fe627166d51d455d0809f8eb130d83c3e19cd274
Three findings from the first security pass: - S3 (Medium): the peer-supplied screen-share ticket was passed to pixelpass as the first positional CLI arg with no end-of-options guard, so a ticket starting with `-`/`--` could be reinterpreted as a flag (argument injection). New pure `viewer_args()` puts flags first, then a `--` guard, then the ticket positionally; spawn_viewer uses it. +2 tests. - S4 (Medium): peer presence display-names (gossip `Announce`, untrusted and spoofable) were rendered unsanitized/unbounded, unlike the chat path. New `sanitize::sanitize_name` strips bidi/zero-width format chars + control chars, collapses whitespace, and caps at 48 chars; applied at the gossip ingest point so every consumer gets a safe value. +4 tests. - S1 (Low): `&id[..8]` byte-slices could panic on a short/non-ASCII id. New panic-free `short_id()` (char-based take) replaces both slices. +1 test. 158 lib tests (was 151), clippy --all-targets clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>