chat: attachment cache, download, and transfer hardening (Phase 3)

Phase 3 of docs/chat-hardening-plan.md — attachments can no longer turn
into unbounded memory, bandwidth, decoder, or task pressure (S15 closed;
S14's filename half closed).

Cache and image cost (3A): AttachmentCache now carries encoded- and
decoded-byte budgets (96 MiB / 64 MiB) on top of the count cap, with
per-entry weights, replacement accounting, and oldest-first eviction; an
individually over-budget fetch services any pending Save/Play from the
bytes in hand and is exposed as Evicted instead of retained.
validate_image_bytes prechecks header dimensions (per-side AND a new
14 MP total-pixel limit) before any decode; the renderer only ever
receives a ≤1600 px downscaled RGBA preview whose w*h*4 cost counts
against the decoded budget — originals stay encoded-only for Save.
sanitize_filename strips the bidi/zero-width spoofing set (RTL-override
extension spoof).

Download policy and state (3B): images auto-fetch only when roster-
authored AND declared ≤4 MiB, gated by a new deterministic
AutoFetchBudget (per-author and session request+byte token buckets,
check-then-take, bounded author map) alongside the existing dedup and
four-permit bound. Attachment state is now explicit — absence/Loading/
Ready/Failed/Evicted — driven by a new AttachmentFetchStarted event, so
skipped or evicted images render a "Load image" button instead of an
indefinite "loading…", and repeated clicks can never spawn duplicate
fetch tasks.

Exact transfers and serve store (3C): fetch_blob requires the received
length to equal the declared size (short = local error, overlong =
bounded-read reject, empty keeps meaning "sender no longer has it");
the file picker's unbounded read is replaced by a metadata-prechecked
cap+1 bounded reader; one Arc<Vec<u8>> now backs the UI cache, command
queue, and serve store; served_files is a count- and byte-budgeted FIFO
ServeStore (16 entries / 128 MiB).

37 new tests (568 lib total) including a real two-endpoint loopback
exercising exact/short/overlong/unknown-id transfers. Plan checkboxes
ticked and constant deviations decision-logged. Tests-green-only: the
plan's two-machine field-test section remains open.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/files.rs

@@ -22,6 +22,22 @@ pub const MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES: u64 = 25 * 1024 * 1024;
 /// the byte cap. Applied via `image::Limits` when validating/decoding.
 pub const MAX_IMAGE_PX: u32 = 4096;
 
+/// Max total decoded pixels, applied on top of the per-side [`MAX_IMAGE_PX`]
+/// limit. The per-side cap alone still admits a 4096×4096 ≈ 16.8 MP bitmap
+/// (~64 MiB transient RGBA); this bounds the worst-case decode allocation while
+/// still clearing common 12 MP phone photos (4032×3024 ≈ 12.2 MP).
+pub const MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_PIXELS: u64 = 14_000_000;
+
+/// Max pixels per side of the downscaled inline preview handed to the renderer.
+/// Original bytes are kept only for Save; the chat column never needs more than
+/// this (it displays at ~260 px, and the lightbox at window size).
+pub const IMAGE_PREVIEW_MAX_SIDE: u32 = 1600;
+
+/// Largest declared size an image attachment may auto-fetch at. Anything larger
+/// (or any skipped/evicted image) renders a "Load image" button instead; a
+/// manual click may use the full [`MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES`] cap.
+pub const MAX_AUTO_IMAGE_BYTES: u64 = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+
 /// Longest filename we keep and display. Keeps the gossip descriptor compact and
 /// the UI tidy; the real bytes are unaffected.
 pub const MAX_FILENAME_LEN: usize = 96;
@@ -75,8 +91,14 @@ pub fn sanitize_filename(raw: &str) -> String {
         .unwrap_or("")
         .trim();
 
-    // Drop control chars; turn other whitespace into single spaces later.
-    let cleaned: String = base.chars().filter(|c| !c.is_control()).collect();
+    // Drop control chars and the same bidi/zero-width spoofing format chars
+    // stripped from display names (a U+202E override can visually reverse an
+    // extension, e.g. "photo\u{202E}gnp.exe" renders as "photoexe.png").
+    // Ordinary non-ASCII filenames pass through untouched.
+    let cleaned: String = base
+        .chars()
+        .filter(|c| !c.is_control() && !crate::sanitize::is_spoofing_format_char(*c))
+        .collect();
     let collapsed = cleaned.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>().join(" ");
     let collapsed = collapsed.trim_matches('.').trim();
 
