Files
pixelpass/src/host/aec/mod.rs
T
molluskandClaude Opus 4.8 4a844ac6fa host/aec: address Codex phase-4 review (no merge-blockers; docs + test holes)
Codex adversarial review found no merge-blocking defects. Five
worth-checking items, all triaged for reachability:

- F1 (spurious pre-ready revoke): unreachable — the AEC's four nodes are
  two Stream/* legs + a null-sink-like virtual sink/source, none claiming
  a device.id, so the phase-3 observer never withholds them; index_present
  goes false only on a genuine full unload. Documented why revoke is NOT
  gated on graph_ready, and why gating it would reopen the reused-index
  alias trap (F4) during a hot-reload-under-churn. Pinned with
  revokes_on_empty_even_while_not_ready (mutation-verified: `&& graph_ready`
  on the revoke guard dies here).
- F4 (test relies on observing the empty gap): documented the phase-5/6
  integration contract it rests on (one observe per graph event, no
  coalescing across a module lifetime boundary) and owed the robust fix
  (serial-continuity / observer-generation) to a later hardening round.
- F2 (late positive evidence beats the deadline): intentional and correct
  — a demonstrably-present identity is ground truth. Documented +
  late_positive_evidence_wins_over_expired_deadline (both arms: node-first
  validates, Tick-first fails closed and stays sticky).
- F3 (real P3 coverage hole): strengthened deadline_is_not_armed_until_
  graph_ready to prove the budget starts at first-ready, not construction
  (mutation-verified: a construction-relative deadline now dies).
- F5 (`+7` grammar mismatch): documented the producer contract — peerspeak
  emits bare decimal (pactl returns unsigned decimal), the narrow parser
  is deliberate. Unreachable on the measured stack.

No core logic change. 24 pure aec tests, cargo test --bins green (145 unit
+ 1 ignored live), clippy -D warnings + fmt clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 15:07:01 -04:00

312 lines
16 KiB
Rust

//! Phase 4 — the AEC identity validation state machine (impl plan §4, design
//! v3.4 §5.2/§5.3).
//!
//! peerspeak's echo canceller (`module-echo-cancel`) creates four graph nodes
//! that all carry `pulse.module.id == <the index pactl returned>`, and the
//! playback leg among them is a `Stream/Output/Audio` node wired straight to
//! the speakers — a fan-out candidate that would copy the whole remote call
//! into the share unless it is excluded (v3.4 §5.2, measured ≈desktop level).
//! The taint engine (phase 2) already excludes it *given* the module index in
//! [`ExclusionCtx::aec_module_id`](crate::host::taint::ExclusionCtx); this
//! module is what decides, at runtime and fail-closed, whether that index may
//! be trusted and handed over.
//!
//! **Why a state machine and not a one-shot check (v3.4 §5.3).** The identity
//! is an *observed correlation on PipeWire 1.6.8*, not a documented contract,
//! and a start-time enumeration races in both directions: peerspeak's
//! `enable()` returns before the playback hazard leg is even in the graph, and
//! pixelpass's capture spawns lazily on the first viewer, at a moment peerspeak
//! does not control. So validation is a bounded epoch, and the identity can be
//! *lost* mid-share (the module unloads) as well as *gained*.
//!
//! **The two traps this is shaped around:**
//!
//! - **Revocation is loss of the whole module identity, not one leg corking**
//! (v3.4 §5.3). Each [`AecValidator::observe`] rescans the snapshot for *any*
//! node bearing the index; [`AecState::Validated`] drops to
//! [`AecState::Revoked`] only when that set becomes **empty**. A single leg
//! corking or relinking (still ≥1 present) stays `Validated` — getting this
//! wrong turns a normal cork into a spurious share-wide audio stop.
