fix(security): cap recovery-identity state (Tier C F-01 follow-up)
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Closes the remaining insider resource-exhaustion vector the Codex Tier C
audit flagged: the active-roster cap bounds the live peer map, but a member
could join (<=32), drop the link without a signed Leave, let the grace timer
expire, and repeat with a fresh identity. Each abandoned identity grew two
unbounded structures and kept doing periodic work forever:

  - known_peers[topic] (the retained rejoin/recovery dial table) was only
    pruned on a signed PeerLeft, so grace-evicted ghosts accumulated.
  - the recovery coordinator's active set + entries map had no identity cap
    and no terminal retry budget — backoff saturated at 60s and re-dialed a
    never-returning peer indefinitely.

Two non-breaking, dependency-free bounds (no wire/protocol change):

  - MAX_RETAINED_PEERS=64 per topic via pure admit_retained() — refreshing a
    tracked peer always succeeds, a brand-new identity is rejected when full.
    Set above MAX_ACTIVE_PEERS=32 so legitimate rooms never hit it.
  - RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS=12 (~7 min) via pure recovery_is_terminal():
    the coordinator gives up, frees the active slot, and signals a new
    terminal channel; a small drain task forgets the retained address (so the
    table self-drains), scrubs seen-connected state, and emits
    PeerConnectionFailed.

Giving up never blocks a legitimate reconnect: a peer returning after a long
outage still rejoins on its own via a gossip announce — terminal eviction only
stops us from dialing a peer that is not coming back, which was a latent leak
even absent an attacker.

