the recycled id is ambiguous. Every
/// edge touching it is treated as unresolved, i.e. fail closed.
Ambiguous,
}
/// One coherent observation of the graph.
///
/// Built through [`GraphSnapshot::new`] so the id indexes and the ambiguity
/// detection cannot be skipped.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct GraphSnapshot {
nodes: BTreeMap<Serial, NodeSnapshot>,
ports: BTreeMap<Serial, PortSnapshot>,
links: BTreeMap<Serial, LinkSnapshot>,
clients: BTreeMap<Serial, ClientSnapshot>,
node_ids: BTreeMap<GlobalId, IdLookup>,
client_ids: BTreeMap<GlobalId, IdLookup>,
}
impl GraphSnapshot {
pub fn new(
nodes: Vec<NodeSnapshot>,
ports: Vec<PortSnapshot>,
links: Vec<LinkSnapshot>,
clients: Vec<ClientSnapshot>,
) -> Self {
let node_ids = index_ids(nodes.iter().map(|n| (n.id, n.serial)));
let client_ids = index_ids(clients.iter().map(|c| (c.id, c.serial)));
Self {
nodes: nodes.into_iter().map(|n| (n.serial, n)).collect(),
ports: ports.into_iter().map(|p| (p.serial, p)).collect(),
links: links.into_iter().map(|l| (l.serial, l)).collect(),
clients: clients.into_iter().map(|c| (c.serial, c)).collect(),
node_ids,
client_ids,
}
}
pub fn nodes(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &NodeSnapshot> {
self.nodes.values()
}
pub fn node(&self, serial: Serial) -> Option<&NodeSnapshot> {
self.nodes.get(&serial)
}
pub fn links(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &LinkSnapshot> {
self.links.values()
}
pub fn ports(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &PortSnapshot> {
self.ports.values()
}
pub fn clients(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &ClientSnapshot> {
self.clients.values()
}
/// Resolve a snapshot-local node id. `None` means "no such node in this
/// snapshot", which for a link endpoint means unresolved ancestry.
pub fn node_by_id(&self, id: GlobalId) -> Option<IdLookup> {
self.node_ids.get(&id).copied()
}
pub fn client_by_id(&self, id: GlobalId) -> Option<IdLookup> {
self.client_ids.get(&id).copied()
}
/// Ports belonging to a node, by the node's snapshot-local id.
pub fn ports_of(&self, node: GlobalId) -> impl Iterator<Item = &PortSnapshot> {
self.ports.values().filter(move |p| p.node == node)
}
}
fn index_ids(entries: impl Iterator<Item = (GlobalId, Serial)>) -> BTreeMap<GlobalId, IdLookup> {
let mut out: BTreeMap<GlobalId, IdLookup> = BTreeMap::new();
for (id, serial) in entries {
out.entry(id)
.and_modify(|slot| {
if *slot != IdLookup::Unique(serial) {
*slot = IdLookup::Ambiguous;
}
})
.or_insert(IdLookup::Unique(serial));
}
out
}
+926
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@@ -0,0 +1,926 @@
//! The taint-engine fixture matrix — design v3.4 §12 plus the impl plan's
//! degenerate-snapshot addition.
//!
//! **Every test asserts an exact partition of the whole candidate universe**,
//! never a spot check on one named node. Checking only the node a test cares
//! about constrains nothing about the others, and an exclude-everything
//! implementation would pass. So each test names *every* `Stream/Output/Audio`
//! node in its graph as either eligible or excluded-with-a-reason-code.
//!
//! Fixture realism that is load-bearing: an ordinary app holds **one client
//! connection**, each pactl module holds its own, and every device node
//! shares the session manager's. Getting that wrong makes the engine look
//! broken (or, worse, makes a leak look fine).
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use super::fixture::{Graph, NodeRef, PULSE_PID, app};
use super::owner::{OwnerKey, strongest_shared_key};
use super::snapshot::{MediaRole, NodeProps, PortDirection, Serial};
use super::{Decisions, Eligibility, ExclusionCtx, ObjectRef, Reason, StickyState, evaluate};
fn ctx() -> ExclusionCtx {
ExclusionCtx {
aec_module_id: None,
pipewire_pulse_pid: Some(PULSE_PID),
pixelpass_owned: BTreeSet::new(),
graph_ready: true,
}
}
fn run(graph: &Graph, ctx: &ExclusionCtx) -> Decisions {
evaluate(&graph.build(), ctx, &StickyState::default()).0
}
/// Assert the complete candidate partition. `excluded` names reason codes.