//! - **Module indices are reused verbatim across unload/reload** (v3.4 §5.2
//! correction 3 — both a reload's module index *and* its `node.link-group`
//! came back byte-identical, and node ids were recycled *and reassigned
//! across legs*). So [`AecState::Failed`] and [`AecState::Revoked`] are
//! **sticky terminal**: a later node reappearing with the same index does
//! **not** un-revoke and alias onto the new module. A genuine reload gets a
//! *fresh* [`AecValidator`] (peerspeak re-tells pixelpass the index on every
//! load), never a resurrected one.
//!
//! **Scope.** This is the validation state machine + `--aec` parsing only.
//! Foreign / second-AEC detection (a non-owned `echo-cancel-*` group, v3.4
//! §5.4 / D3) and the `foreign_aec_warning`/`aec_failed`/`aec_revoked` status
//! *events* are phase 6's, which reads this machine's [`AecState`]. Wiring the
//! parsed [`AecConfig`] out of the CLI and calling [`AecValidator::observe`]
//! in the recompute loop is integration (phases 5/8). The node-side
//! `pulse.module.id` parse (JSON-number-vs-string, u64-not-u32) is phase 3's
//! adapter; this module consumes the already-parsed
//! [`NodeProps::pulse_module_id`](crate::host::taint::snapshot::NodeProps).
#![allow(dead_code)] // Wired into `--aec` parsing + the recompute loop by later phases.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
use crate::host::observer::Millis;
use crate::host::taint::snapshot::GraphSnapshot;
/// The parsed `--aec=off|pulse-module:<idx>` argument (decision D5).
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AecConfig {
/// `--aec=off` — peerspeak's AEC is not in play, so there is nothing to
/// exclude and fan-out proceeds with no AEC identity. Not the same as an
/// *absent* argument (that default is the caller's; see [`parse_aec_arg`]).
Off,
/// `--aec=pulse-module:<idx>` — validate this live module index before
/// trusting it. The index is compared as `u64`, never `u32` (v3.4 §5.2).
PulseModule(u64),
}
/// Why an `--aec` argument was rejected. Rejection is fatal at the CLI edge —
/// there is no fail-closed *default* index, because a wrong index would exclude
/// the wrong node (or nothing), so a malformed value must not silently become
/// "no AEC".
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AecParseError {
/// The value was empty.
Empty,
/// Not `off` and not `pulse-module:...`.
UnknownForm,
/// `pulse-module:` with nothing after the colon.
MissingIndex,
/// The index was not a bare `u64` decimal (sign, whitespace, non-digit, or
/// `> u64::MAX`).
InvalidIndex,
}
/// Parse one `--aec` value. `off` and `pulse-module:<idx>` are the only forms.
///
/// The index accepts values `> u32::MAX` (v3.4 §5.2: `pulse.module.id` sits
/// next to the `object.serial` u32-truncation bug, so it is only ever compared
/// as `u64`) and requires a **bare decimal** — stricter than Rust's [`u64`]
/// parser, which also accepts a leading `+`. Rejected: any sign, surrounding or
/// interior whitespace, non-decimal digits, and overflow. Matching is exact and
/// case-sensitive: the argument is machine-generated by peerspeak from
/// `EchoCancelGuard::module_index`, not typed by a user.
///
/// ⚠️ **Producer contract** (Codex phase-4 review, finding 5): because the
/// grammar is narrower than Rust's parser, peerspeak must emit a bare decimal.
/// `pactl load-module` returns an unsigned decimal, so the stored index is
/// already canonical and no reachable value is rejected; if peerspeak ever
/// changes how it formats the index it must canonicalize (`value.to_string()`),
/// not widen this parser — the narrow grammar is the point.
pub fn parse_aec_arg(value: &str) -> Result<AecConfig, AecParseError> {
if value.is_empty() {
return Err(AecParseError::Empty);
}
if value == "off" {
return Ok(AecConfig::Off);
}
if let Some(index) = value.strip_prefix("pulse-module:") {
if index.is_empty() {
return Err(AecParseError::MissingIndex);
}
// A bare decimal only: reject a leading sign (Rust's `u64` parser
// accepts `+7`), interior/surrounding whitespace, and any non-digit,
// before letting the parser catch overflow. Leading zeros are harmless.
if !index.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) {
return Err(AecParseError::InvalidIndex);
}
return index
.parse::<u64>()
.map(AecConfig::PulseModule)
.map_err(|_| AecParseError::InvalidIndex);
}
Err(AecParseError::UnknownForm)
}
/// The validation epoch (v3.4 §5.3, verbatim).