@@ -164,20 +186,185 @@ pub fn classify(bytes: &[u8]) -> AttachmentKind {
 /// regardless of [`MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES`]. Only PNG/JPEG are buildable in our
 /// `image` feature set; anything else returns `None` and the caller shows a chip.
 pub fn validate_image_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<(u32, u32)> {
-    let mut limits = image::Limits::default();
-    limits.max_image_width = Some(MAX_IMAGE_PX);
-    limits.max_image_height = Some(MAX_IMAGE_PX);
+    let img = decode_image_bounded(bytes)?;
+    Some((img.width(), img.height()))
+}
+
+/// Shared bounded decode: header-check the dimensions (per-side AND total-pixel
+/// limits) BEFORE decoding, then decode under `image::Limits` as defense in
+/// depth. The precheck reads only the container header, so an over-limit bomb is
+/// rejected without paying its decode cost.
+fn decode_image_bounded(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<image::DynamicImage> {
     let reader = image::ImageReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(bytes))
         .with_guessed_format()
         .ok()?;
-    let mut reader = reader;
-    reader.limits(limits);
-    let img = reader.decode().ok()?;
-    let (w, h) = (img.width(), img.height());
+    let (w, h) = reader.into_dimensions().ok()?;
     if w == 0 || h == 0 || w > MAX_IMAGE_PX || h > MAX_IMAGE_PX {
         return None;
     }
-    Some((w, h))
+    if u64::from(w) * u64::from(h) > MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_PIXELS {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut limits = image::Limits::default();
+    limits.max_image_width = Some(MAX_IMAGE_PX);
+    limits.max_image_height = Some(MAX_IMAGE_PX);
+    let mut reader = image::ImageReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(bytes))
+        .with_guessed_format()
+        .ok()?;
+    reader.limits(limits);
+    let img = reader.decode().ok()?;
+    // Decoded size must match the header the precheck approved.
+    if img.width() != w || img.height() != h {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(img)
+}
+
+/// A decoded, display-ready inline preview: RGBA pixels downscaled so neither
+/// side exceeds [`IMAGE_PREVIEW_MAX_SIDE`]. `rgba.len() == width * height * 4`,
+/// which is also the preview's decoded-budget weight in the attachment cache.
+pub struct ImagePreview {
+    pub width: u32,
+    pub height: u32,
+    pub rgba: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+/// Decode image bytes under the same limits as [`validate_image_bytes`] and
+/// build the downscaled inline preview. The full-resolution bitmap exists only
+/// transiently here; the renderer is never handed more than
+/// [`IMAGE_PREVIEW_MAX_SIDE`]² pixels. Returns `None` for anything that fails
+/// validation (caller falls back to a chip / failure row).
+pub fn decode_preview(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<ImagePreview> {
+    let img = decode_image_bounded(bytes)?;
+    let img = if img.width() > IMAGE_PREVIEW_MAX_SIDE || img.height() > IMAGE_PREVIEW_MAX_SIDE {
+        // `thumbnail` preserves aspect ratio within the bounding box.
+        img.thumbnail(IMAGE_PREVIEW_MAX_SIDE, IMAGE_PREVIEW_MAX_SIDE)
+    } else {
+        img
+    };
+    let rgba = img.into_rgba8();
+    let (width, height) = (rgba.width(), rgba.height());
+    Some(ImagePreview {
+        width,
+        height,
+        rgba: rgba.into_raw(),
+    })
+}
+
+/// Estimated decoded RGBA cost of a preview, the weight counted against the
+/// attachment cache's decoded-byte budget (`width * height * 4`).
+pub fn preview_rgba_cost(width: u32, height: u32) -> usize {
+    (width as usize)
+        .saturating_mul(height as usize)
+        .saturating_mul(4)
+}
+
+/// Read at most [`MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES`] bytes from `r`. Returns `Ok(None)` if
+/// the source holds even one byte more (detected by reading cap + 1), so a huge
+/// or unbounded source is never fully buffered. Pure over `Read` for tests; the
+/// picker wraps it via [`read_file_capped`].
+pub fn read_capped<R: std::io::Read>(r: R) -> std::io::Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
+    use std::io::Read as _;