#[track_caller]
fn assert_partition(
decisions: &Decisions,
eligible: &[(&str, NodeRef)],
excluded: &[(&str, NodeRef, &str)],
) {
let mut expected_eligible: Vec<Serial> = eligible.iter().map(|(_, n)| n.serial).collect();
expected_eligible.sort_unstable();
let mut expected_excluded: Vec<(Serial, &str)> = excluded
.iter()
.map(|(_, n, code)| (n.serial, *code))
.collect();
expected_excluded.sort_unstable();
let label = |serial: Serial| -> String {
eligible
.iter()
.map(|(name, n)| (*name, *n))
.chain(excluded.iter().map(|(name, n, _)| (*name, *n)))
.find(|(_, n)| n.serial == serial)
.map_or_else(|| format!("<unnamed {serial:?}>"), |(name, _)| name.into())
};
let actual: Vec<String> = decisions
.candidates
.values()
.map(|d| match d.reason() {
None => format!("{} = eligible", label(d.serial)),
Some(reason) => format!("{} = {}", label(d.serial), reason.code()),
})
.collect();
assert_eq!(
(decisions.eligible(), decisions.excluded()),
(expected_eligible, expected_excluded),
"actual decisions: {actual:#?}"
);
}
#[track_caller]
fn assert_tainted(decisions: &Decisions, node: NodeRef, reason: &str) {
let entry = decisions
.taint
.get(&node.serial)
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("expected {:?} to be tainted", node.serial));
assert_eq!(entry.reason.code(), reason);
}
#[track_caller]
fn assert_untainted(decisions: &Decisions, node: NodeRef) {
assert_eq!(
decisions.taint.get(&node.serial).map(|e| e.reason.code()),
None,
"expected {:?} to be untainted",
node.serial
);
}
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Boundary / degenerate cases — the fail-closed default
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn empty_snapshot_yields_nothing_eligible() {
let decisions = run(&Graph::new(), &ctx());
assert!(decisions.candidates.is_empty());
assert!(decisions.eligible().is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_graph_with_only_untainted_streams_still_partitions() {
// The other half of the degenerate case: "nothing eligible" must not be
// reached by excluding everything unconditionally.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
assert_partition(&run(&graph, &ctx()), &[("firefox", firefox)], &[]);
}
#[test]
fn graph_not_ready_excludes_every_candidate() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
let decisions = run(
&graph,
&ExclusionCtx {
graph_ready: false,
..ctx()
},
);
assert_partition(&decisions, &[], &[("firefox", firefox, "graph-not-ready")]);
}
#[test]
fn decisions_do_not_depend_on_insertion_order() {
// The reported reason must come from an explicit priority, not from
// traversal order, or the audit output is unstable between recomputes.
let build = |reverse: bool| {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let sink = graph.device_node("sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
if reverse {
graph.link(firefox, sink);
graph.link(call, sink);
} else {
graph.link(call, sink);
graph.link(firefox, sink);
}
run(&graph, &ctx()).excluded()
};
assert_eq!(build(false), build(true));
}
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Node-local roots (v3.4 §5.1, §5.2, §6.2, §6.6)
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn peerspeak_tagged_nodes_are_excluded_and_plain_apps_are_not() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let sink = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak-call", 7);
let mpv = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak-mpv", 8);
let notify = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak-notify", 9);
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
for node in [call, mpv, notify, firefox] {
graph.link(node, sink);
}
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("firefox", firefox)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("mpv", mpv, "peerspeak-owned"),
("notify", notify, "peerspeak-owned"),
],
);
// The sink carried peerspeak audio, so it is tainted — that is what
// makes every monitor reader downstream of it tainted too.
assert_tainted(&decisions, sink, "tainted-upstream");
}
#[test]
fn aec_identity_is_exact_equality_and_other_modules_stay_eligible() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let ours = graph.module_node("echo-cancel-playback", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 536_870_919);
// A tunnel/RTP module: it has a `pulse.module.id`, just not ours.