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AecState {
/// `--aec=off` — no AEC identity, fan-out proceeds with no exclusion.
/// Terminal.
NotConfigured,
/// Waiting for the first node bearing the index. **No fan-out occurs here**
/// — silence is the safe direction. Ends at `Validated` on first sight, or
/// `Failed` once the graph is fully enumerated and the bounded deadline
/// passes with the index never seen.
Validating,
/// The index was observed live. Fan-out is permitted, excluding that
/// identity transitively (phase 2 / v3.4 §6.1).
Validated,
/// The deadline expired with the index never observed. **Fail closed** — no
/// fan-out; the caller reports a capability failure rather than sharing.
/// Sticky terminal.
Failed,
/// The whole module identity disappeared mid-share (every node bearing the
/// index gone). **Stop fan-out now** and drop the owned link proxies; do
/// not keep the numeric index and hope, because it is reused. Sticky
/// terminal — see the module header's second trap.
Revoked,
}
/// The bounded, read-only AEC identity validator. Fold the live graph in with
/// [`AecValidator::observe`] once per recompute; read the result with
/// [`AecValidator::state`], [`AecValidator::fan_out_permitted`], and
/// [`AecValidator::validated_module_id`].
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AecValidator {
/// The index to validate. `None` iff [`AecConfig::Off`] (state stays
/// [`AecState::NotConfigured`] forever).
target: Option<u64>,
state: AecState,
/// The `Validating → Failed` budget, applied *after* the deadline is armed.
timeout: Millis,
/// The absolute `Failed` deadline, armed the first time the graph reports
/// ready (the "registry sync barrier" of v3.4 §5.3) and never re-armed —
/// `graph_ready` is dynamic and can flap, but the epoch budget must not
/// restart. `None` until then: while the initial enumeration is still in
/// flight, a not-yet-seen index is *unknown*, not *absent*, so it must not
/// time out to `Failed`.
deadline: Option<Millis>,
}
impl AecValidator {
/// `timeout` is the `Validating → Failed` budget, counted from the moment
/// the graph first becomes ready (not from construction). An `Off` config
/// starts (and stays) [`AecState::NotConfigured`].
pub fn new(config: AecConfig, timeout: Millis) -> Self {
match config {
AecConfig::Off => Self {
target: None,
state: AecState::NotConfigured,
timeout,
deadline: None,
},
AecConfig::PulseModule(index) => Self {
target: Some(index),
state: AecState::Validating,
timeout,
deadline: None,
},
}
}
pub fn state(&self) -> AecState {
self.state
}
/// The validated index to place in
/// [`ExclusionCtx::aec_module_id`](crate::host::taint::ExclusionCtx) —
/// `Some` **only** in [`AecState::Validated`]. `None` everywhere else,
/// including `NotConfigured` (no AEC ⇒ nothing to exclude) and the
/// fail-closed states (whose `None` must be paired with
/// [`Self::fan_out_permitted`] `== false`, i.e. no fan-out at all — *not*
/// a fan-out that merely skips AEC exclusion).
pub fn validated_module_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
match self.state {
AecState::Validated => self.target,
_ => None,
}
}
/// Whether fan-out may proceed at all right now. True only in
/// [`AecState::NotConfigured`] (fan out, no exclusion) and
/// [`AecState::Validated`] (fan out, excluding the identity). `Validating`,
/// `Failed` and `Revoked` all forbid it — silence over echo.
pub fn fan_out_permitted(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self.state, AecState::NotConfigured | AecState::Validated)
}
/// Fold one recompute's view of the graph into the machine.