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    let mut limited = r.take(MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES + 1);
+    limited.read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
+    if buf.len() as u64 > MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    Ok(Some(buf))
+}
+
+/// Read a picked file, bounded by [`MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES`]. Checks metadata
+/// first to reject an obviously-oversized file without opening it, but keeps the
+/// bounded read regardless — metadata can race (the file can grow after the
+/// check) or be unavailable through a portal. `Ok(None)` = over the cap.
+pub fn read_file_capped(path: &std::path::Path) -> std::io::Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
+    if let Ok(meta) = std::fs::metadata(path)
+        && meta.len() > MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES
+    {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    read_capped(std::fs::File::open(path)?)
+}
+
+/// Cap on how many blobs the session serve store retains at once (sent chat
+/// attachments plus the current/next broadcast music tracks).
+pub const SERVED_FILES_MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 16;
+
+/// Byte budget for the serve store. Without it, a sender's own session could
+/// grow unbounded at up to [`MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES`] per send (Phase 3C).
+pub const SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES: usize = 128 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/// Count- and byte-budgeted FIFO store of blobs we serve to room members over
+/// the file plane. Evicting an id makes a later request for it read as an empty
+/// body — the existing "sender no longer has the file" response — never stale
+/// or aliased bytes. Pure (no locks/IO) so budgets are unit-testable; the
+/// transport wraps it in its own mutex.
+#[derive(Debug, Default)]
+pub struct ServeStore {
+    entries: std::collections::HashMap<AttachmentId, std::sync::Arc<Vec<u8>>>,
+    /// Present ids in insertion order; the front is the eviction candidate.
+    order: std::collections::VecDeque<AttachmentId>,
+    total_bytes: usize,
+}
+
+impl ServeStore {
+    /// Insert or replace a blob, evicting oldest entries until the count and
+    /// byte budgets fit. Replacement keeps the id's age and subtracts the old
+    /// bytes before the new ones are counted. Returns `false` for a blob that
+    /// alone exceeds the byte budget (not stored; an existing entry under the
+    /// id is dropped rather than left stale).
+    pub fn insert(&mut self, id: AttachmentId, bytes: std::sync::Arc<Vec<u8>>) -> bool {
+        if let Some(old) = self.entries.get(&id) {
+            self.total_bytes -= old.len();
+        }
+        if bytes.len() > SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES {
+            if self.entries.remove(&id).is_some() {
+                self.order.retain(|k| k != &id);
+            }
+            return false;
+        }
+        let replacing = self.entries.contains_key(&id);
+        loop {
+            let count_full = !replacing && self.entries.len() >= SERVED_FILES_MAX_ENTRIES;
+            let bytes_full = self.total_bytes + bytes.len() > SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES;
+            if !count_full && !bytes_full {
+                break;
+            }
+            let Some(victim) = self.order.iter().find(|k| **k != id).copied() else {
+                break;
+            };
+            self.remove(&victim);
+        }
+        if !replacing {
+            self.order.push_back(id);
+        }
+        self.total_bytes += bytes.len();
+        self.entries.insert(id, bytes);
+        true
+    }
+
+    pub fn get(&self, id: &AttachmentId) -> Option<std::sync::Arc<Vec<u8>>> {
+        self.entries.get(id).cloned()
+    }
+
+    pub fn remove(&mut self, id: &AttachmentId) {
+        if let Some(old) = self.entries.remove(id) {
+            self.total_bytes -= old.len();
+            self.order.retain(|k| k != id);
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn clear(&mut self) {
+        self.entries.clear();
+        self.order.clear();
+        self.total_bytes = 0;
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    fn len(&self) -> usize {
+        self.entries.len()
+    }
 }
 