// "Has any pulse.module.id" is explicitly rejected as an exclusion rule
// — such a module may be the only carrier of audio the user wants
// shared (v3.4 §5.2 correction 2).
let tunnel = graph.module_node("tunnel-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 536_870_921);
let plain = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
let decisions = run(
&graph,
&ExclusionCtx {
aec_module_id: Some(536_870_919),
..ctx()
},
);
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("tunnel", tunnel), ("plain", plain)],
&[("ours", ours, "aec-identity")],
);
}
#[test]
fn aec_module_id_is_compared_beyond_u32() {
// Guards the phase 0a widening at the engine boundary too: these two
// differ only above bit 32.
let big = u64::from(u32::MAX) + 7;
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let ours = graph.module_node("aec", MediaRole::StreamOutput, big);
let other = graph.module_node("other", MediaRole::StreamOutput, big ^ 0x1_0000_0000);
let decisions = run(
&graph,
&ExclusionCtx {
aec_module_id: Some(big),
..ctx()
},
);
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("other", other)],
&[("ours", ours, "aec-identity")],
);
}
#[test]
fn foreign_echo_cancel_group_is_excluded_not_shared() {
// Decision D3: warn and exclude. The group prefix is hazard detection,
// never ownership — it cannot tell peerspeak's AEC from anyone else's.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let foreign = graph.group_node(
"echo-cancel-playback",
MediaRole::StreamOutput,
"echo-cancel-9999-13",
4321,
);
let plain = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
assert_partition(
&run(&graph, &ctx()),
&[("plain", plain)],
&[("foreign", foreign, "foreign-echo-cancel")],
);
}
#[test]
fn pixelpass_capture_sink_and_its_downstream_are_excluded() {
// v3.4 §6.2 cycle prevention, and impl-plan §5.1 row 7: observing the
// capture sink is not enough — a *downstream* candidate must be named,
// or recognising `pixelpass_capture_*` as a mere sink name would pass
// without any transitive propagation.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let other_host_sink = graph.module_node("pixelpass_capture_31337", MediaRole::Sink, 42);
let fwd_in = graph.module_node("fwd-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 77);
let fwd_out = graph.module_node("fwd-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 77);
graph.link(other_host_sink, fwd_in);
let plain = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("plain", plain)],
&[("fwd-out", fwd_out, "tainted-owner-bridge")],
);
assert_tainted(&decisions, other_host_sink, "pixelpass-owned");
assert_tainted(&decisions, fwd_in, "tainted-upstream");
}
#[test]
fn pixelpass_owned_serials_are_roots_even_without_a_capture_sink_name() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let ours = graph.device_node("some-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let reader = graph.app_node("reader-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 5150);
let leg = graph.app_node("reader-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 5150);
graph.link(ours, reader);
let decisions = run(
&graph,
&ExclusionCtx {
pixelpass_owned: BTreeSet::from([ours.serial]),
..ctx()
},
);
assert_partition(&decisions, &[], &[("leg", leg, "tainted-owner-bridge")]);
assert_tainted(&decisions, ours, "pixelpass-owned");
}
#[test]
fn port_exclusive_and_passthrough_are_local_exclusions() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let exclusive = graph.app_node("exclusive", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 100);
graph.port(exclusive, PortDirection::Out, true);
let client = graph.client_of_app(101);
let passthrough = graph.node(
"passthrough",
MediaRole::StreamOutput,
NodeProps {
passthrough: true,
..app(client, 101)
},
);
let ok = graph.app_node("ok", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 102);
graph.port(ok, PortDirection::Out, false);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("ok", ok)],
&[
("exclusive", exclusive, "port-exclusive"),
("passthrough", passthrough, "passthrough"),
],
);
// Neither is hazardous — an unlinkable stream must not taint anything.
assert_untainted(&decisions, exclusive);
assert_untainted(&decisions, passthrough);
}
#[test]
fn a_node_with_no_props_at_all_is_eligible_and_non_streams_are_not_candidates() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let bare = graph.node("bare", MediaRole::StreamOutput, NodeProps::default());
graph.node("video", MediaRole::Other, NodeProps::default());
graph.node("mic", MediaRole::Source, NodeProps::default());
assert_partition(&run(&graph, &ctx()), &[("bare", bare)], &[]);
}
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Edge type 2 — sink → monitor, free at node granularity
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn taint_crosses_app_then_sink_then_monitor_reader() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let sink = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, sink);
// A recorder reading the sink's monitor. The monitor connection IS a
// real Link whose output node is the sink itself, so no synthetic edge
// is needed at node granularity.