+2 pure-seam unit tests (admit_retained, recovery_is_terminal); 418 lib tests
green, clippy --all-targets clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-23 16:20:45 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent f927567105
commit 1a3c481f4c
2 changed files with 162 additions and 26 deletions
+94 -18
View File
@@ -134,6 +134,25 @@ type SeenConnected = Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashSet<EndpointId>>>;
type KnownPeers =
Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], HashMap<EndpointId, EndpointAddr>>>>;
/// Per-topic cap on the retained rejoin-bootstrap / recovery target table
/// (Tier C recovery-identity cap). Set comfortably above the live-roster cap
/// (`gossip::MAX_ACTIVE_PEERS`, 32) so a legitimate room — even one where every
/// member drops at once during a relay outage — never hits it, while an insider
/// who grace-cycles distinct identities (join, drop without a signed Leave,
/// repeat) cannot grow the table without bound. Combined with the recovery
/// terminal budget (which forgets a retained address when it gives up), abandoned
/// identities drain on their own, so this cap is a deterministic ceiling rather
/// than a pinnable slot pool.
const MAX_RETAINED_PEERS: usize = 64;
/// Whether a peer may be inserted into a retained-target table at `len` entries.
/// An update to an id already present is always allowed (it only refreshes an
/// address); a brand-new id is admitted only while below the cap. Mirrors the
/// gossip roster's `admit_into_roster` reject-when-full admission.
fn admit_retained(len: usize, is_new_id: bool, cap: usize) -> bool {
!is_new_id || len < cap
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct RecoveryContext {
coordinator: RecoveryCoordinator,
@@ -522,6 +541,7 @@ struct ActiveSession {
event_task: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
conn_event_task: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
recovery_task: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
recovery_terminal_task: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
grace_timers: GraceTimers,
transport: Arc<IrohTransport>,
/// Loaded PipeWire echo-cancel module (if enabled); unloads on drop.
@@ -557,6 +577,7 @@ impl ActiveSession {
handle.abort();
}
self.recovery_task.abort();
self.recovery_terminal_task.abort();
crate::log_msg("Aborted tasks");
let audio_backend_clone = audio_backend.clone();
@@ -1842,7 +1863,7 @@ async fn run_core_loop(
// The topic of the room this event loop serves, so peer add/remove
// updates the right per-topic bucket in `known_peers` (A8 archive).
let room_topic = topic_id;
let (recovery_coordinator, recovery_task) =
let (recovery_coordinator, recovery_task, recovery_terminal_rx) =
RecoveryCoordinator::spawn(room_state.clone());
let recovery_context = RecoveryContext {
coordinator: recovery_coordinator,
@@ -1851,6 +1872,28 @@ async fn run_core_loop(
topic_id,
};
let recovery_events = recovery_context.clone();
// Drain the recovery coordinator's terminal-eviction signals (Tier C
// recovery-identity cap). When background recovery exhausts its budget
// for a peer, forget its retained dial target so the per-topic retain
// table drains, scrub residual seen-connected state, and surface the
// failure. A peer that later returns can still rejoin via a gossip
// announce, so giving up never blocks a legitimate reconnect.
let recovery_terminal_ctx = recovery_context.clone();
let seen_connected_terminal = seen_connected.clone();
let ui_tx_terminal = ui_tx.clone();
let recovery_terminal_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut terminal_rx = recovery_terminal_rx;
while let Some(peer_id) = terminal_rx.recv().await {
crate::log_msg(&format!(
"Background recovery gave up on peer {peer_id:?}; forgetting retained target"
));
recovery_terminal_ctx.forget(peer_id);
seen_connected_terminal.lock().unwrap().remove(&peer_id);
let _ = ui_tx_terminal
.send(UiEvent::PeerConnectionFailed { id: peer_id })
.await;
}
});
// Friends store + ui sender, so a connected peer who is a friend has
// their saved address auto-healed (W7) — populates `last_addr` so the
// presence scheduler can reach them later.
@@ -1898,13 +1941,22 @@ async fn run_core_loop(
.await;
}
// Retain this peer under this room's topic as a
// future rejoin bootstrap target (A8).
known_peers_events
.lock()
.unwrap()
.entry(room_topic)
.or_default()
.insert(peer_id, state.addr.clone());
// future rejoin bootstrap target (A8), bounded by the
// per-topic retain cap (Tier C recovery-identity cap):
// refreshing a peer we already track is always allowed,
// a brand-new identity only while below the cap.
{
let mut kp = known_peers_events.lock().unwrap();
let bucket = kp.entry(room_topic).or_default();
let is_new_id = !bucket.contains_key(&peer_id);
if admit_retained(bucket.len(), is_new_id, MAX_RETAINED_PEERS) {
bucket.insert(peer_id, state.addr.clone());
} else {
crate::log_msg(&format!(
"Retain table full ({MAX_RETAINED_PEERS}); not retaining new peer {peer_id:?} for rejoin"
));
}
}
// If a multitrack recording is live, give this peer
// its own stem track (silence-padded back to t=0).
if is_multitrack_events.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
@@ -1955,13 +2007,21 @@ async fn run_core_loop(
.await;
}
// Refresh this room's retained rejoin target with the
// fresh addr (A8).
known_peers_events
.lock()
.unwrap()
.entry(room_topic)
.or_default()
.insert(peer_id, state.addr.clone());
// fresh addr (A8), under the per-topic retain cap. A
// re-announce from a peer we already track always
// refreshes; a new identity is bounded by the cap.
{
let mut kp = known_peers_events.lock().unwrap();
let bucket = kp.entry(room_topic).or_default();
let is_new_id = !bucket.contains_key(&peer_id);
if admit_retained(bucket.len(), is_new_id, MAX_RETAINED_PEERS) {
bucket.insert(peer_id, state.addr.clone());
} else {
crate::log_msg(&format!(
"Retain table full ({MAX_RETAINED_PEERS}); not retaining new peer {peer_id:?} for rejoin"
));
}
}
let _ = ui_tx_events.send(UiEvent::PeerUpdated { id: peer_id, state }).await;
}
RoomEvent::ChatMessage { from, name, text, ts: _, attachment } => {
@@ -2079,6 +2139,7 @@ async fn run_core_loop(
event_task,
conn_event_task,
recovery_task,
recovery_terminal_task,
grace_timers,
transport: transport.clone(),
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
@@ -2665,11 +2726,26 @@ async fn run_core_loop(