///
/// `graph_ready` is the observer's dynamic readiness
/// ([`Projection::graph_ready`](crate::host::observer::Projection)); `now`
/// is a monotonic millisecond clock. Positive evidence (a node bearing the
/// index) is authoritative and validates regardless of `graph_ready` —
/// seeing the node *is* seeing it — but the `Failed` deadline only begins
/// once `graph_ready` has first become true, so a slow initial enumeration
/// can never masquerade as a genuinely-absent module.
pub fn observe(&mut self, snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, graph_ready: bool, now: Millis) {
// `Off` (NotConfigured) and both sticky terminals are no-ops: there is
// nothing to look for, and a reappearing reused index must not revive a
// Failed/Revoked epoch (v3.4 §5.2 correction 3).
let Some(target) = self.target else {
return;
};
match self.state {
AecState::Validating => {
// Presence is checked *before* the deadline on purpose: a
// demonstrably-present identity validates regardless of the
// clock, even if the node is first seen just past the deadline
// (Codex phase-4 review, finding 2). The deadline only bounds
// the wait for an identity that is never seen — seeing it, late
// or not, is ground truth that the module exists, and excluding
// a real echo leg is always the safe answer. (A `Failed` can
// still pre-empt this when a `Tick`-only observation crosses the
// deadline first; that only makes the machine *more* fail-closed,
// never less.)
if self.index_present(snapshot, target) {
self.state = AecState::Validated;
return;
}
// Arm the deadline once, on the first ready graph.
if self.deadline.is_none() && graph_ready {
self.deadline = Some(now.saturating_add(self.timeout));
}
if self.deadline.is_some_and(|deadline| now >= deadline) {
self.state = AecState::Failed;
}
}
AecState::Validated => {
// Revocation is the whole identity gone (no node bears the
// index), not one leg corking — see the module header.
//
// ⚠️ **Deliberately NOT gated on `graph_ready`** (Codex
// phase-4 review, findings 1 + 4). Two forces pull opposite
// ways and this is the resolution:
//
// - Gating revoke on readiness would avoid a *spurious* revoke
// from a transient empty snapshot seen while the module is
// still live. But for the AEC that transient does not exist:
// its four nodes are two `Stream/*` legs plus a null-sink-like
// virtual sink/source, none of which claim a `device.id`, so
// the phase-3 observer never *withholds* them
// (`observer::classify` withholds only device-claiming nodes).
// `index_present` therefore goes false only on a genuine
// `global_remove` of every leg — a real unload — and a real
// unload *should* revoke.
// - Worse, gating on readiness would REOPEN the reused-index
// alias trap: if an unload+reload (indices recycle, §5.2
// correction 3) both complete inside one not-ready churn
// window, the ready snapshot would already show the *new*
// module's node and we would never observe the empty gap —
// silently aliasing onto an unrelated module. Revoking the
// instant the gap appears, ready or not, is what closes it.
//
// This correctness rests on the phase-5/6 integration contract:
// **one `observe` per graph event, no coalescing across a module
// lifetime boundary.** Under coalescing, the empty gap between an
// old unload and a reused-index reload can be skipped. The
// robust fix that would not depend on that contract is a
// serial-continuity / observer-generation signal (the AEC nodes'
// `object.serial`s are fresh across a reload even when the index
// is not) — owed to a later hardening round, not built here.
if !self.index_present(snapshot, target) {
self.state = AecState::Revoked;
}
}
AecState::NotConfigured | AecState::Failed | AecState::Revoked => {}
}
}
/// Whether any node in the snapshot bears the target module index. The same
/// exact-`u64`-equality predicate the taint engine roots on
/// (`taint/mod.rs`), kept here so "is the identity live?" has one
/// definition.
fn index_present(&self, snapshot: &GraphSnapshot, target: u64) -> bool {
snapshot
.nodes()
.any(|node| node.props.pulse_module_id == Some(target))
}
}