let rec_in = graph.app_node("recorder-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 555);
graph.link(sink, rec_in);
let rec_out = graph.app_node("recorder-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 555);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("rec-out", rec_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
assert_tainted(&decisions, rec_in, "tainted-upstream");
}
#[test]
fn playing_into_a_tainted_sink_does_not_taint_the_player() {
// Taint flows downstream only. Every app on the box plays into the same
// sink peerspeak does; if that tainted them, nothing would ever be
// shareable and the feature would ship as silence.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let sink = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
graph.link(call, sink);
graph.link(firefox, sink);
assert_partition(
&run(&graph, &ctx()),
&[("firefox", firefox)],
&[("call", call, "peerspeak-owned")],
);
}
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Edge type 3 — the owner bridge (v3.4 §6.1.1, §6.1.2)
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// The measured `module-null-sink` + `module-loopback` shape. Walking Links
/// alone from the leaking output leg finds *no inbound links at all* — a
/// dead end that reads as "clean".
#[test]
fn loopback_forwarder_output_leg_is_excluded_via_the_owner_bridge() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let null_sink = graph.module_node("fabletest_sink", MediaRole::Sink, 536_870_917);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, null_sink);
// The tainted forwarder: legs share `pulse.module.id`, no Link between.
let lb_in = graph.module_node("input.loopback", MediaRole::StreamInput, 536_870_918);
let lb_out = graph.module_node("output.loopback", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 536_870_918);
graph.link(null_sink, lb_in);
graph.link(lb_out, hw);
// The same shape with a clean input — impl-plan §5.1 row 1's eligible
// half. Without it the test would also pass on "exclude all forwarders".
let clean_sink = graph.device_node("clean-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let clean_in = graph.module_node("clean-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 536_870_920);
let clean_out = graph.module_node("clean-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 536_870_920);
graph.link(clean_sink, clean_in);
graph.link(clean_out, hw);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("clean-out", clean_out)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("lb-out", lb_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
// ...and it was the bridge, naming the key — not a Link walk.
assert_eq!(
decisions.taint[&lb_out.serial].reason,
Reason::TaintedOwnerBridge {
key: Some(OwnerKey::PulseModuleId)
}
);
}
#[test]
fn easyeffects_shape_bridges_from_an_audio_sink_to_its_re_emitting_leg() {
// The canonical installed case. The tainted member here is an
// `Audio/Sink`, not a `Stream/Input/Audio` — if the bridge only fired
// from stream inputs, EasyEffects would forward the whole call into the
// share at full level.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let ee_sink = graph.group_node("ee_sink", MediaRole::Sink, "ee", 4321);
let ee_out = graph.group_node("easyeffects-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, "ee", 4321);
graph.link(ee_out, hw);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
graph.link(call, ee_sink);
graph.link(firefox, ee_sink);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("firefox", firefox)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("ee-out", ee_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
assert_eq!(
decisions.taint[&ee_out.serial].reason,
Reason::TaintedOwnerBridge {
key: Some(OwnerKey::LinkGroup)
}
);
}
#[test]
fn gstreamer_split_clients_bridge_on_process_id() {
// The C2 refutation, measured: one `gst-launch pulsesrc ! pulsesink`
// process produced TWO client objects (209 and 210) for its two legs.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let tainted_sink = graph.device_node("null-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, tainted_sink);
let client_in = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let client_out = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let gst_in = graph.node("gst-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, app(client_in, 20172));
let gst_out = graph.node("gst-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, app(client_out, 20172));
graph.link(tainted_sink, gst_in);
// Control: the same split-client shape reading an *untainted* source.
