Add cargo-deny supply-chain policy (deny.toml)

Supersede bare cargo-audit with an enforceable four-part policy, validated
against the current tree with cargo-deny 0.19.9 (advisories/bans/licenses/
sources all pass):

- advisories: deny vulnerabilities + yanked; ignore the two *unmaintained*
  warnings (paste RUSTSEC-2024-0436, audiopus_sys RUSTSEC-2026-0150) with
  rationale. Both are transitive and pinned via Cargo.lock, so a future
  malicious release can't reach us until a deliberate cargo update.
- sources: trust only crates.io; deny unknown registries and git sources
  (core anti-hijack control).
- bans: deny wildcard version reqs; warn on duplicate versions.
- licenses: permissive allow-list covering the current graph.

Mark peerspeak publish = false (it's an application, not a published
library): blocks accidental cargo publish and lets [licenses.private]
skip the missing-license check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Cargo.toml

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 name = "peerspeak"
 version = "0.2.0"
 edition = "2024"
+# Application crate, not a crates.io library — refuse `cargo publish` and let
+# cargo-deny's [licenses.private] skip the missing-license check.
+publish = false
 
 [lib]
 name = "peerspeak"

deny.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+# cargo-deny policy for peerspeak
+#
+# Supersedes a bare `cargo audit` run. Enforce with:
+#     cargo install cargo-deny --locked
+#     cargo deny check
+#
+# In CI, run `cargo deny check` on a locked tree so the pinned, vetted
+# versions in Cargo.lock are what actually get audited.
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Advisories: RustSec database. Vulnerabilities and yanked crates are denied
+# by default. The two `ignore` entries below are *unmaintained* warnings only
+# (no known exploit); they are deep transitive deps we cannot remove. Pinning
+# them via Cargo.lock is our real protection — a future malicious release does
+# not reach us until we deliberately `cargo update`, so each update is a review
+# checkpoint. Revisit these if either advisory is upgraded to a vulnerability.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+[advisories]
+ignore = [
+    # paste: unmaintained, compile-time proc-macro only (zero runtime surface),
+    # transitive via iroh/netdev/netlink and rav1e/image/iced. Maintained fork
+    # `pastey` is already in the tree; stragglers will follow upstream.
+    "RUSTSEC-2024-0436",
+    # audiopus_sys: unmaintained FFI bindings to the stable libopus C library,
+    # pulled in via our direct `opus 0.3.1` dep. No drop-in replacement.
+    "RUSTSEC-2026-0150",
+]
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Bans: shape of the dependency graph.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+[bans]
+# Multiple versions of the same crate bloat the build; warn rather than fail
+# since transitive graphs (iroh, iced) routinely carry duplicates we can't fix.
+multiple-versions = "warn"
+# Wildcard ("*") version requirements are a supply-chain footgun: they accept
+# any future release, defeating the lockfile-as-review-checkpoint model.
+wildcards = "deny"
+# ...but our own intra-repo path deps may use "*"; don't penalize those.
+allow-wildcard-paths = true
+
+# Crates that may never appear in the graph. Add a maintained replacement's
+# predecessor here once you've migrated off it, to prevent regressions.
+deny = []
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Sources: where crates are allowed to come from. This is the core anti-hijack
+# control — only the official crates.io registry is trusted; arbitrary git
+# sources (a common vector for slipping in unaudited code) are rejected.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+[sources]
+unknown-registry = "deny"
+unknown-git = "deny"
+allow-registry = ["https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"]
+# allow-git = []   # add a specific, pinned git repo here only if ever needed
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Licenses: permissive set covering the current graph. If `cargo deny check`
+# reports an unmatched license, vet it and add the SPDX id here (or add a
+# per-crate entry under [licenses.exceptions]) rather than widening blindly.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+[licenses]
+allow = [
+    "MIT",
+    "Apache-2.0",
+    "Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
+    "BSD-2-Clause",
+    "BSD-3-Clause",
+    "ISC",
+    "Zlib",
+    "MPL-2.0",
+    "Unicode-3.0",
+    "Unicode-DFS-2016",
+    "CC0-1.0",
+    "0BSD",
+    "Unlicense",
+    "BSL-1.0",
+    "NCSA",                 # University of Illinois/NCSA — BSD-like permissive
+    "CDLA-Permissive-2.0",  # Community Data License Agreement, permissive
+]
+confidence-threshold = 0.8
+exceptions = []
+
+# peerspeak itself has no `license` field and is not published, so skip the
+# "unlicensed" check for our own (private) crate. Add a license to Cargo.toml
+# if/when this is ever published.
+[licenses.private]
+ignore = true