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{
apply_volume, audio_datagram_len_ok, frame_level, mix_frames, mix_stereo_frames,
next_game_change, should_auto_fetch, stereo_to_mono, KnownPeers, MicLevelMeter,
PeerSpeakTicket, MAX_OPUS_PAYLOAD, MIC_LEVEL_REPORT_SAMPLES,
admit_retained, apply_volume, audio_datagram_len_ok, frame_level, mix_frames,
mix_stereo_frames, next_game_change, should_auto_fetch, stereo_to_mono, KnownPeers,
MicLevelMeter, PeerSpeakTicket, MAX_OPUS_PAYLOAD, MAX_RETAINED_PEERS,
MIC_LEVEL_REPORT_SAMPLES,
};
#[test]
fn admit_retained_rejects_only_new_ids_at_the_cap() {
// Below the cap, a brand-new identity is retained.
assert!(admit_retained(0, true, MAX_RETAINED_PEERS));
assert!(admit_retained(MAX_RETAINED_PEERS - 1, true, MAX_RETAINED_PEERS));
// At the cap, a brand-new identity is refused — this is the bound that stops
// an insider grace-cycling distinct identities from growing the retain table.
assert!(!admit_retained(MAX_RETAINED_PEERS, true, MAX_RETAINED_PEERS));
// A peer already tracked always refreshes, even at (or past) the cap: it only
// updates an existing address and never adds a slot.
assert!(admit_retained(MAX_RETAINED_PEERS, false, MAX_RETAINED_PEERS));
assert!(admit_retained(MAX_RETAINED_PEERS + 5, false, MAX_RETAINED_PEERS));
}
#[test]
fn auto_fetch_only_for_roster_images_not_already_inflight() {
// The happy path: a roster author's brand-new image attachment.
+68 -8
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,27 @@ fn recovery_delay(attempt: usize) -> Duration {
RECOVERY_DELAYS[attempt.min(RECOVERY_DELAYS.len() - 1)]
}
/// Terminal retry budget for background recovery. After this many failed attempts
/// the coordinator gives up: it drops the entry, frees the active slot, and signals
/// the event task to forget the retained address (Tier C recovery-identity cap).
///
/// With the [`RECOVERY_DELAYS`] backoff this is roughly seven minutes of dialing
/// (1+2+4+8+15+30+60s, then 60s steps), far beyond any normal transient outage. A
/// genuine peer returning after a longer outage still rejoins on its own via a
/// gossip announce, so giving up only stops us from dialing a peer that is not
/// coming back — it does not break legitimate reconnect-after-outage.
const RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS: usize = 12;
/// Capacity of the terminal-eviction notification channel. Bounded; on the rare
/// event of saturation the entry is still removed (the dial work stops) and only
/// the retained-address forget is skipped, which the per-topic retain cap bounds.
const RECOVERY_TERMINAL_CAPACITY: usize = 64;
/// Whether `attempt` completed recoveries have exhausted the terminal budget.
fn recovery_is_terminal(attempt: usize, max_attempts: usize) -> bool {
attempt >= max_attempts
}
enum RecoveryCommand {
Start {
peer_id: EndpointId,
@@ -60,19 +81,24 @@ pub(super) struct RecoveryCoordinator {
}
impl RecoveryCoordinator {
pub(super) fn spawn(room_state: Arc<IrohGossipState>) -> (Self, JoinHandle<()>) {
pub(super) fn spawn(
room_state: Arc<IrohGossipState>,
) -> (Self, JoinHandle<()>, mpsc::Receiver<EndpointId>) {
Self::spawn_inner(room_state)
}
fn spawn_inner(room_state: Arc<dyn RecoveryRoom>) -> (Self, JoinHandle<()>) {
fn spawn_inner(
room_state: Arc<dyn RecoveryRoom>,
) -> (Self, JoinHandle<()>, mpsc::Receiver<EndpointId>) {
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(RECOVERY_COMMAND_CAPACITY);
let (terminal_tx, terminal_rx) = mpsc::channel(RECOVERY_TERMINAL_CAPACITY);
let active = Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashSet::new()));
let handle = Self {
tx,
active: active.clone(),
};
let task = tokio::spawn(run_coordinator(room_state, active, rx));
(handle, task)
let task = tokio::spawn(run_coordinator(room_state, active, rx, terminal_tx));
(handle, task, terminal_rx)
}
/// Reserve one recovery slot before grace-expiry teardown begins. Returns
@@ -116,6 +142,7 @@ async fn run_coordinator(
room_state: Arc<dyn RecoveryRoom>,
active: Arc<Mutex<HashSet<EndpointId>>>,
mut rx: mpsc::Receiver<RecoveryCommand>,
terminal_tx: mpsc::Sender<EndpointId>,
) {
let mut entries: HashMap<EndpointId, RecoveryEntry> = HashMap::new();
@@ -155,9 +182,24 @@ async fn run_coordinator(
entries.remove(&peer_id);
continue;
}
if let Some(entry) = entries.get_mut(&peer_id) {
// Advance the backoff, then check the terminal budget.
// `attempt` counts completed attempts, so the delay
// uses the current value before it is incremented.
let terminal = if let Some(entry) = entries.get_mut(&peer_id) {
entry.next_attempt = scheduled_at + recovery_delay(entry.attempt);
entry.attempt = entry.attempt.saturating_add(1);
recovery_is_terminal(entry.attempt, RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS)
} else {
false
};
if terminal {
// Give up on a peer that has not returned within the
// budget: drop its entry, free the active slot, and
// signal the event task to forget its retained
// address so the per-topic retain table drains.
entries.remove(&peer_id);
active.lock().unwrap().remove(&peer_id);
let _ = terminal_tx.try_send(peer_id);
}
}
}
@@ -210,6 +252,23 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(actual, vec![1, 2, 4, 8, 15, 30, 60, 60, 60, 60]);
}
#[test]
fn recovery_budget_is_terminal_only_at_or_past_the_cap() {
assert!(!recovery_is_terminal(0, RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS));
assert!(!recovery_is_terminal(
RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS - 1,
RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS
));
assert!(recovery_is_terminal(
RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS,
RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS
));
assert!(recovery_is_terminal(
RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS + 5,
RECOVERY_TERMINAL_ATTEMPTS
));
}
#[test]
fn recovery_slots_are_deduplicated_and_cancel_immediately() {
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel(4);
@@ -244,9 +303,10 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn coordinator_attempts_rebootstrap_immediately() {
let (attempts_tx, mut attempts_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (coordinator, task) = RecoveryCoordinator::spawn_inner(Arc::new(RecordingRoom {
attempts: attempts_tx,
}));
let (coordinator, task, _terminal_rx) =
RecoveryCoordinator::spawn_inner(Arc::new(RecordingRoom {
attempts: attempts_tx,
}));
let peer_id = SecretKey::generate().public();
let addr = EndpointAddr::from(peer_id);