let mic = graph.device_node("mic", MediaRole::Source);
let ok_client_in = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let ok_client_out = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let ok_in = graph.node("ok-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, app(ok_client_in, 30000));
let ok_out = graph.node("ok-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, app(ok_client_out, 30000));
graph.link(mic, ok_in);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("ok-out", ok_out)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("gst-out", gst_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
assert_eq!(
decisions.taint[&gst_out.serial].reason,
Reason::TaintedOwnerBridge {
key: Some(OwnerKey::ProcessId)
}
);
}
#[test]
fn owner_key_union_falls_through_a_present_but_unequal_key() {
// The §6.1.2 wording trap, asserted on the key resolver itself: a
// first-present implementation stops at `client.id`, sees 209 != 210,
// concludes "different owners", and the leak survives.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let a_client = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let b_client = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let a = graph.node("a", MediaRole::StreamInput, app(a_client, 20172));
let b = graph.node("b", MediaRole::StreamOutput, app(b_client, 20172));
let snapshot = graph.build();
let (a, b) = (
snapshot.node(a.serial).unwrap(),
snapshot.node(b.serial).unwrap(),
);
assert_ne!(a.props.client_id, b.props.client_id);
assert_eq!(
strongest_shared_key(a, b, Some(PULSE_PID)),
Some(OwnerKey::ProcessId)
);
}
#[test]
fn the_strongest_shared_key_wins_when_several_match() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let a = graph.group_node("a", MediaRole::StreamInput, "g", 500);
let b = graph.group_node("b", MediaRole::StreamOutput, "g", 500);
let snapshot = graph.build();
assert_eq!(
strongest_shared_key(
snapshot.node(a.serial).unwrap(),
snapshot.node(b.serial).unwrap(),
Some(PULSE_PID)
),
Some(OwnerKey::LinkGroup)
);
}
#[test]
fn the_pipewire_pulse_pid_does_not_fuse_unrelated_modules() {
// impl-plan §5.1 row 3: two Pulse modules, one tainted input. The other
// module's output MUST stay eligible — that is the only thing that
// makes wrong pipewire-pulse-PID fusion observable at all.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, hw);
let a_in = graph.module_node("a-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 1);
let a_out = graph.module_node("a-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 1);
graph.link(hw, a_in);
let mic = graph.device_node("mic", MediaRole::Source);
let b_in = graph.module_node("b-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 2);
let b_out = graph.module_node("b-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 2);
graph.link(mic, b_in);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("b-out", b_out)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("a-out", a_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
assert_untainted(&decisions, b_in);
}
#[test]
fn an_unknown_pipewire_pulse_pid_over_excludes_rather_than_leaks() {
// v3.4 §6.1.2's failure-mode paragraph: if pixelpass cannot identify
// the daemon PID, key 4 stops being suppressed, every module-created
// stream fuses into one owner, and the result is broad over-exclusion —
// annoying and safe. This test pins that direction; flipping it to
// "leave key 4 out when the PID is unknown" would be a leak.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, hw);
let a_in = graph.module_node("a-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 1);
let a_out = graph.module_node("a-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 1);
graph.link(hw, a_in);
let mic = graph.device_node("mic", MediaRole::Source);
let b_in = graph.module_node("b-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 2);
let b_out = graph.module_node("b-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 2);
graph.link(mic, b_in);
let decisions = run(
&graph,
&ExclusionCtx {
pipewire_pulse_pid: None,
..ctx()
},
);
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("a-out", a_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
("b-out", b_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
}
#[test]
fn coarse_keys_do_not_bridge_device_nodes() {
// ⚠️ A rule added during implementation, NOT present in design v3.4.
// Every ALSA device node is created by one WirePlumber process, so all
// of them share one `client.id` and one `application.process.id`.
// peerspeak's playback taints the default sink on every recompute; if
// coarse keys bridged devices, that taint would jump to the microphone
// source, and then every app holding a mic would lose its playback —
// the exact §6.1.1 catastrophe by another route.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let mic = graph.device_node("mic", MediaRole::Source);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, hw);
let ff_in = graph.app_node("firefox-mic", MediaRole::StreamInput, 11114);
let ff_out = graph.app_node("firefox-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
graph.link(mic, ff_in);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("ff-out", ff_out)],
&[("call", call, "peerspeak-owned")],
);
assert_tainted(&decisions, hw, "tainted-upstream");
assert_untainted(&decisions, mic);
assert_untainted(&decisions, ff_in);
}
#[test]
fn a_module_owned_device_still_bridges_on_its_strong_key() {
// The other side of that rule: exception 2 must not disarm the bridge
// for virtual sinks that genuinely belong to a module.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
let virt = graph.module_node("virtual-sink", MediaRole::Sink, 900_001);
let leg = graph.module_node("virtual-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 900_001);
graph.link(call, virt);
