Security hardening: log redaction + 5 trust-boundary fixes (S10, T1/T2/T5/T6/T7)

Codex (gpt-5.5) implementer branch, senior-reviewed.

- S10 (High): redact capabilities/chat from logs; create log 0600 + chmod
  existing; rotate at 5 MiB. New short_id/short_bytes_hex/redact_for_log seams.
- T1 (P2): friends-ALPN authorizes (handler(from)) before reading any peer
  bytes; unauthorized conns closed pre-read (DoS relief).
- T2 (P2): per-(author,kind) replay gate on state-changing gossip (Announce/
  Leave) only; Chat bypasses it, preserving the S2 no-monotonic-ts decision.
- T5 (P2): cap inbound Opus datagrams at 4 + MAX_OPUS_PAYLOAD (4000).
- T6 (P2): bind friend-Pong room ticket host to the authenticated responder
  (interpret_pong/probe now thread the remote id) — blocks Join-button
  redirect/phishing. Non-regressive given the W7 P3 restamp design.
- T7 (P3): sanitize_ticket caps/validates PeerState.sharing at gossip ingest
  so invalid offers never render a Watch button.

302 lib tests pass (was 291), clippy --all-targets clean, release builds.
Tests-green only; DoS relief + 2-machine replay/redirect behavior want a
field test. W7 P7 (n0 DNS privacy) reviewed read-only — findings to triage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/presence_net.rs

@@ -49,16 +49,17 @@ fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<ControlMsg> {
     serde_json::from_slice(bytes).context("failed to decode control message")
 }
 
-/// Probe `peer` for presence: send a `Ping`, return their `Pong`. An error means
-/// no usable reply (offline / unreachable / refused / malformed) — the caller
-/// treats that as "appears offline". `peer` is usually a bare [`EndpointId`]
-/// (friends store the stable id); a full [`EndpointAddr`] is also accepted (and
-/// used by hermetic tests).
-pub async fn probe(endpoint: &Endpoint, peer: impl Into<EndpointAddr>) -> Result<ControlMsg> {
+/// Probe `peer` for presence: send a `Ping`, return their authenticated id and
+/// `Pong`. An error means no usable reply (offline / unreachable / refused /
+/// malformed) — the caller treats that as "appears offline". `peer` is usually a
+/// bare [`EndpointId`] (friends store the stable id); a full [`EndpointAddr`] is
+/// also accepted (and used by hermetic tests).
+pub async fn probe(endpoint: &Endpoint, peer: impl Into<EndpointAddr>) -> Result<(EndpointId, ControlMsg)> {
     let conn = tokio::time::timeout(IO_TIMEOUT, endpoint.connect(peer, FRIENDS_ALPN))
         .await
         .context("timed out connecting to peer")?
         .context("failed to connect to peer")?;
+    let from = conn.remote_id();
 
     let io = async {
         let (mut send, mut recv) = conn.open_bi().await.context("failed to open control stream")?;
@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ pub async fn probe(endpoint: &Endpoint, peer: impl Into<EndpointAddr>) -> Result
         .await
         .context("timed out awaiting pong")?;
     conn.close(VarInt::from_u32(0), b"done");
-    result
+    result.map(|msg| (from, msg))
 }
 
 /// A reply policy: given the *authenticated* remote id, decide whether and how to
@@ -110,6 +111,10 @@ async fn handle(incoming: Incoming, handler: Handler) -> Result<()> {
 async fn exchange(conn: &iroh::endpoint::Connection, handler: &Handler) -> Result<()> {
     // The authenticated remote id — NOT anything the peer puts in the payload.
     let from = conn.remote_id();
+    let Some(reply) = handler(from) else {
+        conn.close(VarInt::from_u32(0), b"not authorized");
+        return Ok(());
+    };
 
     let io = async {
         let (mut send, mut recv) = conn.accept_bi().await.context("failed to accept stream")?;
@@ -118,13 +123,9 @@ async fn exchange(conn: &iroh::endpoint::Connection, handler: &Handler) -> Resul
             ControlMsg::Ping => {}
             other => bail!("expected a ping, got {other:?}"),
         }
-        // Ask the policy what to send. None -> answer nothing (stranger / invisible):
-        // finish the stream with no bytes so the prober sees an empty (unusable) reply.
-        if let Some(reply) = handler(from) {
-            send.write_all(&encode(&reply)?)
-                .await
-                .context("failed to write pong")?;
-        }
+        send.write_all(&encode(&reply)?)
+            .await
+            .context("failed to write pong")?;
         send.finish().context("failed to finish reply stream")?;
         Ok::<_, anyhow::Error>(())
     };
@@ -220,10 +221,11 @@ mod tests {
         let serve_task = tokio::spawn(async move { serve(server_ep, handler).await });
 
         // The allowed prober gets a Pong with the room.
-        let pong = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(15), probe(&prober, server_addr.clone()))
+        let (from, pong) = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(15), probe(&prober, server_addr.clone()))
             .await
             .expect("probe timed out")
             .expect("probe failed");
+        assert_eq!(from, server_addr.id);
         match pong {
             ControlMsg::Pong { room: Some(r) } => assert_eq!(r.name, "HangOut"),
             other => panic!("expected Pong with a room, got {other:?}"),