 /// Parse a file-plane request: it must be exactly one [`AttachmentId`] (32
@@ -352,6 +539,87 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(validate_image_bytes(&buf.into_inner()), Some((4, 3)));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_strips_bidi_and_zero_width_spoofing_chars() {
+        // U+202E would visually reverse the tail, disguising the extension.
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("photo\u{202E}gnp.exe"), "photognp.exe");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("a\u{200B}b\u{FEFF}.txt"), "ab.txt");
+        // Ordinary Unicode filenames pass through.
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("família_fotos.png"), "família_fotos.png");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("日本語.pdf"), "日本語.pdf");
+    }
+
+    /// Encode a solid PNG of the given dimensions for limit tests.
+    fn png_bytes(w: u32, h: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let img = image::RgbImage::from_pixel(w, h, image::Rgb([10, 20, 30]));
+        let mut buf = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::new());
+        image::DynamicImage::ImageRgb8(img)
+            .write_to(&mut buf, image::ImageFormat::Png)
+            .unwrap();
+        buf.into_inner()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_image_rejects_excessive_total_pixels() {
+        // Both sides within MAX_IMAGE_PX, but 4096 * 4096 > MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_PIXELS.
+        assert!(u64::from(MAX_IMAGE_PX) * u64::from(MAX_IMAGE_PX) > MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_PIXELS);
+        assert_eq!(validate_image_bytes(&png_bytes(4096, 4096)), None);
+        // A 12 MP phone-photo shape passes both limits.
+        assert_eq!(
+            validate_image_bytes(&png_bytes(4032, 3024)),
+            Some((4032, 3024))
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn preview_downscales_to_max_side_preserving_aspect() {
+        // Wide: 3200x400 → 1600x200.
+        let p = decode_preview(&png_bytes(3200, 400)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((p.width, p.height), (1600, 200));
+        assert_eq!(p.rgba.len(), preview_rgba_cost(1600, 200));
+        // Tall: 400x3200 → 200x1600.
+        let p = decode_preview(&png_bytes(400, 3200)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((p.width, p.height), (200, 1600));
+        // Square over the side cap: 2000x2000 → 1600x1600.
+        let p = decode_preview(&png_bytes(2000, 2000)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((p.width, p.height), (1600, 1600));
+        // At/under the cap is untouched.
+        let p = decode_preview(&png_bytes(1600, 900)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((p.width, p.height), (1600, 900));
+        let p = decode_preview(&png_bytes(4, 3)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((p.width, p.height), (4, 3));
+        assert_eq!(p.rgba.len(), preview_rgba_cost(4, 3));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn preview_rejects_what_validation_rejects() {
+        assert!(decode_preview(b"not an image").is_none());
+        assert!(decode_preview(&png_bytes(4096, 4096)).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_capped_stops_at_cap_plus_one() {
+        // Under the cap: full read.
+        let small = vec![7u8; 1024];
+        assert_eq!(
+            read_capped(std::io::Cursor::new(&small))
+                .unwrap()
+                .as_deref(),
+            Some(&small[..])
+        );
+        // Exactly at the cap: accepted. `repeat` is endless, `take` proves the
+        // reader is bounded rather than draining the source.
+        let at_cap = std::io::Read::take(std::io::repeat(1), MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES);
+        let got = read_capped(at_cap).unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(got.len() as u64, MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES);
+        // One byte over: rejected, and only cap + 1 bytes were ever buffered
+        // (an unbounded source returns instead of allocating forever).
+        let over = std::io::Read::take(std::io::repeat(1), MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES + 1);
+        assert_eq!(read_capped(over).unwrap(), None);
+        let endless = std::io::repeat(1);
+        assert_eq!(read_capped(endless).unwrap(), None);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn human_size_units() {
         assert_eq!(human_size(40), "40 B");
@@ -359,6 +627,69 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(human_size(3 * 1024 * 1024 + 300 * 1024), "3.3 MB");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn serve_store_count_and_byte_eviction_fifo() {
+        use std::sync::Arc;
+        let mut s = ServeStore::default();
+        let blob = |n: u8, len: usize| ([n; 32], Arc::new(vec![n; len]));
+        // Count cap: entry 0 is evicted when the 17th arrives.
+        for n in 0..=SERVED_FILES_MAX_ENTRIES as u8 {
+            let (id, b) = blob(n, 8);
+            assert!(s.insert(id, b));
+        }
+        assert_eq!(s.len(), SERVED_FILES_MAX_ENTRIES);
+        assert!(s.get(&[0u8; 32]).is_none(), "oldest evicted by count");
+        assert!(s.get(&[1u8; 32]).is_some());
+        // Byte budget: two ~half-budget blobs evict everything older.
+        let half = SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES / 2;
+        let (a, ab) = blob(100, half);
+        let (b, bb) = blob(101, half);
+        assert!(s.insert(a, ab));
+        assert!(s.insert(b, bb));
+        assert!(s.get(&a).is_some());
+        assert!(s.get(&b).is_some());
+        assert!(s.get(&[1u8; 32]).is_none(), "evicted for byte budget");
+        // A third half-budget blob evicts `a` (oldest), keeps `b`.
+        let (c, cb) = blob(102, half);
+        assert!(s.insert(c, cb));
+        assert!(s.get(&a).is_none());
+        assert!(s.get(&b).is_some());
+        assert!(s.get(&c).is_some());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn serve_store_replacement_accounting_and_remove_clear() {
+        use std::sync::Arc;
+        let mut s = ServeStore::default();
+        let id = [9u8; 32];
+        assert!(s.insert(id, Arc::new(vec![1; SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES - 10])));
+        // Replacing the near-budget blob must subtract its old bytes first —
+        // otherwise this same-id replacement would evict itself.
+        assert!(s.insert(id, Arc::new(vec![2; SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES - 5])));
+        assert_eq!(s.get(&id).unwrap()[0], 2);
+        assert_eq!(s.len(), 1);
+        s.remove(&id);
+        assert!(s.get(&id).is_none());
+        // Removed bytes were released: the budget admits a full-size blob again.
+        assert!(s.insert(id, Arc::new(vec![3; SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES])));
+        s.clear();
+        assert_eq!(s.len(), 0);
+        assert!(s.insert(id, Arc::new(vec![4; SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES])));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn serve_store_rejects_individually_overweight_blob() {
+        use std::sync::Arc;
+        let mut s = ServeStore::default();
+        let id = [7u8; 32];
+        assert!(s.insert(id, Arc::new(vec![1; 8])));
+        assert!(!s.insert(id, Arc::new(vec![2; SERVED_FILES_MAX_BYTES + 1])));
+        // The stale small blob is gone too — a fetch reads "no longer has it",
+        // never old bytes under a replaced id.
+        assert!(s.get(&id).is_none());
+        assert_eq!(s.len(), 0);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn attachment_descriptor_round_trips_json() {
         let a = ChatAttachment {