graph.link(leg, hw);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("leg", leg, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
}
#[test]
fn firefox_three_cases() {
// v3.4 §6.1.1's table, as one graph with an exact partition.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let mic = graph.device_node("mic", MediaRole::Source);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, hw);
// 1. music only
let music = graph.app_node("ff-music", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 1001);
graph.link(music, hw);
// 2. a Meet call: a mic input leg on an untainted source
let meet_in = graph.app_node("ff-meet-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 1002);
let meet_out = graph.app_node("ff-meet-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 1002);
graph.link(mic, meet_in);
graph.link(meet_out, hw);
// 3. screen-sharing with desktop audio: an input leg on a tainted monitor
let share_in = graph.app_node("ff-share-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 1003);
let share_out = graph.app_node("ff-share-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 1003);
graph.link(hw, share_in);
graph.link(share_out, hw);
assert_partition(
&run(&graph, &ctx()),
&[("music", music), ("meet-out", meet_out)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("share-out", share_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
}
#[test]
fn an_unbounded_module_forwarder_fails_closed() {
// v3.4 §12: "a module forwarder with neither link-group nor
// pulse.module.id ⇒ unresolved ⇒ excluded". Its process id is the
// daemon's (so key 4 is suppressed) and its legs carry different
// `client.id`s, so nothing can enumerate its siblings.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, hw);
let in_client = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let out_client = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let fwd_in = graph.node("fwd-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, app(in_client, PULSE_PID));
let fwd_out = graph.node(
"fwd-out",
MediaRole::StreamOutput,
app(out_client, PULSE_PID),
);
graph.link(hw, fwd_in);
// The blast radius must stay small: an ordinary app is bounded by its
// own PID and must not be swept up.
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
graph.link(firefox, hw);
assert_partition(
&run(&graph, &ctx()),
&[("firefox", firefox)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("fwd-out", fwd_out, "unresolved-owner"),
],
);
}
#[test]
fn audio_duplex_over_taints_known_accepted() {
// v3.4 §6.1 edge-type-2 caveat, asserted so that fixing it later is a
// deliberate change and not a silent regression. A duplex device whose
// playback side is tainted has its capture side treated as tainted too,
// so an app recording from it loses its playback leg.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let duplex = graph.device_node("duplex-card", MediaRole::Duplex);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, duplex);
let rec_in = graph.app_node("rec-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 4444);
let rec_out = graph.app_node("rec-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 4444);
graph.link(duplex, rec_in);
assert_partition(
&run(&graph, &ctx()),
&[],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("rec-out", rec_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
}
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Unresolved ancestry — fail closed (v3.4 §6.1.4)
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn a_link_from_an_unknown_node_fails_closed() {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let mystery_in = graph.app_node("mystery-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 6000);
let mystery_out = graph.app_node("mystery-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 6000);
let ghost = graph.dangling_id();
graph.link_ids(ghost, mystery_in.id);
graph.link(mystery_out, hw);
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
let decisions = run(&graph, &ctx());
assert_partition(
&decisions,
&[("firefox", firefox)],
&[("mystery-out", mystery_out, "tainted-owner-bridge")],
);
assert_tainted(&decisions, mystery_in, "unresolved-ancestry");
}
#[test]
fn an_ambiguous_recycled_global_id_fails_closed() {
// Two live nodes claiming one id means the observer missed a removal,
// so every edge touching that id is untrustworthy.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let shared = graph.dangling_id();
let client = graph.client_of_app(7001);
let first = graph.node_with_id("first", MediaRole::StreamOutput, shared, app(client, 7001));
let second = graph.node_with_id("second", MediaRole::StreamOutput, shared, app(client, 7002));
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
assert_partition(
&run(&graph, &ctx()),
&[("firefox", firefox)],
&[
("first", first, "unresolved-ancestry"),
("second", second, "unresolved-ancestry"),
],
);
}
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Stickiness and lifetime-awareness (v3.4 §6.1.3)
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// The scene the sticky tests share: one owner with a tainted input leg and
/// an output leg, plus an untouched bystander.
fn sticky_scene() -> (Graph, NodeRef, NodeRef, NodeRef, NodeRef) {
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, hw);
let rec_in = graph.app_node("rec-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, 8080);
let rec_out = graph.app_node("rec-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 8080);
graph.link(hw, rec_in);
let firefox = graph.app_node("firefox", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 11114);
(graph, call, rec_in, rec_out, firefox)
}
#[test]
fn sticky_taint_survives_the_tainted_input_leg_disappearing() {
// The C3 buffered-audio defect: the recorder stops capturing, but its
// 5-second ring buffer is still full of peerspeak's audio and no graph
// event marks the moment it drains.
let (graph, call, rec_in, rec_out, firefox) = sticky_scene();
let c = ctx();
let (first, sticky) = evaluate(&graph.build(), &c, &StickyState::default());
assert_partition(
&first,
&[("firefox", firefox)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("rec-out", rec_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
let (second, _) = evaluate(&graph.build_without(&[rec_in]), &c, &sticky);
assert_partition(
&second,
&[("firefox", firefox)],
&[
("call", call, "peerspeak-owned"),
("rec-out", rec_out, "tainted-owner-bridge"),
],
);
assert!(
matches!(
second.candidates[&rec_out.serial].eligibility,
Eligibility::NotEligible { sticky: true, .. }
),
"the second exclusion must be recorded as sticky, not re-derived"
);
}
#[test]
fn a_new_leg_of_a_still_tainted_owner_inherits_the_taint() {
// Stickiness is per *owner*, not per node: the recorder opening a
// second output stream after its input leg closed must not escape.
let (mut graph, _, rec_in, _, _) = sticky_scene();
let c = ctx();
let (_, sticky) = evaluate(&graph.build(), &c, &StickyState::default());
let late = graph.app_node("rec-out-2", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 8080);
let (second, _) = evaluate(&graph.build_without(&[rec_in]), &c, &sticky);
assert_eq!(
second.candidates[&late.serial].reason().map(Reason::code),
Some("tainted-owner-bridge")
);
}
#[test]
fn sticky_taint_clears_once_every_owner_member_is_gone() {
// Otherwise an app is unshareable forever, which is the over-exclusion
// half of the trade and just as much a bug.
let (mut graph, call, rec_in, rec_out, firefox) = sticky_scene();
let c = ctx();
let (_, sticky) = evaluate(&graph.build(), &c, &StickyState::default());
// Full teardown: both legs and the client object.
let recorder_client = graph.client_of_app(8080);
graph.drop_clients(&[recorder_client]);
let torn_down = graph.build_without(&[rec_in, rec_out]);
let (_, sticky) = evaluate(&torn_down, &c, &sticky);
assert!(
sticky
.owners
.iter()
.all(|owner| !owner.members.contains(&ObjectRef::Node(rec_out.serial))),
"the recorder's sticky entry should have been dropped: {sticky:#?}"
);
// A brand-new recorder with the same PID starts clean.
let fresh = graph.app_node("rec-out-fresh", MediaRole::StreamOutput, 8080);
let (third, _) = evaluate(&graph.build_without(&[rec_in, rec_out]), &c, &sticky);
assert_partition(
&third,
&[("firefox", firefox), ("fresh", fresh)],
&[("call", call, "peerspeak-owned")],
);
}
#[test]
fn recycled_ids_module_indices_and_link_groups_do_not_inherit_taint() {
// Every one of these recycles on this stack — measured for module
// indices, node ids and link-group strings. Only `object.serial` does
// not, which is exactly why stickiness is keyed on it.
let mut graph = Graph::new();
let hw = graph.device_node("hw-sink", MediaRole::Sink);
let call = graph.peerspeak_node("peerspeak", 7);
graph.link(call, hw);
let old_in = graph.group_node("old-in", MediaRole::StreamInput, "loopback-2541-13", 6100);
let old_out = graph.group_node("old-out", MediaRole::StreamOutput, "loopback-2541-13", 6100);
graph.link(hw, old_in);
let c = ctx();
let (first, sticky) = evaluate(&graph.build(), &c, &StickyState::default());
assert_eq!(
first.candidates[&old_out.serial].reason().map(Reason::code),
Some("tainted-owner-bridge")
);
// Teardown, then a brand-new module reusing the global id, the PID and
// the link-group string verbatim — everything except the serial.
let old_client = graph.client_of_app(6100);
graph.drop_clients(&[old_client]);
let reborn_client = graph.client(Some(PULSE_PID));
let reborn = graph.node_with_id(
"reborn-out",
MediaRole::StreamOutput,
old_out.id,
super::fixture::link_group("loopback-2541-13", reborn_client, 6100),
);
let (second, _) = evaluate(&graph.build_without(&[old_in, old_out]), &c, &sticky);
assert_partition(
&second,
&[("reborn", reborn)],
&[("call", call, "peerspeak-owned")],
);
}